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Abstract 
The objective of this research project is to develop a preliminary examination of an heuristic 
process ontology derived from an east-west comparative methodology. It attempts to trace 
the similarities and discontinuities of an ontological perspective in Friedrich Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy and several different strands of thought in Warring States era Chinese 
philosophical thought, focusing on Daoism in particular. The project traces the conclusions 
of these comparisons from a basic theoretical ontology to a socio-practical consideration. It 
concludes that in theorizing process both perspectives do not rely on traditional dichotomies 
that are seen in Western philosophical thought, they see the world as non-deterministic and 
utilize correlative thinking. The research traces further considerations in the areas of 
epistemology and evaluation based on these points and concludes that there is no separation 
between epistemology-evaluation and the underlying ontology, they are direct continuations 
of ontology. As a last question of theory, this research examines the consequences of 
comparative process ontology for language, claiming that it allows us to undermine a 
subjective/objective dichotomy by naturalizing language. Lastly, the theoretical groundwork 
of this project is applied to a number of extant philosophical issues. It attempts to resolve the 
dichotomy of reality and appearance as a metaphysical issue, and offers an account of how 
socio-political and economic issues can be theorized according to such an ontology. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is an attempt to set the ground for work in what I call 
‗comparative process ontology‘, and I will begin by explaining what each of these 
terms mean. Starting with the last term, ‗ontology‘, what is meant is the very broad 
sense of the term as the study of what there is, or the general features of what there 
is. This is a contentious term to use in a project dealing with ancient Chinese 
philosophy (Daoism specifically), and as such I must qualify it further. In all cases, 
unless stated otherwise, I mean the term ‗ontology‘ to be convey elements of the 
terms ‗world-view‘ and ‗cosmology‘. The reason that I have refrained from 
substituting in ‗world-view‘ alone for ontology is that it fails to capture the specific 
focus of ontology on the fundamental features of the world, and it is too general. 
Likewise, ‗cosmology‘ would have been much more applicable in the case of ancient 
Chinese philosophy (and I do refer to cosmology as such in some relevant sections). 
Again, however, cosmology fails to perfectly mesh with the concerns of ontology. 
Cosmology is typically understood as the study of the physical universe and has in 
the past 100 years been more and more considered co-terminus with physics and 
astronomy. Hence, for lack of a more suitable term, I will use ‗ontology‘ for the 
duration of this thesis with the caveat that it does not refer to a strict discipline, it 
rather refers to those general, fundamental features that underlie a world-view, which 
may sometimes, and other times may not, be co-terminus with physics and 
astronomy
1
. This thesis thus deals with explicating the general, fundamental features 
of a world-view (namely, that contained within Nietzsche‘s philosophy and 
supplemented with elements of process thought in Daoism).  
What are these features, and in what way will they be explicated? This is a 
thesis that is couched in the methodology of process philosophy. Process philosophy 
is based on the premise that the nature of the world is change, and that such a 
dynamic nature of being should be the primary focus of any comprehensive 
philosophical account of reality. Process philosophy opposes substance metaphysics, 
which is the dominant research paradigm in the history of western philosophy since 
                                                          
1
 Even so, it might be claimed that usage of the term ‗ontology‘, with its own history and cultural 
basis, is a fundamentally Western term that is erroneously applied in this instance. I would hold that 
the term as I use it is general enough to be used, and I further address the Western basis of this work 
in a following section. 
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Aristotle. The substance-metaphysical view of the world is that the basic, primary 
units reality should be thought of as simple and unchangeable ―substances‖. In 
contrast, process philosophers analyse processes and the way they occur as the basic 
units of reality. Why conduct this thesis through process philosophy? The primary 
aim of this work is to highlight process thought in Nietzsche‘s philosophy and to 
address or elucidate some of its shortcomings with elements of Chinese Daoist 
thought. This is done in such a way as to pose a host of new approaches (or add 
insight to existing ones) to traditional philosophical problems of both theory and 
practice (specifically, metaphysics and socio-political theory). The main concepts I 
draw from in my comparison are, among others, the form of correlative thinking 
exemplified in the Yijing as a means of elaborating how process thought might be 
understood in tandem with Nietzsche‘s ontology. I also draw on the notion of all-
under-heaven, a formative idea in Chinese thought, as a means of showing how 
epistemology is linked in process thought to direct socio-political pragmatism. As a 
means of evaluating the appearance-reality distinction, I contrast the ‗butterfly 
dream‘ story of the Zhuangzi with Nietzsche‘s observations on the distinction in TI. I 
also look at socio-political efficacy, shi, construed mainly in Legalism (focusing on 
its Daoist roots) compared with  efficacious actors in Nietzsche‘s philosophy. In the 
area of theory, I conclude that we can describe Nietzsche‘s process thought as a 
means of thinking in which the traditional dichotomies of objective/subjective, 
external/internal are undermined, with a tendency towards non-determinism and 
correlative thinking. In the area of epistemology and evaluation, I conclude on the 
basis of process philosophical thinking that Nietzsche offers us a power-pragmatic 
means of understanding what knowledge is. Likewise, I conclude that the conflict 
between his perspectivism and will to power doctrine may be addressed through 
considering the notion of pervasiveness.  In the area of language I interpret semiotics 
and meaning as expressions of will to power, offering a conception of meaning that 
attempts to bridge the gap between nomenclaturism and subjectivism. I also offer 
practical conclusions in the latter  chapters, where I establish a means of addressing 
the distinction between reality and appearance as a difference of degrees of power 
through Nietzsche‘s power pragmatism, underlined and explained by a process 
ontology. Likewise, I trace the influence of process thinking through to Nietzsche‘s 
considerations on socio-politics, which I argue to be pragmatically oriented, and by 
this I hope to facilitate new ground for re-thinking Nietzsche‘s position. In order to 
 7 
 
do this I focus the majority of work on establishing Nietzsche as a process 
philosopher and aiming to draw out the conclusions of understanding his philosophy 
through process thought. The process-philosophical tradition of thinking has a 
variety of well-recognized thinkers (including, Whitehead, Pearce, Bergson and 
Deleuze) at its disposal for the development of a comparative ontology. Why then 
use Nietzsche‘s philosophy? I have chosen Nietzsche because he is strikingly under-
represented as a process philosopher in relevant literature. Nicholas Rescher‘s 
introductory text Process Metaphysics: an Introduction to Process Philosophy 
(1996) in addition to the above surveys such thinkers as Dewey and Heraclitus 
(Hegel is also recognized in process thought) but no extended consideration is given 
to Nietzsche. This is to some degree understandable: Nietzsche seldom explicitly 
addresses at length the issues of process or change and its metaphysics. Nonetheless, 
that Nietzsche has not been afforded the same study as other key figures in process 
thought is a striking lacuna. I aim to show that this deserves to be addressed by 
establishing how some of the most significant doctrines and concepts within 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy trace their development to an insight derived from process-
style thought. It is thus worthwhile to draw on Nietzsche rather than conventional 
process thinkers because he offers a new perspective through which to address 
conventional issues in process philosophy. Although the focus of my writing is thus 
on Nietzsche‘s philosophy, I fundamentally arrive at the main conclusions for 
practice and theory by means of comparing elements of Nietzsche‘ process thought 
and selected parts of ancient Chinese process thought in Daoism. These conclusions 
I hold to be a possible basis for the further development of comparative process 
ontology. It must be made clear, however, that while these conclusions are arrived at 
in a comparative frame, the general approach of the thesis is to work within a 
Western philosophical standpoint, explicating the process ontology primarily 
through establishing Nietzsche as a philosopher of process. It will not try to establish 
an equal reading of both sides (which is not to say I give a diminished reading). 
Where I introduce material from the Chinese tradition of thought, it is selective and 
certainly not comprehensive. Instead, when I draw on concepts from Chinese 
thought and Daoism it is for the purposes of clarification, or providing an external 
perspective from which compare a particular issue that is dealt with. What thus 
remains is to further explain my usage of the term ‗comparative‘ in delineating a 
comparative process ontology. This area requires extended consideration of the 
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general issues of commensurability and conceptualizing comparison, and I have 
devoted a section to establishing this work‘s comparative stance. 
 
Comparative Philosophy, Nietzsche, and Commensurability 
A project based in both comparative philosophy and Nietzsche‘s philosophy 
faces a double issue of commensurability when it comes to drawing on traditions and 
philosophies alien to those from one‘s own background. Where commensurability in 
comparative philosophy is concerned, there are apparent issues of whether it is 
ultimately possible to draw on an intercultural philosophy without fundamentally re-
interpreting it in one‘s own tradition; whether great differences in languages, and the 
fundamental differences in thought derived from them, can be translated without 
those most unique or characteristic elements being lost in the translation. Similarly, 
where comparative philosophers raise the issue of commensurability on an 
intercultural level, Nietzsche‘s thought similarly lends itself to the question of 
whether perspectives in general could ever truly be commensurable. Such a project 
as this, then, must address issues of commensurability on both the intercultural level 
and the constitutional, bodily level. In this brief section, I‘ll now describe how the 
project deals with the first of these issues in comparative philosophy, as an issue of 
comparative methodology proper, whereas my treatment of the latter will be evident 
in the later chapter on Nietzsche‘s perspectivism. In order to do so, it will be 
necessary, first of all, to outline and defend the thesis‘s operative understanding of 
comparative philosophy as one of intercultural comparison. Following from this, I 
evaluate the possibility for comparative philosophy in Nietzsche‘s work, and I lastly 
detail and justify the dialogical-comparative methodology that I will use for 
discussing Nietzsche‘s philosophy and aspects of Chinese Daoist philosophy. 
This thesis will proceed on an understanding of comparative philosophy as 
intercultural comparison. Such an understanding is certainly not without its 
criticisms. Perhaps the most fundamental criticism is whether what is being 
compared on one side (typically the non-Western one) can even be considered 
philosophy ‗proper‘. Chris Goto-Jones summarises the dilemma involved in this 
particular debate neatly: ‗if comparative philosophy really is philosophy (and we 
need not take this for granted), then philosophy itself should already be inclusive of 
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the kinds of texts with which it concerns itself. So, either comparative philosophy is 
not about philosophy at all, or it is the richest and fullest expression of the 
philosophical endeavour, which means that we must revisit what it means to be a 
professional philosopher‘ (Goto-Jones 2013, pp. 135-136). Addressing Chinese 
thought, for example, as non-philosophy engenders a long discussion about adequate 
principles of exclusion from the discipline, while addressing it as philosophy proper 
engenders an equally long discussion about the status of professional philosophy as a 
discipline. Both avenues are simply too extensive to be dealt with sufficiently in this 
work, although they present core methodological questions. Regarding the question 
as to whether one side (the Chinese side) of the comparison made in this thesis is 
philosophical, I cannot address it to a satisfactory length in the present work. Instead, 
I will humbly admit that I may have, unbeknownst to myself, written a dissertation 
on Nietzsche‘s philosophy and aspects of Chinese ‗cultural theory‘ rather than 
philosophy proper, and nonetheless hope that, in spite of such a mislabelling, it 
proves a significant contribution to the field. 
A more immediate criticism, and one certainly worth some present 
consideration (since this dissertation claims to be a comparative project), is the 
criticism that what is unique to ‗comparative‘ philosophy as a specific sub-discipline 
within philosophy is unclear. One can quite easily claim that much of philosophy 
involves comparison by default, whether in comparing different philosophers within 
the same tradition or different traditions within the same culture, and so on. The 
problem, as Ralph Weber neatly summarises, is that ‗[t]he missing piece of 
information in the notion of comparative philosophy […] is some reference to the 
claim that there is a boundary between the philosophies of different cultures that is 
ex ante considered qualitatively importantly different from what separates 
philosophies of writers, schools or traditions within one and the same culture.‘ 
(Weber 2013, pp. 596-597). Likewise, establishing a sufficient intercultural 
boundary that accurately reflects the unique preoccupations of comparative 
philosophy is equally difficult. For example, it can be claimed with some degree of 
justification that a comparison of German philosophy with its Anglo-American 
equivalent might be well considered intercultural. Likewise, the same might be said 
for any comparisons of Chinese, Korean or Japanese philosophies with each other. 
However, most comparative philosophers are not understood to be concerned with 
 10 
 
exclusively Western comparisons, and so the concern is to delineate the pertinent 
form of East-West comparison that many do deal with.  
This thesis assumes that the relevant boundaries specific to comparative 
philosophy (as being concerned with intercultural comparison) can be ostensibly 
maintained if one admits the following points: that these boundaries are not 
constituted by or reducible to a set of essential properties (to say that an intercultural 
comparison just is [x, y, and z]), but are relative and historically contingent. They 
are, so to speak, not rigid boundaries, but permeable ones. What may constitute 
enough of a difference to be ‗intercultural‘ to a theorist from one cultural 
background may not be so for another, and what may constitute an ‗intercultural‘ 
comparison at one point in history may cease to be so at another point.
2
 Given these 
unstable-seeming foundations, how can comparative philosophy be a coherent and 
stable sub-discipline? The fundamental basis of comparative philosophy functions in 
both respects on the back of a persistence of a series of contingent, relative family 
resemblances in features rather than any unchanging, essential characteristics. There 
may not be wholesale agreement on the entirety of features within that family 
resemblance, but the functioning of the resemblance does not depend on such an 
agreement, it simply depends on the persistence, communicability and exchange of 
enough features in language to be recognizable to a sufficient degree. Equally 
important is the consideration of the context, the framing and the considered ends of 
the comparative project that is undertaken, in order to categorise it properly. For 
example, a non-Western perspective might frame the comparison between something 
like Anglo-American and Continental philosophy as a comparative, intercultural 
project where Western commentators would be reluctant to do so. It seems to me that 
such a project can be admitted as comparative and intercultural with no significant 
issue insofar as one need not think that comparative philosophy need be done from a 
unified standpoint, that comparative philosophy can instead be pluralistic in the 
sense that there may be no one method characterising comparative works, there may 
even be methods that are at odds with each other. A response on this basis can 
thereby be formed against criticisms citing the need for a precise and essential 
understanding of where the boundaries of intercultural comparison lie, as such 
criticisms presuppose a) a reductive view of the basis of intercultural comparison, b) 
                                                          
2
 I am here extensively drawing on Wittgenstein‘s notion of language games as discussed in 
Philosophical Investigations 74 - 75 
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a unified view of a single type of comparative philosophy, when other forms may 
just as well be supposed. 
 
Weber also raises another important point: ‗the different works [of 
comparative philosophy] all mirror mainstream (and often ―Western‖) philosophical 
predilections of their authors, which means that the eventually favored method or the 
framing of the meta-methodological discussion itself are indebted to one or another 
philosophical approach beyond comparative philosophy that is itself not open to 
debate‘ (ibid. p. 597). If a theorist persists in doing intercultural comparison he will 
necessarily be doing so from a theoretical position that is not itself intercultural, he 
will be drawing on a method from within his own culture. This complaint only seems 
valid insofar as one insists that the basis of intercultural comparison must itself be 
‗intercultural‘, but one can just as easily claim that one need not start from an 
intercultural basis in order to provide intercultural conclusions. One can begin from a 
theoretical perspective that is from a singular culture, and yet produce intercultural 
findings. One‘s methodology may be, for example, fundamentally Western in origin 
(deconstructionist, phenomenologist, analytic, and so forth), but the intercultural 
comparison (by drawing on Daoist or Confucian thought) and the conclusions one 
makes using that methodology combined with those of other cultures may not be 
reducible only to these Western aspects. Likewise, it can also be said that these 
different methodologies are open to debate in the sense that their suitability and 
application in particular cases of intercultural comparison can be questioned through 
critical debate. It seems entirely possible to question the validity of, for example, 
Phenomenology, Deconstructionism, or Analytic philosophy to Confucianism, 
Daoism, Buddhism, and so on, and the introduction of intercultural comparison may 
in fact derive new issues or problems for those methods. If Weber‘s misgiving is that 
the favoured methodology of much intercultural comparison is typically a Western 
one, he has a significant point: there is an unfortunate monopoly of Western 
theoretical perspectives in the sub-discipline, where one would hope that a more 
egalitarian distribution of theoretical perspectives would flourish. This is a complaint 
against the distribution of perspectives in intercultural comparison, however, not 
against the possibility of intercultural comparison. Weber‘s cited implication that 
‗methodology in comparative philosophy would indeed coincide with methodology 
in philosophy – were it not for the emphasis on cultures and the potential 
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methodological consequences of this emphasis‘ (ibid. p. 597) reflects a socio-
political, empirical issue with the one-sided monopoly of theoretical perspectives 
(namely, Western ones), rather than a significant strike against comparative 
philosophy understood as intercultural comparison in general. Further remarks by 
Weber and Goto-Jones along these lines also seem insufficient as concrete 
arguments against taking comparative philosophy as inter-cultural comparison. 
Weber warns, for example, that ‗[i]f reliance on cultures comes to be the only or the 
dominant way of doing comparative philosophy, then one runs the risk of turning a 
blind eye to the historical and ideological reasons that have made talk of cultures 
popular in the first place‘ (Weber 2013, p. 601). Goto-Jones similarly writes that  
‗a rather fundamental tension is established between [comparative political 
thought] as political thought and CPT as a genus of area studies, where area 
studies tends toward the elucidation of spatial and cultural categories. In the case 
of the former, we are envisioning CPT as a new way of defining more inclusive 
contours of the field of political thought itself; in the case of the latter, we 
approach a vision of CPT as a field of battle (or mediation) between myriad 
cultural identities. The former may be accused of abstraction and the latter of 
activism‘ (Goto-Jones 2011, p. 90) 
We can infer to some degree that Goto-Jones‘s sentiments about comparative 
political thought may be applied to comparative thought in general, and he claims 
that it ‗must be abstract in [the above] sense, lest its content and concerns become 
contingent upon times of diversity qua conflict, which risks intellectual complacency 
on the one hand and reactionism on the other‘ (ibid.). In both authors, it appears that 
the prevalence of comparative philosophy as intercultural comparison carries with it 
a number of ideological risks. I would infer that the underlying problem that both 
authors highlight is a Western-centric dominance of comparative philosophy. It is 
possible to claim that, here, the problem need not necessarily be that intercultural 
comparison is a poor fit for the notion of comparative philosophy as much as the 
problem may again be one of a socio-political one-sidedness in favour of Western 
academia. Addressing this one-sidedness, however, involves the sort of activism that 
Goto-Jones forgoes in favour of abstraction: it requires concrete changes in socio-
political and economic circumstances, and these factors cannot be addressed alone 
by the theoretical abstraction that Goto-Jones favours. The criticisms of Weber and 
Goto-Jones in this regard seem not so much to rule out the notion of comparative 
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philosophy as intercultural as much as to simply show the degree of awareness of 
contingent political factors that can influence the discourse. This should not come as 
a surprise however, because (according to how I have argued for intercultural 
comparison to be understood above) the nature of the discipline itself is strongly 
contingent upon cultural and socio-political factors. 
 
Weber (2013) has delineated four general and non-exclusive approaches to 
how contemporary comparative philosophy is carried out. Firstly, he cites the 
method that ‗does as much as possible to de-emphasize the role of the comparer 
while emphasizing all comparata as emancipated objects to be studied in their 
respective historical contexts‘ (Weber 2013, p. 4), taking Geoffrey Lloyd‘s work as 
exemplifying this approach. Lloyd writes that ‗On the one hand are the risks of 
distortion if we use the conceptual tools familiar to us. […]On the other hand, if the 
reaction […] is to insist that we use the conceptual framework of our ancient 
subjects, how is that possible?‘ (Lloyd 2004, p. 2). Lloyd recognizes the 
inescapability of one‘s own interpretive perspective yet still argues for comparison 
as fundamentally productive and possible, claiming that ‗is essentially no different 
from the processes of learning that we have constantly been engaged in, since 
childhood, in our own society, in all its diversity, acquiring and using our own 
natural languages. Even if we have no algorithm for this, there is much to be said for 
reflecting on where all of our own experience of learning begins, to make the most of 
what those reflections suggest, as we confront the more arcane problems of 
understanding the exotic‘ (ibid. p. 9). The second general approach, which Weber 
attributes to scholars like David Hall and Roger Ames, is ‗[e]mphasizing the 
comparer as well as the one comparatum that is somehow considered not to be 
―one‘s own‖‘ (Weber 2013, p. 4). Ames and Hall‘s approach is ‗transcultural in 
intent since it seeks to promote that sort of dialogue which may eventually result in a 
mutual recognition of both commonalities and differences  as a means of addressing 
important issues of theoretical and practical concern‘ (Ames and Hall 1987, p. 6). 
However, their approach is not self-effacing in the sense that they claim ‗we cannot 
presume to stand above disputes that define the character of our culture or the 
relations between cultures‘ Weber 2013, p. 8).A third method, attributed to François 
Jullien, is one that ‗emphasizes again the comparer but this time together with the 
one comparatum that is somehow considered to be ―one‘s own‖‘ (ibid.). This 
 14 
 
position is reflected in Jullien‘s recent claim that ‗we can no longer limit ourselves, 
in Europe, to the horizon of European thought. We must leave home and shake off 
our philosophic atavism—go ―to see‖ elsewhere, which was already the first 
meaning of ―theory‖ for the Greeks, let us remember, before theory became dully 
speculative‘ (Jullien 2016, p. 3). Lastly, the fourth approach ‗de-emphasizes all 
comparata, but emphasizes perhaps more greatly than any of the other approaches 
the comparer, i.e. at least in a specific sense‘ (ibid.), and Weber suggests that Bo 
Mou‘s writing serves as an example of this type. In addressing the comparative 
issue, Bo Mou emphasizes the ‗constructive engagement‘ strategy: The Constructive 
engagement strategy concerns ‗philosophical-issue-engagement that aims at how 
thinkers‗ ideas and texts under comparative examination can make a joint 
contribution to a series of issues, themes or topics of philosophical significance that 
can be commonly or jointly concerned through appropriate philosophical 
interpretation‘ (Mou 2010, p. 4).  
Insofar as the seeds of any sort of comparative position along the lines of this 
spectrum can be made out in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, I would suspect that they align 
most closely with the third approach, that of Jullien‘s. Nietzsche‘s attitude towards 
non-European cultures and traditions, at least in his published works, is 
instrumentally focused, as Weber takes Jullien‘s to be (albeit certainly in different 
ways): ‗Jullien‘s interest in decoding China is instrumental only, that China 
functions as a heterotopic image in a (pseudo-) Foucauldian way and that the main 
emphasis in the approach is put on that for which China is the other‘ (Weber 2013, p.  
5).  Although Nietzsche stresses the self-consciousness and inescapability of one‘s 
own cultural and philosophical perspective (while also stressing the possibility for 
expanding that perspective), his philosophical project is hardly ever explicitly 
concerned with attempting to appreciate non-European cultures in a way that draws 
fullest from the grounds of those cultures themselves. His use of them is 
fundamentally instrumental in the sense that they are enlisted foremost as case 
studies or data to be interpreted through his own philosophical perspective. Consider 
GS 145, as an example, which holds that ‗[a] diet that consists predominantly of rice 
leads to the use of opium and narcotics, just as a diet that consists predominantly of 
potatoes leads to the use of liquor‘. Nietzsche‘s interest here lies not so much in 
anthropological analysis specific to the different regions as much as it does in 
framing and understanding a sociological problem through the insights of his 
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philosophical theory, through the naturalistic approach of his philosophy.  In this 
strong instrumental sense then, Nietzsche‘s philosophy might not be considered to 
hold a viable basis for a comparative project, as it seems as though data from 
differing cultures risks being reduced to having the status of a reified ‗vessel‘ 
through which Nietzsche‘s philosophy and fundamentally Western perspective 
elaborates itself. There are misgivings within comparative philosophy over the 
instrumentality of Jullien‘s approach and whether it turns China into an ‗other‘ 
through which Western philosophy can better understand itself
3
. At first blush these 
complaints would seem only to be amplified in Nietzsche‘s case because he was 
writing in a period where colonialism and imperialism were underlying the reception 
of foreign perspectives.  
If there is indeed a case to be made that Nietzsche‘s philosophy can be a 
basis for comparative thinking, as I think there is, it will be through his 
perspectivism. That is, through an emphasis on rigorous interpretation and the ‗art of 
reading‘ (HAH 270), as with Nietzsche‘s heritage in philology, that is nonetheless 
admittedly bound up with an instrumental focus. I will argue that for Nietzsche 
perspectives are ‗invested‘: they are guided by the will to power, to express force, 
and so the claim that there can be an interpretive perspective without any 
instrumental influence may be dubious. While comparative interpretation may be 
instrumental in the way that Jullien or Nietzsche exhibit, one can still claim that a 
comparative approach that fails to appreciate the different cultural and historical 
specificities of the comparatum (the thing compared) is one that likely proffers a 
diminished interpretation (a reason why we tend to reject approaches that reify 
different cultural phenomena). In this sense these threaten to be perspectives that 
instrumentally contribute less to one‘s overall holistic perspective (one‘s overall 
understanding of the world) than they might have, given a more adequate 
interpretation, or, in the agonistic sense of competing perspectives that Nietzsche is 
concerned with, a ―level playing field‖. Given my use of Nietzsche‘s philosophy as 
the primary component of Western comparison, I think that fruitful comparison is 
nonetheless possible in Nietzsche‘s philosophy when it is admitted that a) its 
methodological aim will be fundamentally instrumental (it is a means through which 
                                                          
3
 See Ralph Weber‘s article ‗What about the Billeter-Jullien Debate? And What Was It about? 
A Response to Thorsten Botz-Bornstein‘ (2014) for a summary over the debate that Jullien has 
instrumentalized Chinese Philosophy. 
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the self-conscious comparer develops and extends his own historically and culturally 
situated holistic perspective, as an expression of will to power), and b) the 
sufficiently differing perspectives (the comparata) are interpreted in such a way that 
they can offer more than simply a restatement or re-interpretation of the interpreter's 
perspective, which would be a ―mirroring‖ of his position (which, in order to do so, 
will involve more than a superficial appreciation of the cultural context of the 
comparata, and demand a significant level of emphasis on the comparatum). It is 
admittedly difficult to consistently find this second aspect in Nietzsche‘s published 
work, but it is an aspect that both his perspectival writing and his emphasis on 
interpretation would commit him to, and an aspect that he may have pursued more 
rigorously had he had access to the wealth of more adequately parsed intercultural 
data now available. 
Having established the conditions under which a comparative project based 
in Nietzsche‘s philosophy can be feasible, it will be necessary to situate the 
methodology of the project more generally. This dissertation, as a comparative 
project, will proceed according to the following points. Returning to Weber‘s 
typology, it will not attempt comparative philosophy foremost in the sense of either 
Lloyd‘s approach (de-emphasizing the role of the comparer), nor will it be 
comparative in the manner of Ames and Hall, in which the comparer's position is 
self-conscious yet the compared philosophy is nonetheless to be taken on ―its own 
terms‖. It will share the most similarities with Jullien‘s approach insofar as the 
manner of comparison will be (consciously) instrumental, treating aspects of Chinese 
philosophy as a means of extending and deepening its own position. As such, the 
majority of writing in this project will focus on explicating Nietzsche‘s philosophy, 
as it is the operative side of comparison. Given the disparity between the time given 
to one side over another, it is necessary to give a justification. The most basic reason 
is simply the scope of the project: this is a heuristic work towards a comparative 
process ontology proper, it is not a comprehensive account. In order to be fully 
comprehensive, it would require a systematic detailing of the tradition of process 
thought in the West (including figures like Hegel, Peirce, Whitehead, Bergson), 
along with a more concrete, historical detailing of the development of process 
thought through the history of Chinese philosophy. It would also require an extended 
consideration of substance-style ontologies, and their deficiencies and strengths 
contrasted with process ontology. These are outside the scope of this project. This 
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project aims to put forward a heuristic example of how a fuller comparative process 
ontology may be developed, and in doing so establish the advantages of pursuing 
such an ontology and the problems facing any such attempts. A less basic reason 
directly relates to the previous discussion of comparative methodology. This is a 
Western-centric research project: it is developed from a distinctly European cultural 
perspective and draws on outside perspectives as supplementation. Hence, it does not 
pretend to be comparative in the sense that each side of comparison is given equal 
treatment and that its critical perspective is one that attempts to distance itself from 
either side. It is comparative in the sense that it arrives at conclusions or insights that 
were not capable of being achieved within one side of the comparison alone. Such an 
understanding of comparison quite reasonably faces that charge that by focusing on 
one side it risks neglecting or mis-representing the other. As such, while there is an 
evident focus on one side of the comparison, the comparative aspects will be pursued 
in a manner that resists a superficial, reifying treatment of those aspects as reducible 
to an ―other‖ or a ―mirror‖ through which the comparing perspective simply 
elaborates its own position. This does not require a distanced, meta-theoretical 
position outside of the comparison to justify: such a pitfall can be prevented within 
the comparison by a strong commitment to Nietzsche's perspectivism. This general 
perspectivism provides the basis for his own holistic perspective, will to power; and 
a necessary prerequisite of developing a greater, more holistic perspective is the 
capacity to interpret and incorporate other competing perspectives in a productive 
and synthetic manner.  
 
More specifically, the manner by which a holistic perspective interprets 
another (and thereby extends and re-interprets itself in a fundamentally more 
sophisticated manner) can be best methodologically embodied, I hold, in terms of a 
dialogue between perspectives. It is a dialogue in the sense that Nietzsche describes 
it, as an exchange in which ‗everything one of the parties says acquires its particular 
colour, its sound, its accompanying gestures strictly with reference to the other to 
whom he is speaking, and thus resembles a correspondence in which the forms of 
expression vary according to whom the correspondent is writing to‘ (HAH 374). The 
dialogue is thus not so much about how much or how little one side or the other says 
(it has to be equitable to some extent for it to be a dialogue in the first place), but 
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rather about the different characteristics that may emerge from its relation to another 
text outside the culture. This project therefore proceeds by dialogically interpreting 
key principles of change in Daoist philosophy with Nietzsche's philosophy of 
becoming. An important assumption in doing so, and one that facilitates a dialogical 
exchange in this manner, is that the interpretation involved in comparative 
philosophy need not primarily be one of interpreting an essential meaning in 
language or text, or the pursuit of a single ―authentic‖ interpretation. Instead, this 
project adopts many aspects of the position laid out in Ma and van Brakel‘s 2013 
paper ‗On the Conditions of Possibility for Comparative and Intercultural 
Philosophy‘. The main point of this paper is to advocate ‗‖de-essentialization‖ across 
the board‘ (Ma and van Brakel, 2013, p. 297) in comparative philosophy, which is 
contrasted with a perceived presupposition that much of intercultural, comparative 
philosophy has implicit methodological tendencies towards either universalism or 
strict relativism: ‗[t]he universalist assumes that there eventually has to be one ideal 
language in which intercultural philosophical dialogue can be carried out and the 
results of comparative philosophy can be best expressed. The relativist assumes that, 
for each philosopher or philosophical tradition, there is one ideal language. Hence, 
different traditions are incommensurable‘ (ibid. 310). Incommensurability presents 
itself as one of the key methodological issues in doing comparative philosophy, 
because incommensurability between traditions undermines any basis on which 
different traditions may be contrasted or compared. What is suggested in the paper is 
that such an incommensurability can be traced, on the one hand, from an implicit 
universalism where there needs to be an ideal, mediatory language hypothesised to 
bridge the gap between traditions. On the other hand, such an incommensurability 
may be derived from an implicit relativism; an ideal language is also assumed in this 
instance, but against the mediatory nature of the universalist variety, the relativist 
assumes that different traditions have only their own ideal means of interpretation 
that must be grasped by the comparer.  Against this conclusion, Van Brakel and Lin 
instead present the process of textual interpretation, in the specific field of 
comparative philosophy, as an open-ended and dialogical process: ‗Using the 
hermeneuticians‘ advice to model the interpretation of a text in terms of having a 
dialogue with the text, the same model can be applied to interpreting text X [...]. 
Usually a large number of Y would be involved in the project of interpreting X. 
Some may focus more on reconstruction of the text; others on its interpretation. 
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Some would claim to have access to the ―original meaning‖ of X and claim to speak 
as a representative of (the author of) X. Other Y may aim for an interpretation that is 
relevant to and directed at a particular audience‘ (ibid. 306). Such a construal of the 
interpretive aspect of doing comparative philosophy (once de-essentialization is 
assumed) provides a broad, yet sophisticated basis for appreciating a multitude of 
different interpretive approaches or agendas. Ultimately, according to van Brakel and 
Lin, comparative philosophy in the vein of this process of interpretation is 
fundamentally one of real and imaginary dialogue: an imaginary dialogue between 
two interpreters in a tradition (who themselves are or were in real dialogue with that 
tradition), and the comparer, who is himself engaged in a real dialogue with both of 
those interpreters. A dialogical approach in this manner further suits this project 
because it recalls the style of Nietzsche‘s own philosophical writings. Nietzsche 
typically presents alternating perspectives through a form of (admittedly often one-
sided) dialogue, where he neither attempts to explicate or situate his own position 
entirely outside of a tradition or context, nor does he do so for the positions of his 
interlocutors. We instead see that Nietzsche‘s consciousness (or lack of it, in some 
cases) of his own position emerges through his dialogue with other traditions.  
However, starting from such a dialogical position that is in media res carries 
with it certain potential methodological disadvantages. There is the risk of the 
theorist under-developing the core ideas that emerge through dialogue: Nietzsche‘s 
writing, for instance, is notoriously resistant when it comes to the extraction of a 
coherent, consistent interpretation (although perhaps he would take this as a strength 
concerning his own writing). Likewise, a dialogical basis lends itself to an implicit 
(rather than explicit) rendering of the positions of the interlocutors: instead of being 
laid out in an abstract manner they emerge through dialogue. A potential issue that 
may arise is that some fundamental assumptions on either side of the exchange 
remain implicit and unquestioned in such an approach, where the critical distance of 
an explicit discussion of such issues might engender them. Another concern of key 
importance for this dissertation is whether such an approach may limit its holistic 
findings in terms of explanatory breadth. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
provide a comparative ontology of change, and it therefore involves a certain degree 
of abstraction that is at odds with a dialogical approach.  In order to address these 
problems, I will adopt a synthetic approach that draws on both dialogical and 
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comparative philosophical methods. Dialogue will be the prima facie manner in 
which I will proceed in discussing East and West traditions and philosophers 
throughout the thesis. At decisive points, however, I will abstract from the dialogical 
form in order to outline and explicate elements of an emerging holistic theory. 
Hence, there may be portions of the text in which Chinese thought is interspersed 
with Nietzsche‘s philosophy and vice-versa, but there will also be portions in which 
both are separated and compared with each other. This will allow me to develop the 
work in a way that draws from the advantages of both traditions. Proceeding 
dialogically ensures that the theoretical background of the work is never effaced in 
dealing with either sides of the comparative divide, while also emphasizing the 
historical and contextual backgrounds of either side. On the other hand, drawing on 
the theoretical abstraction of the comparative method at key points will allow me to 
formulate my findings with a greater explanatory depth and breadth. To summarise, I 
would claim the difference between the two methods might be thus seen as one of 
theory and practice: comparative methodology favours theoretical consideration (and 
abstraction), and the strength of theory is that it provides numerous schemata 
through which to understand phenomena and to be applied to practice. Its 
disadvantage is the degree of abstraction involved in doing so: the more theoretical 
and abstracted from immediate experience one‘s interpretive perspective becomes, 
the more the validity of one‘s perspective risks coming into question (there is no 
disinterested perspective, as Nietzsche reminds us). On the other hand, while a 
theory without practice or application has diminished value, practice without theory 
is blind: a dialogical, account (in which the interpretive perspective is interwoven 
with the comparison) risks being limited in its applicability without an underlying 
elaboration of the schemata on which it functions. One could likewise consider the 
difference between comparison and dialogue in this sense as one of degrees of 
abstraction: comparison involves a greater degree of abstraction in the sense that the 
comparer abstracts both cultural texts from each other and the comparer from the 
texts, whereas there is little abstraction from the comparer, and the texts from each 
other, in dialogue. The answer, in order to resolve these methodological drawbacks, 
is to draw on both theoretical comparison and dialogical involvement as inextricable 
from each other, using dialogical exposition and comparative theorization. This is a 
significant point lending itself to ontologies of change that I hope to demonstrate 
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throughout this thesis: ontology is inextricable from praxis, and both Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy and Chinese cosmology are consummate examples of this. 
 
Given the elaboration of my methodology, one can still legitimately ask 
whether the comparative ontology to be outlined in this dissertation is truly 
comparative in its most important sense. As I have attempted to show, the answer to 
this question ultimately lies with how one conceives the end of comparative 
philosophy, a subject too broad to be fully dealt with in the present context. As was 
discussed, there are a number of different approaches to comparative philosophy 
present in academia, as well as a number of different motivations for comparative 
projects: not all share the assumption, for example, that a project can only be truly 
comparative when it is undertaken in such a way that the comparer evenly lays out 
two different traditions to be compared, conscious of their own position or not, and 
proceeds to derive conclusions on the basis of the comparison between the two. 
Likewise, not all adhere to an ideal associated with the end of comparative 
philosophy, the foundation of a basis for a ―world‖ philosophy of a synthetic East-
West basis. According to Nietzsche‘s philosophy, such an ideal should not be 
undertaken unquestioningly, due to its universalist implications. Nietzsche thinks it 
is not even desirable to attempt something as systematic as a ―world‖ philosophy4, as 
different types of human beings require different ways of living bound up with 
different modes of thought. The function of a comparative project, at least when 
conducted in the spirit of Nietzsche‘s philosophy, is not one of aiming for a world 
philosophy, but one that aims for a philosophy of the future among other 
philosophies.  
 
Thesis Summary 
Having established the meaning of each of the key terms involved in 
comparative process ontology, I will now summarise the different chapters of this 
work. Chapter one sets out the basis of process thinking in both Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy and Chinese Daoist philosophy. In this chapter I want to establish how 
                                                          
4
 He writes of the will to a systematic philosophy, for example, that ‗I mistrust all systematizers and 
avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity‘ (TI ―Maxims and Arrows‖ § 1.26) 
 22 
 
both philosophies most basically understand change in virtue of their world-views. 
In order to do this for Nietzsche, I begin with one of his major influences, Heraclitus, 
who is also recognized as a major influence in process philosophy. I spend some 
time detailing the manner in which Heraclitus has been received as a process 
philosopher and then examine some potentials way in which he differs from 
Nietzsche on the subject of change. The most significant difference attested will be 
that Heraclitus may be argued to perceive change as transcendent, beyond 
explanation or language, while Nietzsche fails to recognize this. In response, I 
examine interpretations of Nietzsche work that stress his conception of change as 
immanent: available to the senses and capable of being understood. These 
interpretations take us only so far in establishing a satisfactory conception of change, 
it is through examining the vocabulary available in ancient Chinese cosmology 
(specifically the Yijing text) that a satisfactory basic understanding of change may be 
established. I conclude the chapter by establishing how the general features 
perceived between both accounts lay the ground for an ontological basis of change.  
In the second chapter I want to explore the shift from ontology to evaluation 
and epistemology. The core aim is to show how in a comparative process ontology 
such as the one I outline, the shift from basic ontology to human epistemology and 
evaluation is one that is continuous, it does not require positing a gap between reality 
and subject. In this regard I detail process-informed interpretations of Nietzsche‘s 
two key ideas, perspectivism and will to power. I want to claim that perspectivism is 
reducible to becoming, while will to power is Nietzsche‘s own evaluative 
perspective within becoming. I attempt to resolve the problem that emerges of how 
he can claim to have a hierarchy of perspectives in a perspectival ontology by 
examining the notion of ‗pervasiveness‘ of perspectives (a feature that emerges from 
the interaction of perspectives but not any singular perspective) as what is 
determinative of hierarchy. I emphasize to a certain extent a disinclination towards 
traditional epistemological issues in my account of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism and 
will to power, and a favouring of pragmatism (particularly in conceiving of truth). In 
this regard I draw similarities between such conceptions and epistemology-
evaluation within the ancient Chinese tradition, further drawing out the contrasts in 
the evaluative pre-occupations of Chinese and Greek originary thought. As 
demonstrative of the continuity between evaluation and ontology in a comparative 
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process philosophy, I discuss the cosmological relation in Chinese cultural thought 
between humans and the totality of relations making up the world, and how that 
relationship directly impacts upon the highest political ideals within Chinese 
thought. In addition, I examine the ways in which the perspectivism found in the 
ancient Daoist text of the Zhuangzi serves as a foil for any totalising perspective, but 
understood outside of the epistemological debate over realism and subjectivism.  
The third chapter covers the last general area that a heuristic comparative 
process ontology needs to account for: language. Language remains one of the key 
areas in which traditional philosophical view-points prevail, and I aim to provide an 
account of language that undermines its traditional dichotomies by looking at both 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy and ancient Chinese pre-occupations with language. I 
provide a detailed analysis of Nietzsche‘s views of language as they develop in the 
early and late periods of his writing, and I conclude that will to provide a process-
philosophical perspective which sidesteps the metaphysical realist/idealist debate 
that has influenced traditional views of language. In order to more fully develop how 
a comparative process ontology might elaborate a conception of language, I briefly 
examine the pre-occupations of the School of Names ancient Chinese philosophical 
school. Here I focus on the claim that compared with Western philosophical 
development of ontology, ancient Chinese thinkers developed a mereology (a 
contentious claim that I further examine), and how this mereology influences the 
conception of language and argumentation. Again, the influences of an underlying 
process worldview are shown to establish a pragmatic focus that in turn influences 
the manner in which language is conceived.  
The focus of the thesis shifts from theory to application in the fourth chapter. 
There I examine two case studies: the first being a classical philosophical problem of 
metaphysics (appearance and reality), the second being a broad practical application 
of process thinking to technology and economy. With regard to the first case study, 
my aim is to draw what new insights the conception of a comparative process 
ontology has for an old philosophical problem. To this end I take Robert Nozick‘s 
‗experience machine‘ thought experience and parse it through the 
ontologies/cosmologies I have elaborated in previous chapters. Appearance and 
reality is a useful case study for comparative process ontology because it highlights a 
distinction that I show is undermined and yet necessary in some regard. I argue that 
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both Nietzsche and Daoist texts provide answers to this issue that do not require the 
re-instantiation of hard ontological distinctions between reality and appearance. For 
Nietzsche, it will be the agonistic positing of different degrees of power as 
differentiating reality from appearance: what is real has more power than what is not. 
With the daoists (Zhuangzi) one can arrive at a therapeutic answer: one does not 
require differentiation between reality and appearance so much as one requires the 
ability to act consummately according to the situation one finds oneself in. The 
second case study is a broad survey of economic, political, and technological issues 
as envisioned in comparative process ontology. Again, I focus on detailing a 
hypothetical approach situated within Nietzsche‘s philosophy to the issue of 
technology, and I examine a debate over whether the issues of transhumanism align 
with Nietzsche‘s philosophy. Drawing on a process thought basis, I argue that 
Nietzsche‘s response might have been pragmatic in the sense that the benefit or 
detriment of advanced technology depends on the will of the type that uses it. In 
addition, I try to formulate a hypothetical position from Nietzsche‘s philosophy in 
the area of politics and economics, again through a process basis. I argue that within 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy we see a preference for dynamic and adaptive political and 
economic institutions that prevent social stagnation. These are exhibited in the 
tendency towards lesser state intervention and lesser market control. I compare the 
conclusions drawn in this respect to the political and economic writings of the 
Chinese Legalist school of the Warring States period (focusing on some of its Daoist 
tendencies) that derives similar conclusions on the basis of a process-oriented 
thinking.  
The last chapter is directly concerned with conceiving socio-political efficacy 
in comparative process ontology. I examine the ways in which an underlying view of 
the world as process shapes derivative notions of how the individual socio-political 
agent can act effectively in the world. To begin with, I elaborate the idea that 
Western conceptions of efficacy have often relied on a determinate/indeterminate 
dichotomy for understanding efficacy, derived from seeing praxis as a matter of 
fitting a practical reality to an ideal model: this is contrasted with Chinese notions of 
efficacy in which there is no such pre-established external model. I focus in on two 
operative notions within the respective philosophies: I trace the notion of virtu 
through Machiavelli‘s philosophy to its similarities with Nietzsche‘s view of 
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effective political agents (Napoleon and Cesare Borgia), while I examine the notion 
of shi as efficacious disposition in the ancient Chinese strategic text of the Sunzi 
along with later Daoist and Legalist conceptions. I then examine a core element of 
efficacy, conceptions of fate in both Nietzsche‘s philosophy and the Daoist text of 
the Zhuangzi. There, I elaborate the differences between what I term Nietzsche‘s 
fatalism and necessitarianism, arguing that both can be understood on a processual 
basis as non-determinative. Likewise, the Zhuangzi characterises fate as response to 
inevitable change (in non-deterministic terms) and utilizes its own conception of 
efficacious action (wu-wei) as a response. Lastly, I detail some issues with this 
conception and their implications for conceiving efficacy in comparative process 
ontology. The last section of this chapter is one which focuses on examining a 
significant manner in which process-thought in the socio-political context falls short 
of its potential in both philosophies. I take to issue the conception of the feminine in 
both Nietzsche‘s philosophy and the Han period Chinese philosopher Dong 
Zhongshu‘s state philosophy, arguing that in both cases the holistic perspective 
afforded by process thinking is undermined by a focus on the immediate political 
context. This raises a compelling issue for comparative process thought in the 
practical context: to what extent can a process-based holistic worldview be 
maintained without introducing differentiations that, while necessary for political 
and social functioning, undermine that very holism? As such, while the thesis 
establishes a basis for development of further work in the area of a comparative 
process thought and ontology, it also introduces several key critical issues for further 
consideration. 
 
Chapter 1 – Change as Ontology/Cosmology: Heraclitus, Nietzsche 
and Chinese Cosmology 
 
This first chapter will lay the foundations proper for a comparative theory of 
process by discussing the ways in which both Nietzsche and Chinese thought of the 
Warring states period conceives of change as a worldview. In doing so, I will engage 
with some of the potential problems of conceiving change in these ways. Having 
worked through these issues, there should be a clear picture of what the basis and 
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core features of a process ontology are, comparatively considered.  There are three 
sections in this chapter, the first two concerning Nietzsche and the latter concerning 
Chinese cosmological thought, specifically the Yijing. In the former two I trace the 
notion of becoming as it develops in key areas of Nietzsche‘s work, focusing on 
Nietzsche‘s philosophical relationship to Heraclitus. In the course of doing so I 
examine Artur Przybyslawski‘s argument that Nietzsche in effect fails to retain the 
notion of becoming that Heraclitus has. I argue against some elements of his 
account, claiming that Przybyslawski draws on a transcendent understanding of 
becoming (an understanding that is above and beyond human perception), and that 
there are alternate means of understanding becoming as immanent (available to 
perception). Focusing on the latter, I look at how the vocabulary of becoming is 
explicated by commentators like Christoph Cox and John Richardson. While going a 
great distance to elaborate Nietzsche‘s view of becoming in coherent ways, I find 
their accounts ultimately unsatisfying: they re-instantiate problematic dichotomies 
and draw on substance-based language. In response I turn to Chinese thought and its 
vocabulary for process as a means of better elaborating becoming as an ontology. In 
particular, I elaborate the notion of change as it appears in the classic Chinese 
cosmological text of the Yijing, a text often used for divination in the ancient period 
and held as a consummate example of correlative thinking in Chinese thought.   
In order to detail and apply a comparative process ontology, its basis must be 
explicated in a clear way. A comparative process ontology is a world-view of change 
influenced by philosophies from different cultures, and hence the first point of 
explanation must be: what is change? In the context of this thesis, such a question is 
put more accurately as ―what is change for Nietzsche and ancient Chinese thought?‖ 
A process ontology is an alternative to substance ontology, which holds that the 
world may be viewed fundamentally in terms of substances, discrete entities that 
must be what they are at any point in time. The notion of substance is criticized in 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy (WTP 45), while it is more-so latent in Chinese thought of 
the period I am generally concerned with (the Warring States period)
5
. Instead, both 
philosophies favour at the highest level an operative role for change in the 
description of the world. Before we can begin to appreciate what these respective 
                                                          
5
 In this chapter I do briefly consider substance-style interpretations of features within Chinese 
cosmology, and I am certainly not claiming that the notion of substance is entirely absent from 
Chinese thought. 
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conceptions have to offer as an alternative to mainstream ontological thought and 
socio-political application, we must be able to understand the conceptions 
themselves and their implications for process thinking. We will begin by looking at 
the conception of change, or becoming, as it is present in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, in 
particular with its Heraclitean influence.  
 
1.1 Heraclitus and Nietzsche 
A significant re-evaluation of the conceptual differences and similarities 
between Nietzsche‘s and Heraclitus‘ teaching of becoming can address a paradox 
that emerges in trying to explicate change in static terms or a language of being. 
There has traditionally been seen to be a strong overlap between the two 
philosophers on this subject, but this must be rigorously examined. Artur 
Przybyslawski, in a move away from typical views on the relationship, writes that 
‗Nietzsche is faithful not to Heraclitus himself but to his interpretation of Heraclitus 
from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks‘ (Nietzsche 1998, p. 88). More so, 
according to Pryzbyslawski Nietzsche diverges in PTAG from an authentically 
Heraclitean account of becoming in his inability to extricate himself from the 
limitations of grammar and elements of Schopenhauer's (and thus Kant's) 
philosophical influence. One of Przybyslawski's chief criticisms of Nietzsche‘s later 
unpublished characterisations of becoming as will to power (WTP 1067) emphasizes 
the same problem of grammar. Przybyslawski highlights that ‗[t]he useful term 
―becoming‖ cannot be found in Heraclitus‘s text. It has been created by the 
commentators, but Heraclitus himself could not use it‘ (Przybyslawski 2002, p. 93).  
Heraclitus gestures towards becoming through the use of contradiction, rather 
than fixed terminology. ‗The only thing Heraclitus does is multiply contradictions as 
examples of flux to avoid using the same term that indicates something constant in 
the background of every contradiction‘ (ibid.). Projecting constancy or stability 
through into the flux will falsify it, and attempting to conceptualise flux through a 
language of being merges the contradictions and opposites that, through their 
opposed tension, Heraclitus uses to signify becoming. ‗[T]he term ―becoming‖ levels 
two opposites of the contradiction and levels every contradiction that is unique and 
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irreducible to another contradiction. The concept of becoming petrifies nature.‘ (ibid. 
94). Pryzbyslawski argues that the same may be said for becoming as will to power, 
used to designate the host of Heraclitean metaphors, often put in terms of streams or 
rivers, which Nietzsche uses to describe becoming. If we are to understand in what 
way process can be found to underlie the core principles of Nietzsche‘s philosophy, 
we have to consider one of his most important philosophical influences: the ancient 
pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus. I now want to survey in what ways Heraclitus 
has been claimed to be part of the tradition of process philosophy, doing so will 
thereby elucidate the ways in which Nietzsche adheres to such a tradition and the 
ways in which he departs from it. Firstly, what sort of process philosopher Heraclitus 
is, if he truly can be considered to be one, remains to be established. In his survey of 
process philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, Nicholas Rescher 
provides a general interpretation of Heraclitus as process philosopher at first blush: 
‗[Heraclitus] depicted the world as a manifold of opposed forces joined in mutual 
rivalry, interlocked in constant strife and conflict. Fire is the most changeable and 
ephemeral of these elemental forces […] The fundamental "stuff" of the world is 
not a material substance of some sort but a natural process, namely, "fire," and all 
things are products of its workings (puros tropai). The variation of different states 
and conditions of fire that most process manifesting of the four traditional Greek 
elements engenders all natural change‘ (Rescher 1996, p. 9).  
How well does this process-philosophical interpretation fit with classical scholarly 
readings of Heraclitus? It will be most efficient to understand the necessary 
comparisons and contrasts according to some of the central ideas in Heraclitus‘s 
writing: Flux, the doctrine of Co-Present Opposites, Monism, and lastly, the logos. 
Process-philosophical readings, of course, focus on the notion of flux in Heraclitus‘s 
writing. Regarding flux, the most commonly cited example in Heraclitus work 
representing this notion is fragment LI: ‗One cannot step twice into the same river, 
nor can one grasp any mortal substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and again 
gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and departs‘ (Kahn 1979, p. 53). A 
common misunderstanding of this saying, one that can be traced to Plato
6
, is the 
view that every single thing changes at every moment, hence you cannot step twice 
in the same river. As many commentators point out, this ‗radical flux‘ interpretation 
                                                          
6
 Cf. Cratylus 402a4-b4. 
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neglects the point that the river in which the waters perpetually change and flow 
through itself remains the same. Many commentators instead take the river example 
as an elaboration of a deeper, stable structure beneath a constantly changing flow. 
Kahn, for example, holds that it represents ‗the preservation of structure within a 
process of flux, where a unitary form is maintained while its material embodiment or 
'filling' is constantly lost and replaced‘ (Kahn, 1979, p. 168). Although he appears to 
interpret the example in the same way, Rescher‘s process philosophical survey puts 
forward a similar addendum: ‗Heraclitus was only half right: We indeed do not step 
twice into the same waters, but we can certainly step twice into the same river. The 
unity of a particular that defines what it is consists in what it does. Process 
metaphysics accordingly stresses the need to regard physical things, material objects, 
as being no more than stability-waves in a sea of process.‘ (Rescher 1996, p. 53). 
The fundamental principle of flux in LI, then, is that change on an ontological level 
permits talk of stability and objects on a more developed level without necessary 
contradiction. 
 
The doctrine of Co-Present Opposites (alternatively known as the doctrine of 
Unity of Opposites) is also a contentious idea in Heraclitus‘s philosophy, and has 
been argued for in a number of forms. One prevalent reading is Jonathan Barnes‘s 
logical re-formulation which states that ‗every pair of contraries is somewhere 
coinstantiated; and every object coinstantiates at least one pair of contraries‘ (Barnes, 
1982, p. 53). As such, the doctrine of Unity of Opposites appears to break the law of 
non-contradiction. As Guthrie highlights (1978, p. 437) this reading traces its history 
back to Aristotle. A number of interpreters attempt to make sense of the doctrine 
without recourse to logical principles. Kahn, for example, reads the doctrine as 
principle of understanding utilised in better grasping the fundamental structure of the 
world, the logos: ‗the doctrine of opposites is, among other things, an attempt to 
attain a larger vision by recognizing the life-enhancing function of the negative term, 
and hence comprehending the positive value of the antithesis itself‘ (Kahn 1979, p. 
189). Guthrie also presents a different interpretation which holds that the key point 
of the doctrine is not that literal opposites exist, but that the strife born from 
opposites in a permanent feature of the world: ‗Heraclitus […] asserted that any 
harmony between contrasting elements necessarily and always involved a tension or 
strife between the opposites of which it was composed. The tension is never 
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resolved. Peace and war do not succeed each other in turn: always in the world there 
is both peace and war. Cessation of struggle would mean the disintegration of the 
cosmos‘ (Guthrie 1978, p. 437). Guthrie goes further, and claims that according to 
Heraclitus (fragment 67) opposites are identical. Here Guthrie presents four non-
literal senses of identity he supposes that Heraclitus draws on:  (a) reciprocal 
succession and change, (b) Relativity to the experiencing subject, (c) in terms of 
value, that opposites are only appreciated in relation to their opposites, and (d) there 
are the opposites which are ―identical‖ because only they different aspects of the 
same thing (ibid. p. 446). Reciprocal succession and change represents a form of 
identity insofar as it concerns two qualities which are taken to be on contrasting sides 
of the same spectrum; day succeeding into night and vice-versa. Relativity to the 
experiencing subject refers to the identity of qualities in terms of their relativity to a 
subject: ‗there is no essential difference between pleasant and unpleasant‘ (Guthrie 
1978, p. 445, my emphasis). The identity of qualitative states in this instance seems 
to be that they all are identical in sharing the feature of depending on a relative 
perspective, hence that there is no qualitative state that is essentially pleasant or 
unpleasant (for example) apart from perspectives. Regarding (c), we may say that the 
sense of identity between qualities is reflected in their inextricable complementarity, 
sickness is intelligible only through a complementary relation with health, hunger 
with satiety, and so forth. We can again say that this essential complementarity of 
properties is what contributes to the sense of identity that Guthrie interprets in 
Heraclitus‘s writing. Lastly, concerning (d), opposites are considered identical in the 
sense that they are ‗only different aspects of the same thing, the point at which 
Heraclitus gets nearest to the later distinction between permanent substratum and 
mutable characteristic‘ (ibid.). Hence, one example for consideration is in writing; 
straight and slanted may be opposite qualities, but a single line of writing may 
exemplify both at the same time by being both straight at one segment of the line and 
slanted at another segment of the line. 
 
As Emlyn-Jones points out, two major questions emerge from the way in 
which Guthrie describes the identity of these different aspects: ‗Firstly, in what sense 
are these, or any opposites, ―the same thing‖? Secondly, how can an apparent 
statement of identity refer to opposites whose relationship appears to be something 
else?‘ (Emlyn-Jones 1976, p. 94)  Because Guthrie attempts to explicate and 
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reconcile these four aspects in terms of identity he is ultimately drawn to conclude 
that Heraclitus‘s contribution to thought along these lines is to have pushed the 
rigour of logical thinking forward by posing contradictory challenges of 
interpretation and paradox: ‗What was for him an exciting discovery was only 
possible at a stage of thought when many logical distinctions, now obvious, had not 
yet become apparent. By baldly stating the absurd consequences of neglecting them, 
he unintentionally paved the way for their recognition‘ (Guthrie, ibid. p. 443). 
Instead of attempting to resolve paradox through interpreting his writing in different 
senses, Emlyn-Jones argues that, taking Heraclitus‘s paradoxical utterances 
seriously, ‗the identity of opposites and the consequent paradox are not primarily the 
result of reflection upon the various ways in which opposites are related [for 
Heraclitus].   If anything, the relationship is the other way round - the explanations 
are of facts which have already been grasped intuitively. The identity of opposites is 
presented as a mystery which has objective existence outside men and controls their 
lives […]‘ (Emlyn-Jones 1976, p. 113). As such, the relevant fragments resist textual 
interpretation and logical resolution. Insofar as this present work is concerned, it is 
obvious that a fixed interpretive stance must be taken on Heraclitus‘s writings 
regarding the textual issues just discussed. As this work is not an extended study of 
Heraclitus or the Presocratics, it can only adopt a particular interpretation within 
scholarship, not argue extensively for it. This work will assume an interpretation that 
attempts to resolve the paradoxes Heraclitus poses for us, insofar as it remains a 
plausible contender among others in contemporary commentaries. Although it may 
not be proven to be the most accurate one, it may however reveal similarities 
between Heraclitus and Nietzsche, similarities not recognizable if adopting a more 
specific interpretation. 
 
That being said, the interpretation that this work holds to is Daniel Graham‘s 
explicit reading of Heraclitus as a process philosopher (2012). Graham initially 
raises a core issues that must be resolved regarding Heraclitus‘s world-view; how 
does Heraclitus‘s seeming monism (that all things are one ―stuff‖, which Heraclitus 
apparently renders as fire) square against his other prevailing view of flux? As 
Graham writes, ‗On the one hand, Flux says […] that all things are changing in some 
respect, or (in an unrestricted version) that all things are changing in all respects. On 
the other hand, Monism, that is, material monism, says that ultimately all things are 
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one stuff, namely, for Heraclitus, fire. But if all things are one stuff, and there is one 
subject for every change, then all changes are basically non-substantial changes‘ 
(Graham 2012, p. 2). If changes are ultimately non-substantial and actually only 
accidental, then it turns out that ‗[w]hat is really real is not process, but 
substantiality, that of the underlying reality that is the subject of all change‘ (ibid). 
This would then point to Heraclitus being a substantial monist because he does not 
ultimately allow for fundamental change in substances. Retrieving Heraclitus from 
this position seems to hang on how we are to understand the basic ―stuff‖ he 
considers as constituting the world, fire. If we understand ‗fire‘ in a looser, less 
substantial sense, as Kahn for example does
7
, we can claim instead that Heraclitus 
does not subscribe to monism in such a sense, he instead posits constant change as 
the nature of reality. Graham finds either option initially unpalatable, writing that 
‗[t]o the degree we take material monism seriously, we trivialize flux as a mere local 
variation of an all-pervasive static reality. To the extent that we take Flux seriously, 
we find ourselves compelled to sweep Monism under the rug.‘ (ibid). Taking either 
option thus seriously diminishes the scope of the accompanying doctrine, and this is 
problematic insofar as both doctrines appear to have considerable scope. Graham 
ultimately privileges flux over monism. He firstly defends the idea that flux is 
fundamental, but not itself a substance, by claiming that Heraclitus allows for 
changes in his basic ontology that are not merely local variations or accidents. 
Graham examines the manner in which there is a number of transformations of the 
stuff of Heraclitus‘s cosmology: earth becomes water and water becomes fire, and 
fire then becomes water, which then becomes earth. According to Graham, the use of 
terms like birth and death in fragment B36 indicates no underlying persistence of 
substance: ‗What the terminology implies is a radical change from stuff to stuff such 
that there is no transmission of identity from one elemental body to another. When 
one stuff is born, another dies. Heraclitus envisages then a radical change with 
accompanying loss of identity, not a mere alteration of an on-going reality. There is a 
set sequence and order of changes, but no continuing substratum‘ (ibid. 3). In 
particular, with regard to fire and its cosmological prevalence, Graham points out 
                                                          
7
 Kahn writes that Heraclitus‘ use of fire elicits a ‗radical shift in perspective‘ (1979: 23); rather than 
the element of fire merely serving as a replacement cosmology, ‗it signifies both a power of 
destruction and death — as in a burning city or a funeral pyre — and also a principle of superhuman 
vitality‘ (ibid).What fire thus signifies is useful for grasping the structure of reality, by contemplating 
fire one can ‗perceive the hidden harmony that unifies opposing principles not only within the cosmic 
order but also in the destiny of the human psyche‘ (ibid). 
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that it serves as not as a predominant ontological ―stuff‖ or substance through which 
every material change occurs, it is rather a standard of exchange: ‗[Heraclitus] does 
not say that fire is all things, but that it is a standard of value against which all things 
can be measured‘ (4). This initially seems somewhat vague, but when appreciated in 
accompaniment with Kahn‘s commentary (that fire represents both a principle of 
death and degeneration, and of vitality and growth), the emphasis on fire for its 
symbolic implications further cements the notion that fire can be considered as a 
measure rather than itself a grounding ontology. Having established that substantial 
monism appears to be out of the question for Heraclitus
8
, Graham sets about 
examining the relationship between logos, the intelligent structure of the cosmos, 
and flux. Does the logos precede constant change as Heraclitus‘s ultimate 
cosmological foundation? Graham argues that ‗the law of change [Graham‘s reading 
of logos] is manifest only in the processes themselves. It has no being apart from the 
processes that exemplify it. Heraclitus, for his part, does not present the logos as a 
transcendent principle‘ (ibid. 5). 
 
In rough summary, then, the view of Heraclitus I have sketched out from 
preceding commentaries is as a process philosopher that presents a philosophical 
worldview in which the cosmos has an intelligible structure (the logos), the activity 
of this structure is constantly changing (the notion of flux) although out of such 
change are derived stable structures. Appreciation of such an holistic logos is 
achieved through the grasping of key principles like the doctrine of opposites, where 
there is a unity of opposite properties at play within flux, all of which are basically 
motivated by an understanding of the processual nature of reality. This is the 
Heraclitus that I want to show is closest in philosophical relation to Nietzsche. How 
does Nietzsche‘s own philosophy stack up against this reading of Heraclitean 
cosmology? I will now analyze the parallels and disjoints in either philosopher‘s 
work, with the hope that elucidating both the similarities and dissimilarities will 
provide key insights in determining how Nietzsche himself is more or less of a 
process philosopher. In order to do so, I will firstly discuss Nietzsche‘s own 
reception of Heraclitus and his view of his philosophy as an heir, in some respects, 
                                                          
8
 This is not to say that Flux as described cannot be considered a monism of some form, it is simply 
that its substantial monist form seems to be an inadequate explanation. 
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of Heraclitus‘s philosophy. I will then look at the broader literature on the 
relationship between Heraclitus and Nietzsche. 
 
A sufficient focal point for this analysis is Philosophy in the Tragic Age of 
the Greeks, an unpublished early work which contains an extended consideration of 
Heraclitus by Nietzsche. PTAG serves as a compelling work not primarily because of 
Nietzsche‘s philological treatment of the pre-Socratic philosophers, but because of 
how his characterisation of these philosophers reflects his own thought. Most 
relevant is his rendition of Heraclitus, and it is important to immediately point that 
Nietzsche is not attempting to represent a clear and factual account of Heraclitean 
philosophy. As Nietzsche himself emphasizes in both of his prefaces to PTAG, the 
aim is to ‗emphasize only that point of each of their systems which constitutes a slice 
of personality and hence belongs to that incontrovertible, non-debatable evidence 
which it is the task of history to preserve‘ (PTAG ‗early preface‘, p. 24). From the 
beginning of his treatment of Heraclitus it is clear that Nietzsche recognizes in him 
the same pre-occupation with  deriving stability and regularity from an ontological 
flux:  
 
‖Becoming is what I contemplate," [Heraclitus] exclaims, "and no one else has 
watched so attentively this everlasting wavebeat and rhythm of things. And what 
did I see? Lawful order, unfailing certainties, ever-like orbits of lawfulness, 
Erinnyes sitting in judgment on all transgressions against lawful order, the whole 
world the spectacle of sovereign justice and of the demonically ever-present 
natural forces that serve it (PTAG 5, p. 51) 
 
One significant point that Nietzsche sees in Heraclitus is his rejection of ‗the 
duality of totally diverse world‘ (ibid.) namely the duality of physical and 
metaphysical worlds. This is surely a point in which Nietzsche has contributed some 
of his own contemporary pre-occupations, but there are also a few key insights that 
appear reflective of Heraclitean process philosophy proper. When claiming that 
Heraclitus sees nothing other than becoming, the important basis of process 
philosophy is established: a rejection of substance as the basic paradigm in favour of 
process. Nietzsche also points out another feature of process philosophy, the 
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tendency to conceptualize properties relationally
9
 rather than substantially. For 
Nietzsche, Heraclitus‘s doctrine of co-present opposites is ‗an observation regarding 
the actual process of all coming-to-be and passing away. [Heraclitus] conceived it 
under the form of polarity, as being the diverging of a force into two qualitatively 
different opposed activities that seek to re-unite. Everlastingly, a given quality 
contends against itself and separates into opposites; everlastingly these opposites 
seek to re-unite‘ (PTAG 5, p. 54). Nietzsche‘s appreciation of the doctrine aligns in 
many ways with the reading offered by Guthrie above, in which the irresolvable 
tension between underlying contrasting elements produces the ontological stability 
we are faced with empirically. Nietzsche, however, adds that this stability is 
achieved through the reversible ‗momentary ascendancy of one partner‘ (ibid. 55), 
emphasizing an agonistic character to these forces. To summarize, in Philosophy in 
the Tragic Age of the Greeks Nietzsche does provide an interpretation that 
corresponds to the process philosophical reading of Heraclitus in a number of 
important ways: he correctly recognizes that process is paradigmatic for Heraclitus 
while also recognizing that for Heraclitus, represented through the doctrine of co-
present opposites, process ontology is relational: properties have their identity in 
virtue of their relation with their opposites. 
 
Complemented by his early treatment of Heraclitus, Nietzsche returns to the 
philosopher again at the opposite end of his philosophical career in Ecce Homo. 
There he describes Heraclitus in friendly terms and re-affirms the positions earlier 
sketched in PTAG: the relational aspects of process thought are reflected in the 
‗affirmation of passing away and destroying‘ (EH 3) and a paradigmatic 
commitment to ‗becoming. along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of 
being‘ (ibid.). Similar to the manner in which Nietzsche draws on Schopenhauer to 
discuss Heraclitean philosophy, thus helping to break away from a conventional 
interpretation of his work, Nietzsche interprets Heraclitean philosophy in his own 
mold in EH. He claims, for example, that the affirmation of passing away and 
destroying is itself a feature of Dionysian philosophy. It is this particular tragic 
                                                          
9
 For a further explanation of this tendency, see Rescher (2000:7): ‗Traditional metaphysics sees 
processes (such as the rod‘s snapping under the strain when bent sufficiently) as the manifestation of 
dispositions (fragility), which must themselves be rooted in the stable properties of things. Process 
metaphysics involves an inversion of this perspective. It takes the line that the categorical properties 
of things are simply stable clusters of process-engendering dispositions.‘ 
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affirmation that also sets Nietzsche‘s understanding of relationality in process 
ontology apart from Heraclitus. Likewise, he also draws a significant comparison 
between his own important concept of eternal recurrence and Heraclitus‘s 
philosophy, claiming that ‗The doctrine of the "eternal recurrence that is, of the 
unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of things-this doctrine of 
Zarathustra might in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus‘ (ibid.). Why is 
it that Nietzsche claims this? Some clues are apparent in Nietzsche‘s early 
unpublished writing On the Pathos of Truth. There Nietzsche establishes the 
Heraclitean world-view as ‗the play of the great world-child, Zeus, and the eternal 
game of world destruction and origination‘ (breazeale 1993, p. 64). If Nietzsche‘s 
doctrine of eternal recurrence is understood as a claim about reality (namely, that the 
world will repeat itself forever) then some affinity is visible: Heraclitus also posits 
that the world is a process, and as a process of constant change it has no beginning or 
end. Those further qualitative insights that Nietzsche draws upon in his description 
of the eternal recurrence in TSZ are bound up with the idea of ‗willing‘ the eternal 
return, of joyously affirming all the processes of the world as necessary. Likewise, 
Heraclitus affirms that his process ontology is itself the only constitutive form of 
justice in the world
10. Nietzsche describes this aspect of Heraclitus‘s ontology, 
characterizing it in an unpublished note at one point as ‗the moral-legal character of 
the whole world of becoming‘ (WTP 412). As Simon Gillham has pointed out, the 
idea of justice at work can best be described as cosmodicy, which is a term that 
Nietzsche himself borrows from Erwin Rohde. Cosmodicy is understood as a self-
justification of cosmic processes, wherein ‗the arising and perishing of things with 
properties expresses the true nature of justice, rather than as serving as a punishment‘ 
(Gillham 2004, p. 146). According to Gillham, however, drawing from material in 
the Pre-Platonic Philosophers lectures, Nietzsche arrives at a view of Heraclitean 
ontology as non-telic and fundamentally aesthetic, ‗a non-teleologically determined 
cosmos which can be known or, rather, experienced, only by the artist or by the child 
at play‘ (PP 147).  
 
                                                          
10
 See Kahn‘s commentary to the Fragments: ‗A precursor of the Enlightenment in other respects, 
Heraclitus is in this regard a conservative. For him there is no split in principle between nomos and 
nature. As an institution, law is neither man-made nor conventional: it is the expression in social 
terms of the cosmic order for which another name is Justice (Dike)‘ (15) 
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To return to Przybyslawski‘s claims that Nietzsche is faithful foremost to his 
own way of interpreting Heraclitus rather than to Heraclitus himself: it would be 
difficult to contest this. Nietzsche very often interprets Heraclitus in a manner in 
which he contributes elements of his own doctrines or concepts into his readings. At 
the same time, however, he often does so candidly. In PTAG Przybyslawski 
highlights that Nietzsche at this point is strongly influenced by Schopenhauer‘s 
philosophy, and this problematizes his treatment of Heraclitus. When Nietzsche 
writes that ‗the whole nature of reality [Wirklichkeit] lies simply in its acts [Wirken] 
and that for it there exists no other sort of being‘ (PTAG 5) Przybyslawski raises the 
point that ‗If Heraclitus rejected being altogether, the word ―being‖ should not 
appear in this description of becoming, because no other word expresses firmness 
more emphatically‘ (90). The main problem, Przybyslawski goes on to explain, is 
that Nietzsche (under the influence of Schopenhauer‘s philosophy) is attempting to 
discuss Heraclitus‘ view of becoming by reference to concepts that themselves are 
fixed, and he draws on the problematic conceptions of Schopenhauer to do so. 
Regarding Schopenhauer, for Przybyslawski the problem is as follows:  
 
‗What is important is that Schopenhauer needs something solid, fixed, and 
unchanging to think about or to explain change, which is therefore reduced to 
permanent substance. Therefore change is not thought of as a change in itself. 
What is paradoxical is the grasp of change as something secondary, a derivation 
from something that does not change at all. This is an Aristotelian way of 
thinking, not a Heraclitean one.‘ (91)11 
 
Thus for Przybyslawski the problem conceiving becoming for Nietzsche is one of 
conceptualization and language. Thought requires a self-identical object, whether 
empirically or conceptually, and so the concept of change is not reflective of change 
itself because change is not self-identical: ‗Change is grasped as something else in 
order to appropriate the escaping change within reflection, to subject it to thought, to 
make the change the object of thinking. Nevertheless, change is not an object.‘ 
(ibid.) If we agree with the problem of describing becoming as Przybyslawski frames 
it, Nietzsche never overcomes this issue, even in his later philosophy. His description 
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 Przybyslawski is here referring to Schopenhauer‘s writing in The World as Will and Representation 
(Book I, 29). 
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of becoming in terms of metaphors of  streams in TSZ
12
 and his grand description of 
will to power in WTP 1067 as ‗a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally 
changing‘ are inadequate descriptions of becoming for Pryzbyslawski because ‗the 
whole argument is not sound just because he uses his definite term ―will to power‘ 
(93). The use of the definite term or concept is again stated by Przybyslawski as a 
formative issue, and it is also the point of separation between Heraclitus and 
Nietzsche in describing becoming. Przybyslawski writes that Heraclitus never 
directly commits the mistake Nietzsche makes because he refrains from drawing on a 
singular term to describe becoming, instead he ‗[multiplies] contradictions as 
examples of flux to avoid using the same term that indicates something constant in 
the background of every contradiction‘ (93). The doctrine of co-present presents 
would accordingly be a gesturing by Heraclitus towards becoming by pointing 
towards something through which both opposites could be said to be simultaneously 
manifest. Describing these contradictions under one fixed concept or name will, 
Przybyslawski thinks (94), nullify those contradictions: ‗In our case, the term 
―becoming‖ levels two opposites of the contradiction and levels every contradiction 
that is unique and irreducible to another contradiction. The concept of becoming 
petrifies nature‘ (94). The ideas of becoming and will to power as Nietzsche 
describes them throughout all of his philosophical periods of thought are thus subject 
to Przybyslawski‘s arguments. 
 
1.2 – Theorising Process in Nietzsche’s Philosophy 
 
At this point, having looked over the general arguments, it may be helpful to 
ask whether Przybyslawski‘s characterization of flux is acceptable. The main issue 
that can be contended in Przybyslawski‘s critique is his conception of becoming. 
Evidently for Nietzsche, at least in his later philosophy when he departs from the 
Kantian elements of his earlier work, becoming is not clearly conceptualized as a 
noumenon: the world is not presented as radical flux in-itself. Yet this type of 
conception of becoming is the one that Przybyslawski criticises at length compared 
with his own conception, which is not noumenal. To what extent, however, is 
Przybyslawski‘s account of becoming different from becoming as noumenon? For 
                                                          
12
 CF. TSZ ‗On Self-Overcoming‘ 
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Przybyslawski likewise becoming is not a noumenon, it is not a singular concept in 
language, or a thing-in-itself, because this would nullify the differences and 
continuity inherent in becoming
13
. If for Przybyslawski becoming is not noumenal, 
nor is it capturable in a singular object or linguistic concept, it would appear that 
becoming is transcendent (in the sense that understanding becoming is beyond the 
scope of perception and conceptualization)
14
. The important difference between 
becoming conceived as noumenon and as transcendental is that a noumenal 
becoming would commit Nietzsche to dualism (in claiming there is a world of 
appearances and the noumenal world of flux), which he is at pains to reject by the 
time of TI, whereas a transcendent becoming as suggested by Przybyslawski does 
not necessarily imply dualism. While there is nothing prima facie unacceptable about 
considering becoming as transcendent, there are other ways of conceiving becoming, 
specifically as immanent. In addition, commentators have attempted to formulate a 
grasp of becoming in Nietzsche that is non-noumenal yet also non-transcendental 
(often as a response to conceiving Nietzsche as a post-Kantian), that it so say, 
immanent. Conceiving becoming as immanent is to claim that becoming is amenable 
to the understanding and perception, neither transcendental nor transcendent. One 
such prominent theorist of immanent becoming along these lines is Christoph Cox, 
who writes that 
 
‗[Nietzsche] begins by reversing our common linguistic and philosophical 
habits, arguing that what is primary are actions, deeds, accidents, and becomings 
rather than subjects, doers, substances, or beings. […]Nietzsche's initial premise 
is that the natural world in which we are situated and that we observe is, first and 
foremost, a world of becoming, that is, a world of myriad actions, happenings, 
effects, and appearances.‘ (Cox 1999, p. 125-126). 
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 For Przybyslawski it appears necessary that we avoid an approach in which ―change, war, conflict‖ 
is thought with something that is made unchanging by the language itself‘ (94) 
14
 To put this point in more systematic terms, I am abiding by Ames‘ and Hall‘s definition of what is 
transcendent by whether it requires an appeal to a being or principle that conditions the world but is 
not in turn conditioned by it. The Judeo-christian God is an example of a transcendent being because 
he exists outside of the world and yet influences it in turn. CF. Ames, Hall, Thinking from the Han 
(1998, p. 198). I would argue that the understanding of ‗transcendent‘ here bears some important 
overlap with the Kantian equivalent of ‗transcendental‘, in the sense that it is concerned with what 
goes beyond the possible knowledge of human beings. The core difference is that the notion 
‗transcendent‘ does not necessarily imply a noumenal/phenomenal distinction, whereas what is 
‗transcendental‘ is strongly linked to such a distinction. 
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If we begin from the basis of becoming as primary rather than our categories of 
subjects and substances, and so on, how do we arrive at the point whereby we can 
distinguish and categorise the world in a way that is not equivalent to the 
noumenal/phenomenal distinction?  Cox introduces the notion of affects in relation 
to becoming in order to explain this element further.  These ‗affects‘ are described as 
‗interior states‘ (127) which help explain and predict actions, appearances and 
becomings. They are therefore to some extent a replacement for the language of 
subject-atoms, entities and unities.  Cox then goes on to state that these affects are to 
a large extent un-isolatable from each other, and directly links this ontology of 
affects into perspectivism by saying that ‗While each affect is or has an 
interpretation in a rudimentary sense, Nietzsche tends to think of interpretations and 
perspectives as hierarchical aggregates of affects in which some dominate and others 
are subordinate‘ (129).  
 
As Matthew Meyer points out in his reading of Cox‘s commentary, affects so 
understood may be equivalent in ontological terms to force, that they are effectively 
two descriptions of the same reality (Meyer 2014, p. 47). At the same time, Meyer 
argues that it is questionable whether Cox‘s characterisation escapes the charge of 
dualism, for the simple reason that there now appears to be ‗on the one hand, a true 
world of dynamic relations of force that can also be described from a first-person 
point of view as a chaos of sensations or affects and, on the other hand, an apparent 
world of conscious subjects and ordinary, everyday, middle-sized objects‘ (ibid. 48). 
The main point of issue, then, is that we are confronted with two apparently 
conflicting views of the world in which we perceive stability, stasis, unified entities 
and substances, but also changing processes. Przybyslawski‘s conception of 
becoming avoids this very issue by claiming that change, truly understood, is simply 
beyond our perceptual and conceptual grasp as transcendental, whereas Cox risks re-
instantiating a noumenal/phenomenal dichotomy in so many other terms. John 
Richardson also offers an alternative understanding of becoming in elaborating a will 
to power ontology in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, although only in the course of 
rejecting it for an alternative. Richardson proposes the view that being and becoming 
should not be seen as conflicting opposites, but rather than being is better expressed 
through the notion of becoming. This being-centric understanding of becoming 
Richardson terms ‗being replacement‘ (Richardson 1996, p. 80) and claims that we 
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should understand change or becoming as a matter of individual beings or entities 
being in a constant state of replacement by other beings/entities. So, for example, the 
green color of an apple doesn‘t persist but is rather changed into red, or the apple 
itself does not last and is changed into its digested or decomposed products. 
Richardson claims that such an interpretation has the benefit of resolving the 
difficulties in Nietzsche‘s rejection of thinghood, fixed and unchanging entities, with 
flux and the apparent stability of experience. On the one hand, Richardson claims 
that Nietzsche rejects thinghood in the sense that there are no timeless entities that 
are not themselves replaced by other entities (pp. 80-82). To begin with, then, 
Nietzsche would be said to reject thinghood because strictly speaking, given that the 
world is in a constant state of change there are no truly persisting objects, only those 
that are instantaneously being replaced: existence would be simultaneous with 
replacement.  
 
If the world is truly changing in such a way, then how does Richardson 
reconcile this fundamental change with our experience of stability and persistence? 
There are two potentially helpful ways in which we can think of how Richardson‘s 
theory applies to flux and stability of experience. Firstly, Richardson suggests we 
consider changes between objects in terms of a part-whole relationship. As Meyer 
succinctly points out: ‗Thinking in these terms emphasizes constant change because 
it can be said that a thing changes when any of its parts change, even if those parts 
cannot be detected by the naked eye‘ (Meyer 2014, p. 52). Very similar to this is an 
alternative understanding that stresses that the tension between parts is what 
constitutes the stability of the whole, just as in Heraclitus‘s image of the tensed bow. 
Indeed, this view shares some affinities with Daniel Graham‘s above interpretation 
of Heraclitus as a process philosopher. Hence, to summarize, what appears stable 
and persisting to our eyes is in fact changing interminably on a part-whole basis. The 
problem with this view, as both Meyer and Richardson highlight, is that ‗[a]ccording 
to this reading, becoming not only does not undermine the existence of beings, it 
multiplies the number of beings in the universe infinitely‘ (Meyer 2014, p. 52-53). 
So, returning to the Heraclitean metaphor of the stream what we find according to 
this understanding a series of streams and their contents which perpetually replace 
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each other. This turns out not to square with Nietzsche‘s rejection of thinghood15 as a 
lie adequately because, as Meyer highlights, it multiplies the number of entities in 
the world infinitely (52).  
 
If Richardson points out the problems with becoming understood as ‗being 
replacement‘, what sort of theory does he offer in contrast to the above views? 
Richardson‘s key point is that the sort of becoming that Nietzsche is describing is 
fundamentally temporal. Przybyslawski‘s above criticism of Nietzsche is that despite 
his use of metaphorical language or conceptualization through will to power he 
cannot ultimately grasp change, the use of either fixes a phenomenon that is by its 
nature constantly changing, and this constant change is beyond either our perceptual 
or intellectual faculties. Richardson, however, claims that we ought to conceptualize 
change as process(es) that require a temporal context: ‗we can never understand a 
being or thing ―in the moment‖ ; it must always be grasped in a temporal context, as 
having been this and as about to be that‘ (Richardson 1996, p. 102). We should then 
not speak of the change in the colour of an apple as from the state of green to red, we 
should be describing it in terms of a process. Because the identity of any particular 
state depends on the sort of temporal relation Richardson describes, he points out 
that what is primary is the process of change rather than beginning from the notion 
of a state-to-state change. This appears to be an important point that Przybyslawski 
does not address: as Richardson points out, what we call real beings are extended in 
time, and thus any change they are subject to is temporal. It is difficult to see what 
the notion of a pure process of change separated from anything extended through 
time would be. Hence such an idea offers little explanatory value when it comes to 
elaborating an adequate conception of process. There is still an issue of whether 
Richardson‘s interpretation is faithful to Nietzsche‘s denial of thinghood. As 
Richardson writes, ‗In the terminology I‘ve adopted (but not explained), its point is 
only to redescribe beings, by insisting that temporal stretch is essential to them: 
they‘re processes‗ (Richardson 1996, p. 104). On first glance it appears to face 
problems in this regard, because Richardson admits that the notion of being is still at 
play, but that the beings now refer to ‗process points‘, temporal points we delineate 
within a process. Richardson concludes that it may be as inadequate to describe 
                                                          
15
 Cf. TI ‗"Reason" in Philosophy‘,  2 
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processes in these terms as we once again arrive at a being-centric ontology. 
Richardson‘s ‗process point‘ account of becoming is in many respects similar to the 
‗monad‘-type reading of will to power that exists in many critical commentaries, 
described as quanta of power. Hales and Welshon, for example, describe such quanta 
as ‗primitive units of force that form their own (unique, non-standard ontological 
category)‘ (Hales and Welshon 2000, p. 69). On the basis of this Richardson goes 
further to suggest that there may be issues in the way the ontology is conceived: we 
might do better to consider it also in terms of genealogy in order to once more grasp 
the temporal aspect of becoming, compared to the self-sufficiency of each 
momentary being. Lastly, one further point that Richardson makes with regard to 
Nietzsche‘s ontology is that becoming, so understood, is contextual. In addition to 
having a temporal character, the processes constituting becoming are contextual or 
relational: they are what they are in virtue of their relation to other processes (1996, 
p. 101). 
Ultimately Richardson concludes that the process-point language, and 
description of the project as ontology, is still fundamentally viable given that these 
terms have been effectively ―emptied out‖ of their substance-type terminology:  
 
‗If Nietzsche‘s replacement of beings with becomings is still part of a theory of 
reality, isn‘t it still part of a theory of ―being‖, too, once we've purged that term of 
its usual presumption of self-sufficient moments? To be sure, this purging reaches 
deeper into the notion than our earlier ejection of the Parmenidean-Platonic 
accretions to being: unchangingness and eternity. But I think there remains an 
evident core, which justifies treating Nietzsche's project of description as still 
generically the same as the traditional one, still a theory of ―what's there‖, an 
ontology‘ (ibid) 
 
Other commentators have also dealt sufficiently with the problems looming behind 
substance terminology as they relate to ‗monad‘-type will to power ontologies, and 
they do so in ways strongly similar to those used in the ontological descriptions of 
process philosophy. Hales and Welshon emphasize that we should consider quanta of 
power less in terms of substances than as events (2000, p. 69), and indeed there is a 
significant resource available in process philosophy that might be used to address the 
issue of terminology in Nietzsche‘s relational ontology as Richardson describes it. 
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Mourelatos suggests a process-based vocabulary in his influential paper ‗events, 
processes, and states‘ (1978) which denotes the differences between the terms 
discussed in the title. For Mourelatos process, like stuff, is homogeneous and 
indirectly countable, while events are heterogeneous and directly countable. The 
benefit of having available a vocabulary like Mourelatos‘s is that it allows us to 
describe and categorize a relational process ontology like Nietzsche‘s without facing 
the problems of being-based ontology that Richardson is describing. In order to 
properly be a viable alternative to transcendental becoming, we must also be able to 
explain the leap from disorganized affects or processes (what we might term ‗pure 
flux‘) to the organized, stable world we perceive. Cox‘s affect-based conception of 
becoming did not appear to give us an immediate answer. How, then, does 
Richardson‘s conception fare? It is especially with claiming that the processes of 
becoming are contextual/relational that we go some ways towards addressing the gap 
between flux and experience in a satisfactory manner. If we are to maintain a non-
dualistic (yet not substantial-monist) conception of becoming we must be able to say 
that both the world of a ‗chaos of sensations or affects‘ (Meyer 2014, p. 48) and the 
world of ‗conscious subjects and ordinary, everyday, middle-sized objects‘ (ibid) are 
real. Both worlds are real because the processes that make up both are one and the 
same. However, they are also relational, and so they may be both a disorganized 
chaos apart from a human perspective and the objects of everyday experience 
without contradiction or, importantly, without one being more or less ontologically 
real than the other. Does this mean that the relational ontology of becoming is 
idealist? No, because what constitutes the identity of a process is partly our 
experience of it, but not wholly. This is an ontological issue we will return to in the 
coming chapters. For now, there are two points to consider: 1) we can immediately 
see how there will be a strong link between ontological becoming or process in 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy and his perspectivism, 2) the relational ontology serves to 
highlight similar ontological features as the doctrine of co-present opposites in 
Heraclitus‘s philosophy. I will explore the links in the former point in the coming 
chapter on perspectivism, so it is now worthwhile to linger on the similarities with 
the doctrine in the second point. 
 
Putting aside the addressed problem of transcendental becoming, we can now 
return to the evaluation of Nietzsche as a process philosopher by comparison with 
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his predecessor. As I have explored them, commentaries on Heraclitus as a process 
philosopher (such as Daniel Graham‘s) highlight that Heraclitus offers a broad 
conception of change or process that functions in a similar manner to the relational 
ontology outlined above. As Graham writes, within Heraclitus‘s view of change it is 
structure and order that emerges from flux rather than being separate from it or 
imposed upon it: ‗If we return to the river fragment, we see that for Heraclitus 
stability may emerge from a process of constant exchange and replacement of 
material contents. To put it in a philosophical way, form supervenes on flux. As long 
as some sort of equilibrium state is achieved, we may find a long-lasting structure 
which is characterized by constant material change‘ (Graham 2012, p. 5). Of course, 
there is no perspectival or ontological issue at hand as there is in Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy, but debates over the status of the role of the logos in Heraclitus‘s writing 
seem to take on a similar function. As noted earlier, the logos (the structure of the 
world) can be seen not a transcendent principle, it is rather an immanent principle at 
work in process, accessible to (yet at the same time constitutive of) human 
understanding. In a similar vein, relational ontology is wholly immanent (we can 
perceive and understand process). 
 
To summarize thus far: it is an open question to ask whether Nietzsche is a 
process philosopher. I argue that it is acceptable to do so, and the most immediate 
way to verify this is to consider the philosophical affinities that Nietzsche has with 
his Heraclitus, a widely known rudimentary process philosopher. Along the way, a 
significant issue arose: the way in which both philosophers discuss becoming is 
evidently different, with Nietzsche struggling with a neo-Kantian conception of 
noumenal flux. This is the criticism of Przybyslawski, who appears to be theorising 
about becoming as transcendent, which is to say that it is beyond conceptualization 
or perception. Considering this, I examined other ways in which commentators have 
attempted to understand becoming as immanent: Cox provides a variant in which 
becoming is immanent as affects, but the same issues of noumenal and 
transcendental becoming are present. Namely: the world as affect-becoming does not 
comfortably bridge the gap between disorganized flux and our immediate, stable 
experience. We have looked at alternative attempts to bridge this gap with a different 
vocabulary, namely John Richardson‘s process-point vocabulary. We have seen that 
Richardson runs aground with this vocabulary in the sense that it seems to require 
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bringing in the notion of substance at some point or other in order to be 
understandable. This raises a question: can we address this through reference to other 
traditions, such as process philosophy? Regarding this, I briefly examined the 
process-philosophical vocabulary of events, processes and states. What may further 
aid an attempt to re-think the vocabulary of process at this point is an examination of 
a vocabulary and cosmological viewpoint in ancient Chinese philosophy. Such an 
approach may provide further resources to properly ground a comparative process 
ontology in its own vocabulary. I have chosen this period in ancient Chinese 
philosophy because it contains some of the formative cosmological notions that I 
hold may be insightful for an account of comparative process ontology. A significant 
portion of later Chinese philosophy from the Han period onwards turns towards an 
increasing concern with syncretism and aligning state with cosmos. This is reflected, 
for example, with the ‗Unification of the Three Teachings‘ (三敎) ideology. I have 
refrained from drawing on philosophical work of this nature because of the danger 
that it may introduce derivative concepts that may make it more difficult to get at the 
cosmological assumptions that lie at the basis of such ideologies. That is not to say 
that such periods and movements have nothing to offer for conceiving process 
thought, but they fall outside the scope of a heuristic work such as this to be 
integrated. I have likewise refrained from drawing on Buddhist thought (Chan, for 
example) for the same reason: the concern with avoiding the introduction of further 
metaphysical or conceptual schemata that problematize a clear and direct grasp of 
the underlying process-based principles.
16
 
 
1.3 – Theorising Process in Early Chinese Cultural Thought 
 
Besides the vocabulary provided for conceiving becoming that we have 
examined in the Western tradition of process philosophy, there are also ample 
resources available from the altogether different perspective of pre-Warring States 
period Chinese thought. We have already seen at length that the debate over 
                                                          
16
  The same justification applies to the Western side of the comparison. I have chosen Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy as a basis precisely because his work resists the imposition of metaphysical schemata. 
While there is the use of conceptual schema in Nietzsche‘s philosophy (such as will to power, 
perspectives, drives) Nietzsche often appears to draw on scientific terminology (such as the language 
of drives), and we could speculate that such conceptual schemes be ‗swapped out‘ for various 
equivalent scientific notions. 
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conceiving becoming has to a large extent focused on how the leap from an 
undifferentiated chaos of process to human cognition, regularity and stability, and 
the perception of things, is possible. This is resolved to a degree, as we have seen, 
with the interpretive work of commentators like Richardson and Cox, who attempt to 
show how the transformation from so-called pure process to our everyday perception 
is immanent. Nonetheless this project is tinged from the outset by a metaphysical 
history of substance thought in the West, and we have arrived at what appeared to be 
a terminal point in our theorising of becoming: we can resolve the perceptual gap but 
we are still faced with a vocabulary that is tinged with substance metaphysics. 
Hence, we must either reject Richardson‘s reading of becoming in Nietzsche‘s work 
or concede it at the cost of saying that it partly arrives at the same theoretical point as 
a theory of being, that we are effectively describing being in other terms.  
 
 Chinese thought in the work I am concerned with (the Yijing) offers a 
perspective in which the notion of metaphysical substance as it appears in ancient 
Greek philosophy has far less operative role and instead ‗concerns relations and 
changes much more than Western philosophy‘ (Mou 2009, p. 504). As such, a 
consideration of its relevant vocabulary may therefore enlighten our own conception. 
It may be helpful to initially begin with accounts of how Chinese philosophy is so 
separate from Greek philosophy. Much of the discussion on how Chinese thought 
differs from Western thought centers on the debate over whether or not Chinese 
thought undergoes the shift of transcendental thinking and dualism. In more specific 
terms, the debate can be seen to be over whether Chinese entered what Karl Jaspers 
denotes the ‗Axial Period‘, the period in which mankind ‗experiences absoluteness in 
the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence‘ (Jaspers 2009, p2). The 
influential sinologist Benjamin Schwartz adopted and elaborated the notion of 
transcendence as it appears in relation to the axial period:  
‗To the extent that the word "rationalism" refers to the primacy of the idea of 
order, we can already speak here of the emergence of a kind of Chinese 
rationalism. It is, however, a rationalism that is radically different from many 
varieties of rationalism in ancient Greece. What we have is an image of an all-
embracing and inclusive order which neither negates nor reduces to some one 
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ultimate principle that which is presumed to exist. Like the rationalism of 
bureaucracy, it classifies and subsumes the existent reality. It is a synthetic rather 
than an analytic conception of order.‘ (Schwartz 1975, p. 53). 
This sort of transcendence differs from the form of transcendental thinking that we 
have associated with Western thought. Here, transcendence is taken to still be within 
an immanentistic cosmology, the key point is simply that a form of rationalism 
emerges in Chinese thought that is somehow comparable (according Jasper‘s thesis 
of the axial period) to Western rationalism in a universalistic sense. It is with this 
latter element of universality, or the sense in which Chinese thought is taken to 
evolve in a particular direction reflective of a general progression in thought, that 
many commentators are at odds with. Joseph Needham for example emphasizes the 
role of Chinese cosmology as a cyclical process in being the bedrock of Chinese 
thinking, rather than the mechanistic or atomistic thinking that has guided Western 
rationality:  
‗Things behaved in particular ways not necessarily because of prior actions or 
impulsions of other things, but because their position in the ever-moving cyclical 
universe was such that they were endowed with intrinsic natures which made that 
behaviour inevitable for them […] They were thus parts in existential dependence 
upon the whole world-organism. And they reacted upon one another not so much 
by mechanistic impulsion or causation as by a kind of mysterious resonance‘ 
(Needham 1956, p. 281) 
In addition to this, what emerges in the West more specifically is the dualistic 
tendency between Democritean atomistic thought on the one hand, which sees its 
development into Cartesian and ultimately mechanistic thinking, and on the other a 
separated, spiritualistic and theological form of thinking that finds its roots in 
Platonism. It is especially this latter element that distinguishes Chinese thought out 
from Western tendencies: it has been argued that there is no demiurge or logos, or 
external will that participates in the creation or shaping of the cosmos in Chinese 
thinking. Chinese mythological figures and creators embody and participate in the 
same world in which humans and animals do. Others have more strongly criticised 
the notion of transcendence in Chinese thought, such as Ames and Hall. Such 
commentators go so far as to radically downplay the role of rationality in any 
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familiar form being operative in ancient Chinese thought and instead point to the role 
of correlative thinking as an alternative bedrock: ‗If comparative philosophy has 
anything to say about Chinese culture during the so-called Axial Age, it is certainly 
this: notions of 'absoluteness: 'transcendence: and 'subjectivity' were of doubtful 
significance‘ (Ames and Hall 1995, p. xiii). Ames and Hall compare the dominant 
mode of thinking in Chinese culture to that of Western thought, contrasting its 
reliance on ‗analogical or correlative thinking‘ (ibid.) with ‗causal thinking‘ (ibid.). 
The former differs from the latter in that it assumes process as dominant over stasis, 
and draws on correlations in order to explain phenomena rather than invoking 
agencies or external principles.  
Having examined some of the fundamental background behind Chinese 
thought (we will explore this aspect in further chapters), we can now look at its 
development in concrete terms. Chinese philosophy is dominated by a process 
paradigm because it stipulates that the fundamental principle of reality is change 
(bian). The primacy of this basis as such is most directly perceived in the writing of 
the ancient cosmological text of the Yijng. The Yijing, or Book of Changes, is an 
ancient example of correlative thinking and cosmology. We will consider the Yijing 
primarily in terms of its use in correlative thinking because it represents the aim, as 
Schwartz writes, of ‗that of finding in the homologies between human and natural 
phenomena a means of controlling human civilization as well as individual human 
life by ―aligning‖ them with the cycles, rhythms and patterns of the natural realm‘ 
(Schwartz 2009, p. 355). The Yijing was originally used to provide a structure for 
divination. This structure was composed of 64 hexagram figures (gua) themselves 
combinations of 3-line figures. Such hexagrams were built up line by line with 
information for each line corresponding to a structure conceived in order to organise 
the phenomena they are used to interpret. More specifically, the lines composing a 
hexagram structure describe the patterns, directions, and the principle of change: 
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Fig 1: (Individual lines, yao) 
 
Fig 2: (Hexagrams, gua) 
 
Fig. 3: (Full structure) 
 
  
 51 
 
The movement from the bottom line (yao) up to the top line of the hexagram 
(gua) symbolizes the process of change in general terms of a particular situation. The 
bottom line will generally serve as the foundational stage of change. The second line 
represents a progression of movement of change in which there is a proper formation 
of change within the foundation, while the third line represents a stage in which that 
change has become concrete and enacted. The fourth line signifies a period of strong 
growth of change, while the fifth indicates the high point of change in which there is 
relative flourishing or abundance of that process. The sixth and final line represents 
the apex of change, which then also implies another transformation into another 
cycle of change. Lastly, two fundamental notions are used in interpreting the 
structure: yin and yang.  Originally the notions of yin and yang appear to have a 
perceptual and experiential basis as day turning to night, as indicated by Bo Mou:  
‗As we take the shining and shading experience as the primitive experience of 
change, we can see that change consists in the shining becoming the shading of 
the light or the shading becoming the shining of the light. But we also see that 
shining and shading may coexist for a period of time before there is complete 
shading or complete shining as clouds may move one way or another. We also 
come to see that this kind of change occurs naturally and constitutes a natural 
course of events in the world. We further notice that changes of this sort take 
place against a background sky and space which may contain other things but 
which may appear not changing against the moving clouds and the events of 
shining and shading. But this is not to say that they may not change from one state 
to another. What we come to see for the moment is that there is change marked by 
shining which we may call the yang (literally, sunshine on the hill) and there is 
also the change marked by shading which we may call the yin (literally, shadows 
over the hill)‘ (Mou 2008, p. 82) 
Thus the two formative notions of yin and yang, which evolve in what might 
be understood to be a metaphysical direction, are derived from a change and 
appearance-based intuition of the world. These two notions come to be developed in 
terms of abstract properties that we will later analyse. To return a final time to the 
Yijing (having elaborated some of the principles through which it is interpreted), 
while it is often associated with divination or fortune-telling, the Yijing may be 
understood structurally as a compilation of symbols and imagery through which to 
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parse any particular experience or expectation. Most importantly, parsing such 
experiences with the Yijing invites the interpreter to consider them in terms of the 
field of changing circumstances. In his introduction to the text, Li Yan clarifies this: 
‗Understanding and conforming to nature and society in their changes, the 
philosophy in the Book of Changes does not define absolute favorableness or 
unfavorableness. Good or ill luck, smoothness or adversity are all relative and 
transformable. As long as you can grasp the proper time, position and direction, 
you can obtain relative freedom even under absolutely restricted circumstances. 
On the other hand, if you proceed from a stiff and one-sided view, you may end 
up in a situation which is unfavourable and dangerous to you even if the other 
circumstances are favorable.‘ (Li Yan 1997, p. ix) 
Such an activity is made possible through the correlative thinking at the basis 
of the text: As Schwartz explains (2009, p. 355), our thinking is composed of words 
drawn from the vocabulary of our language. In speaking we combine our words from 
larger groups or sets, and then combine them in sentences or phrases. In doing so we 
draw on a stock of thought patterns that have pre-existing associations. Some 
examples of these associations would be: day-night, light-darkness, good-bad. We 
already use these in cliché forms: ‗in the light of day/the darkness of ignorance‘, etc. 
More importantly, we sometimes metaphorically substitute these relations in phrases 
as well, when they are similar: ‗king‘ is to ‗men‘ what ‗lion‘ is to ‗beasts‘,  ‗king‘ is 
to ‗throne‘ what ‗chairman‘ is to ‗chair‘. Thus, before thinking in concrete sentences, 
then, we are linguistically and socially predisposed to pattern our experiences in 
terms of these chains of oppositions. We associate that night comes after day, and 
that the daylight is safer while the night is more dangerous. This represents the non-
causal manner in which Chinese thought proceeds, and the Yijing is a structure that 
draws on it
17
.  
The Xici commentary to the Yijing also provides further vocabulary that 
shows a development in Chinese understanding of process. As Bo Mou points out: 
‗There is a unity 
of the initial change and the completing action, which is intended by the term 
yi-jian, literally, the completed action of change. […] the point of using yi-jian or 
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 For an extended analysis of correlative thinking in Chinese thought, see A. C. Graham‘s Yin-Yang 
and the Nature of Correlative Thinking (1986) 
 53 
 
jian-yi to refer to the principle of change is that it indicates evolution to a more 
advanced stage of development of culture and knowledge through the inventive 
power of the human mind. To be simple and easy (as the term jian-yi suggests 
semantically) is to go beyond a given form of experience to a higher form of 
experience which integrates the earlier forms in a new form of experience with 
greater scope and greater unity and hence greater simplicity. This new form of 
experience requires intelligent use of the mind for organization, interrelation and 
comprehensive integration. In this sense the idea of yi-jian or jian-yi is one of 
rational ordering and ontological rooting‘ (Mou, 2009, p. 82-83). From the outset of 
Chinese cultural thought, then, some features reminiscent of process thought as we 
have covered it are apparent; the idea that change is consistent with structure and 
regularity yet not mechanistically determined, as evidenced by the text of the Yijing 
as an example of correlative thinking derived from a process stand-point. As we have 
also seen, there is a clear emphasis on relationality derived from process. As a text 
concerned with efficacy (the ability to act effectively), the Yijing elaborates an 
interpretive structure where patterns of change constantly shift in their directionality 
and transform into each other, processes are patterned and regular yet also 
transformative and reversible. Additional vocabulary is also present in Chinese 
thought of this period in describing the workings of change. Also operative in 
thought of this period are three central concepts of yin and yang (which we will 
explore further in Chapter 5), two qualitative concepts that combine to form features 
of the underlying ―stuff‖ of the world, qi, which is often understood in commentaries 
as vital force.  
 
If there is any resemblance to the Western notion of thing-hood or substance 
it may be found in the idea of xingzhi (which Robin Wang translates as substance), 
an alternative way of understanding the functioning of yin and yang. According to 
the xingzhi interpretation both yin and yang have more direct correlations: yin, for 
example, is directly correlated with the moon, while yang is directly correlated with 
the sun. As Robin Wang writes, the xingzhi interpretation is more intrinsically 
hierarchical: ‗In contrast with the qi interpretation [it] tends to objectify the ideas of 
yin and yang. Yin and yang are converted into things one can see and feel; they have 
substance to them‘ (Wang 2005, p. 212). However, it must be borne in mind that 
xingzhi is still not an equivalent to substance metaphysics as it is understood in the 
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West. This is because the substance of xingzhi does not refer to some ultimately 
unchanging particular; it is rather simply another way of conceptualizing process. 
Processes according to xingzhi are understood through objectified yin and yang, 
which under this schema become directly sensible: yin and yang become things we 
can see or feel, and thus classify in the manner above. This is directly practical yet at 
the same time may be dangerous in the manner of its classification, a point we will 
return to more fully in the final chapter. In any case, both qi and xingzhi are both 
schemata for interpreting the basic, fundamental processes of the world. The main 
difference appears to be in praxis: the qi interpretation lends itself to theoretical, 
holistic and correlative consideration while the xingzhi interpretation is, as Robin 
Wang points out, ‗an empirical perception of yin and yang, one that could foster a 
conceptual transition from dynamic to static and eventually dualistic and hierarchical 
categories‘ (ibid.).  
 
So much for having established some basic features of process thought in 
Chinese process thought— how are things conceived of in such a tradition? We have 
already seen that thing-hood in the West is strongly intertwined with the notions of 
substance and being, to the point where it has been difficult for commentators to 
formulate a theory of becoming in Nietzsche‘s philosophy without falling back on 
terminology infused with the former notions. As I have written, process thinking 
offers a potential solution with an alternative vocabulary. Chinese philosophy also 
offers a theoretical background that is both similar in the direction of its vocabulary 
yet completely different in its origin. The ancient Chinese tradition of thought 
emphasizes thing-hood in both processual terms and an inter-relation with human 
beings. Gong Hua'nan and Liu Liangjian examine thing-hood at length in their article 
‗How Is the Arrival of Things Possible? — On Things and Their Arrival in Ancient 
Chinese Thought‘ (2008). Taking as a fundamental basis the idea that within the 
Chinese tradition things were predominantly conceived in terms of events, that 
‗Chinese thought was more interested in things as events than in things independent 
of human beings, so many thinkers directly claimed that things are events ‗ (394). 
They go on to point out that there has been an inextricable element of practicality 
and inter-relation in the Chinese conception of things throughout its various schools 
of thinking. In Confucian thought, for example, human beings have a central role in 
the process of growth and achievement of things as phenomena, ‗When a human 
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being doesn‘t act as a human being, a thing will fail to realize its proper 
characterization‘ (391). Part of what constitutes a consummate human being 
according to Confucianism thus involves a human‘s involvement with the things in 
his environment, but this must be considered carefully: what this relation involves is 
not a detached, external environment that the Confucian human simply participates 
in and molds. There is no such bifurcation: ‗Confucianism holds that a thing is an 
element innate in a net woven by Heaven, Earth, human beings, and things‘ (ibid.). 
To be sure, within this net humans have a more emphasized position according to 
Confucian doctrine (this comes to a head in the philosophy of Xunzi
18
). 
Daoism likewise maintains the interwovenness of human beings and things 
as inter-related processes, but it shifts the emphasis from human action as a means 
for the cultivation and achievement of things to withholding purposive interference 
in order to allow for the self-cultivation of things (ziran). The Daodejing clearly 
enunciates these principles, as both commentators point out: ‗In effect, for Laozi19, 
we can produce a thing only when we do not take possession of it, we can act 
properly only when we do not rely on our own ability, and we can support a thing in 
its nature only when we do not take any action‘ (393). Again, however, it should be 
noted that by not taking action it is not implied that things are by themselves, a 
separate world external and isolated from human beings. By virtue of being 
processes of nature like all else, things are already implicated with humans, and 
Daoism points out that there is already a natural totality of all processes that steer 
things toward self-completion (Dao), within which human purposive intervention is 
unnecessary.  
At this point that we can consider some potential criticisms of the cosmology 
and conception of thing-hood laid out according to Chinese thought. A natural and 
immediate question is whether there is anthropocentrism involved in these 
conceptions. It could be argued that anthropocentrism assumes an epistemological 
external/internal or subjective/objective worldview. Unreflectively applied to 
                                                          
18
 Xunzi is known in Chinese philosophy for claiming both that human nature tends towards 
selfishness, and that resources are scarce. Hence, the manipulation of environment and the importance 
of economics are clear: ‗Xunzi argues that human desires always outstrip the material resources 
available for their satisfaction: Distributing and allocating these goods in ways that achieve maximum 
satisfaction requires deliberate creative social policy. He argues that Confucian training, in particular, 
not only brings about order, but deals practically with the distribution of scarce economic resources‘ 
(Hansen 1992, p. 314) 
19
 The typically supposed author of the Daodejing. 
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Chinese cultural thought of the time, this is erroneous given that such dichotomies 
are not as clearly formulated in the works covered. Nonetheless, within Chinese 
tradition there are philosophers who do criticise schools of thought on the basis of a 
particular form of anthropocentrism. It will be important to qualify in what sense 
there is anthropocentrism, because it is not the form evident in Western philosophy 
(namely, the debate over subjective and objective, or realism and idealism). The 
Zhuangzi is one of the most informative examples of criticisms of anthropocentrism 
within the Chinese tradition and it will therefore be fruitful to consider some of its 
criticisms as a means of better understanding its differences with Western 
philosophy. As a methodologically Daoist text, the Zhuangzi offers a response to the 
various disputes of the schools during the Warring States period. These disputes 
predominantly revolved around the notion of names (ming) and the various guiding 
discourses (dao
20
) advocated by the different schools. The stories of the Zhuangzi 
work to undermine the idea that there could be any one guiding discourse that is 
ultimately the case, and it does this by 1) proffering a kind of perspectivism in which 
the value judgements from one perspective are seen not to hold from another, and 2) 
showing that the distinctions from within any particular guiding discourse are 
relative and reversible. The former can be seen in stories like the ‗happy fish‘, 
known among many things, as Graham points out (1989, p. 123), for being the only 
instance of disputation of Zhuangzi with the famous logician-philosopher Hui Shi: 
 
Chuang Tzu and Hui Shih were strolling on the bridge above the Hao river. ―Out 
swim the minnows, so free and easy,‖ said Chuang Tzu. ―That‘s how fish are 
happy.‖ ―You are not a fish. Whence do you know that the fish are happy?‖ ―You 
aren‘t me, whence do you know that I don‘t know the fish are happy?‖ ―We‘ll 
grant that not being you I don‘t know about you. You‘ll grant that you are not a 
fish, and that completes the case that you don‘t know the fish are happy.‖ ―Let‘s 
go back to where we started. When you said ‗Whence do you know that the fish 
are happy?‘, you asked me the question already knowing that I knew. I knew it 
from up above the Hao.‖‘ (ibid.) 
                                                          
20
 The notion of dao here differs from Dao, with the former referring to multiple guiding discourses 
proffered by the schools (for example, there was a Confucian guiding discourse, a Daoist guiding 
discourse, etc), and the latter totality of processes that make up the world, the singular Dao of 
Daoism. I draw on this notion of a guiding discourse from Chad Hansen‘s A Daoist Theory of Chinese 
Thought (1992). 
 57 
 
 
Although variously interpreted, the ‗happy fish‘ exchange has been read both as a 
perspectivist critique and as a deflationary attack on argumentative logic
21
. Likewise, 
the ‗sorting which evens things out‘ (trans. Graham) or Qiwulun serves as an 
excellent textual example of the second point, showing how distinctions from any 
particular dao may be reversible and relative: ‗[N]o thing is not ―other‖, no thing is 
not ―it‖. […] Hence it is said ―‖Other‖ comes out from ―it‖, ―it‖ likewise goes by 
―other‖‖ […] If going by circumstance that‘s it then going by circumstance that‘s 
not, if going by circumstance that‘s not then going by circumstance that‘s it.‘ (ibid. 
p. 52). The Zhuangzi is a consummately daoist text in this regard, and shares the 
same tendency towards reversibility and relativization that the daodejing enunciates:  
 
‗As soon as everyone in the world knows that the beautiful are beautiful, 
There is already ugliness. 
As soon as everyone knows the able, 
There is ineptness. 
Determinacy (you) and indeterminacy (wu) give rise to each other, 
Difficult and easy complement each other, 
Long and short set each other off, 
High and low complete each other,‘ (Laozi 2003, p. 176) 
 
Although he is a xuanxue scholar and thus outside the scope of this thesis, the 
neo-daoist Wang Bi recognizes in his commentary this sense of essential Daoist 
complementarity that ‗[e]njoying and getting angry [thus] have the same root, 
agreeing and rejecting [thus] come out of the same door; therefore it is not possible 
to take up [only one of them] unilaterally‘ (quoted in Wagner, Rudolf G. 2003, p. 
126). Attacking an anthropocentrism that has its roots in the idea that there could be 
any one guiding discourse from which to make non-relative, timeless 
discriminations, the Zhuanzgi points out that ‗Gibbons are sought by baboons as 
mates, elaphures like the company of deer, loaches play with fish. Mao-ch‘iang and 
Lady Li were beautiful in the eyes of men; but when the fish saw them they plunged 
deep, when the birds saw them they broke into a run. Which of these four knows 
                                                          
21
 See the recent publication Zhuangzi and the Happy Fish (eds. Ames, Roger T.; Nakajima, Takahiro, 
2015) for a selection of different readings of the passage. 
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what is truly beautiful in the world?‘ (Zhuangzi, ‗the sorting which evens things out‘, 
Graham 2001, p. 58). When presented with a perspectival account such as this, it is 
imperative for the Western interpreter not to make sense of the passage in terms of 
the subjective/objective dichotomy previously described. It is not that the Zhuangzi 
is rejecting any sort of objective standard of beauty, as there is no such notion of 
objectivity present in the work. Likewise, the passage is not an expression of 
scepticism over beauty: each animal has something that is attractive and what is 
attractive to one species may be repulsive to another. As such, the text does not 
denigrate any form of attraction. Instead, the point of the passage lies towards its 
end, where there is a clear concern with shi/fei (‗that‘s it/that‘s not it‘) disputation: 
‗Which of these four knows what is truly beautiful in this world? In my judgement 
the principles of Goodwill and Duty, the paths of ―That‘s it, that‘s not‖, are 
inextricably confused; how could I know how to discriminate between them?‘ 
(ibid.). Beside the perspectival point, there is also the important Daoist point that 
there is no ultimate guiding discourse (dao) from which to deem things so or not so, 
and thus any evaluation may be ‗confused‘: it can be reversible and relative, and 
there are no ultimate grounds for discriminating between them. 
 Anthropocentrism is thus recognized in Daoism as a criticism of guiding 
discourses that attempt to impose themselves as lasting and holding for all (the first 
lines of the Daodejing famously state ‗[way]-making that can be put into words is 
not really way-making, [a]nd naming that can assign fixed reference to things is not 
really naming‘22 (Daodejing Ch. 1, trans. Ames and Hall) but not in a manner that 
accords with Western debates over objectivity and subjectivity. There is no question 
as to whether a particular guiding discourse is part of the world; it is rather that there 
is a recognition in Daoism that none are encompassing, none are equivalent to the 
entirety of processes represented by Dao: ‗[w]ay-making being empty, [y]ou make 
use of it but do not fill it up. So abysmally deep—[i]t seems the predecessor of 
everything that is happening‘ (ibid. Ch. 2). David Ames and Roger Hall have 
                                                          
22
 I adhere to a generally non-metaphysical interpretation of the Daodejing (one that does not 
speculate a metaphysical or ineffable totality beyond the totality of processes in the world, a Great 
Dao.  This research follows Hansen in claiming that ‗We could, in principle, take as interpretive 
hypotheses that the subject was a dao or any dao, or simply Daos‘ (Hansen 1992, p. 215). This would 
appear to fit with a Daodejing and a Zhuangzi conceived as responses to the guiding discourses (dao) 
of previous schools rather than focusing on the introduction of a metaphysical entity. It may be the 
case that interpretively speaking, the truth may lie somewhere between both readings, but those 
sceptical elements are those of relevance to this research. 
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previously attempted to elaborate Daoist philosophy in a process-philosophical 
terminology and ‗follow A. N. Whitehead in questioning the appropriateness of 
using ―creativity‖ in the familiar creatio ex nihilo model that we associate with 
Judeo-Christian cosmogony. Whitehead argues that any robust sense of creativity 
requires that creativity itself is more primordial than God‘ (Ames and Hall 2003, p. 
29).  In particular, in describing Chinese cosmology (although they are reluctant to 
use such a term) they draw on the notion of focus and field, with a focus representing 
any particular process within an ‗endless stream of always novel yet still continuous 
situations‘ (ibid. 25), the field. According to this account, this leads to a worldview 
in which there is ‗ontological parity among the things and events that constitute our 
lives‘ (ibid.). As we have already noted, a process-based view of the world 
emphasizes an appreciation of the inter-dependency of the various processes that 
make up the whole. In particular, chapter 10 of the Daodejing asks whether the 
efficacious individual at hand can adopt the disposition of a newborn baby (ibid. Ch. 
10).  That is to say, it asks whether the individual can maintain a perspective that, 
like the newborn baby, is empty of all super-conscious inclinations and instead is 
open to the flow of ever-changing experience. The Zhuangzi likewise reinforces this 
sentiment through its critical treatment of argumentative discrimination: ‗[t]he Way 
[Dao] has never had borders, saying has never had norms. It is by a ‗That‘s it‘ 
[discrimination] which deems that a boundary is marked. […] What is outside the 
cosmos the sage locates as there but does not sort out. What is within the cosmos the 
sage sorts out but does not assess‘ (Graham 1989, p. 57). Ames and Hall emphasize 
this characteristic in their rendering of Chinese cosmological thought: 
‗The field of experience is always construed from one perspective or another. 
There is no view from nowhere, no external perspective, no decontextualized 
vantage point. We are all in the soup. The intrinsic, constitutive relations that 
obtain among things make them reflexive and mutually implicating, residing 
together within the flux and flow. This mutuality does not in any way negate the 
uniqueness of the particular perspective. […] A corollary to this radical 
perspectivism is that each particular element in our experience is holographic in 
the sense that it has implicated within it the entire field of experience. This single 
flower has leaves and roots that take their nourishment from the environing soil 
and air. And the soil contains the distilled nutrients of past growth and decay that 
constitute the living ecological system in which all of its participants are 
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organically interdependent. […] By the time we have ―cashed out‖ the complex of 
conditions that conspire to produce and conserve this particular flower, one ripple 
after another in an ever-extending series of radial circles, we have implicated the 
entire cosmos within it without remainder.‘ (ibid. 31) 
In this way the Daoist stance on anthropocentrism presents a similar response 
to the issue of interpreting process or becoming. The fundamental point that I have 
attempted to argue is evident within both traditions of process thought is that there is 
no discontinuity between human experience and flux: they are both intertwined, yet 
flux is not necessarily reducible to human experience. Nietzsche struggles to 
adequately express this in his philosophy because of the influence of substance 
metaphysics within the Western tradition. We have seen that even in attempts to 
reconcile Nietzsche‘s account of becoming as purely immanent one encounters 
problems of substance vocabulary. However, as evidenced in Chinese texts such as 
the Yijing (as discussed in chapter one), Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, we are 
presented with an alternative interpretation that is free from this sort of influence, 
and allows us to ―see around our own corner‖. Chinese process thought also raises 
remarkable methodological similarities with accounts of process we have 
encountered in esteemed process philosophers such as Heraclitus: process is 
compatible with the structure and regularity of human experience. Throughout this 
latter section I have attempted to elucidate the vocabulary through which early 
Chinese thinking conceives of change. Some of this vocabulary and its underlying 
structure is dramatically different to the way in which I have charted attempts to 
discuss change in the former section (Richardson‘s and Cox‘s attempts to extricate 
the language of becoming from the noumenal/phenomenal dichotomy, and 
Richardson‘s ‗process-point‘ terminology which risks re-instantiating the notion of 
substance on a different level). Some of the reasons for this difference I have 
attempted to show: the role of correlative thinking in developing this vocabulary 
through the Yijing. But just as important is the absence of the familiar distinctions 
and dichotomies Western commentators struggle with. I hope to have shown through 
this latter analysis that an engagement with these dichotomies is not strictly 
necessary, there are alternate vocabularies and structures of thought through which to 
pursue the same end. It is reasonable to ask: why not draw on such vocabularies to 
resolve the problems faced in discussing change in Nietzschean philosophy rather 
than attempting to work through such familiar problems with Western 
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methodologies? Such a question may not be capable of being answered, because it 
relies itself on a hypothetical question as to how Nietzsche would have developed his 
philosophy had he access to such alternative modes of thought. Nonetheless, such 
modes of thought do provide further solid ground for the development of a 
comparative process ontology, and its basic features should be clear: comparative 
process ontology sees the world in terms of change, it eschews traditional 
dichotomies of Western philosophical thought (external/internal, 
noumenal/phenomenal, subjective/objective), it is non-deterministic and favours 
correlative thinking, and its vocabulary favours an events-based language over a 
substance-based vocabulary. This is by no means the fullest, most comprehensive 
explication of such features, but it may suffice for a heuristic basis on which to 
proceed further. 
 
Chapter 2 – Epistemology-Evaluation in Comparative Process 
Thought 
In this chapter, I will devote the majority of my time to unravelling the 
relationship between Nietzsche‘s perspectivism, becoming, and the doctrine of will 
to power. In the context of comparative process ontology, I do this as a necessary 
part of showing one of the core features of comparative process ontology: there is a 
clear and direct interconnection between ontology and evaluation in comparative 
process ontology. I will now argue for a reading of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism that is 
continuous with both his view of reality as becoming and his doctrine of will to 
power. This reading will attempt to address two significant problems raised by 
scholarship regarding perspectivism: 1) How should we interpret Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism, is it a psycho-biological, ontological or epistemological doctrine? 2) 
If evaluative judgements in Nietzshe‘s philosophy are merely perspectival, how can 
they have any motivational force behind them for other perspectives. That is to say: 
how is inter-perspectival critique possible, and if so, on what grounds does it 
proceed?  
In order to address these issues, I‘ll put forward a reading of perspectivism 
that claims it consists of two components: an ontological component, and an 
epistemological-valuational aspect, which turns out to be an extension of the first 
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component. The ontological component of perspectivism concerns the ontological 
status of what the stated perspectives of perspectivism are, and what sort of an 
ontology perspectivism proposes if it is indeed ontological. Here I claim that 
Nietzsche's ontological perspectivism implies that the world consists solely of a 
multiplicity of perspectives reducible to flux, flux itself characterised as ever-
changing force. The epistemological-valuational aspect of perspectivism is 
concerned with Nietzsche's pre-occupation with the rank or hierarchy of the 
multiplicity of perspectives constituting the world
23
. The manner in which he ranks 
perspectives is through his own doctrine of will to power, his own philosophical 
perspective, which considers all perspectives to be in a constant struggle amongst 
each other, from the lowest (what I take to be something like inert matter) to the 
highest (which Nietzsche seems to think are the grand, holistic perspectives of the 
most influential philosophers
24
), according to the pervasiveness of different 
perspectives so organized.  
What is meant by construing will to power as an evaluative standpoint, or a 
valuational aspect of perspectivism? It will be necessary to provide an overview of 
will to power as Nietzsche discusses it in his works. Will to power is never 
cohesively or systematically discussed by Nietzsche, a point which has given rise to 
various interpretations of will to power, some of the more influential readings of 
which are discussed below. In some passages, particularly in Beyond Good and Evil 
he describes will to power as a principle of life, to an uncertain degree: ‗life itself as 
such is will to power‘ (BGE 13), ‗Granted finally that one succeeded in explaining 
our entire instinctual life as the development and ramification of one basic form of 
will – as will to power, as is my theory‘ (BGE 36), ‗‖Exploitation‖ does not pertain 
to a corrupt or imperfect or primitive society: it pertains to the essence of the living 
thing as a fundamental organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic will to 
power which is precisely the will of life‘ (BGE 259). Likewise in OGM Nietzsche 
briefly mentions will to power in his account of punishment, particularly in 
addressing the idea that punishment was devised for punishing, where he claims on 
the contrary that ‗purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has 
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 Cf. BGE 263, 260, and WTP 287. 
24
 In an unpublished note dated 1883-1885, Nietzsche writes that ‗[t]o impose upon becoming the 
character of being-that is the supreme will to power‘ (WTP 617). I claim that it is philosophers who 
often exhibit what Nietzsche claims to be the grandest perspectives because they are those who have 
historically theorised Being the most, and indeed, Being has been the general pre-occupation of 
Western philosophy. 
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become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a 
function‘ (OGM II 12). In TSZ Nietzsche also mentions will to power, in the context 
of representing values: ‗A tablet of things held to be good hangs over every people. 
Behold, it is the tablet of its overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to power.‘ 
(TSZ I 15).  Nietzsche‘s published writings, then, give a family resemblance of 
features to contemplate when trying to understand what will to power is as a concept, 
but no definitive, comprehensive account is given of it. At times he appears to posit 
it as a concept that relates to organic life, at other times it appears to be a 
psychological principle, and in unpublished notes such as in WTP 1067 it appears as 
an ontological principle: ‗This world is the will to power-and nothing besides!‘ For 
now, it will be helpful to sketch some general features I attribute to will to power as 
a concept. Firstly, I take it as an evaluative standpoint. That is to say, I will claim 
that will to power is concerned with evaluating things and the world, it facilitates the 
description of order of rank. This sets it apart from perspectivism, which simply 
recognises a multiplicity of perspectives. As a more specific example, what separates 
a reactive and resentful individual from an active and affirmative type is the degree 
to which a will to power is expressed through both. Later in this chapter, I will 
examine the different ways in which interpreters have come to grips with the 
concept,  before settling on the view that will to power represents Nietzsche‘s 
evaluative philosophy, his manner of ordering phenomena according to his 
perspective. This is ‗evaluative‘ because it involves perspectival judgement: 
Nietzsche affirms some phenomena over others, and describes the workings of other 
perspectival judgements as their ―wills to power‖ . How should we understand power 
in this instance? Given that I have already argued that for Nietzsche what is 
fundamental is a flux of changing perspectives describable in terms of force, power 
itself is reducible to force. To explain Nietzsche‘s perspectival evaluations, or any 
other perspectival evaluations simply as manifestations, however, is explanatorily 
reductive, and puts us back in the area of describing process ontology rather than 
describing the world from a particular perspective within the multiplicity. To sum 
up, then will to power, I claim, is Nietzsche‘s evaluative perspective, how he ranks 
phenomena as higher or lower, value-wise, and ‗will‘ in this instance is the very 
process (conscious or unconscious) of ranking phenomena, whereas ‗power‘ is 
simply reducible to the expression of force. 
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To return to ranking perspectives according how pervasive they are, 
construing perspectivism according to pervasiveness also makes the rank order of 
perspectives an empirical issue: whether a perspective is ‗higher‘ than another can be 
judged by how pervasive it is throughout history and human culture
25
. In this sense, 
epistemological-valuational perspectivism escapes the complaint that it is "just" a 
perspective among others, for every perspective by nature has this empirical basis. 
Nietzsche's perspectivism therefore presents itself both as an evaluation of the 
multiplicity of perspectives and as the greatest competitor yet, given its depth and 
breadth of holism; as such Nietzsche estimates that his philosophy, in being the best 
perspective yet, will become the most pervasive as a "philosophy of the future". 
 
To begin with, it will be important to consider contemporary interpretations 
of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism in order to better understand whether there are 
interpretive shortcomings to be accounted for. In a recent work Ken Gemes has 
surveyed a variety of interpretations on what sort of doctrine perspectivism is (taking 
Nietzsche‘s writings on the subject as a whole). He presents three different 
understandings: a semantic reading of perspectivism, an epistemological reading, 
and a psychobiological interpretation, the last of which he favours. Semantic 
perspectivism, which Gemes understands as the claim that ‗[t]here are no facts/no 
truths, only interpretations‘(Gemes 2013,.p. 554), presents the problem typically 
posed of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism: how can such a claim itself be true if there are 
no truths or facts? This theoretical incoherence is countered with another 
interpretation, the epistemological reading of perspectivism. Perhaps the most 
ambitious interpretation along these lines is the variety summarized by Gemes 
holding that perspectivism explores how ‗[b]eliefs are not justified through a 
comparison with a mind independent reality or by reference to some indisputable 
foundational truths‘ (oxford handbook, same section). This interpretation is 
particularly engaging for the sort of wide-ranging consequences its adoption would 
bring in interpreting Nietzsche‘s philosophy, and so it will be necessary to consider 
the position to a significant degree. I will look at two contemporary interpretations 
that fall along this line, both Tsarina Doyle‘s (2009) and Katrina Mitcheson‘s 
                                                          
25
 This raises the question of whether wholly pervasive perspectives like the ascetic ideal are higher in 
terms of order of rank. I address this issue later in this chapter when I discuss Nietzsche‘s conception 
of truth as power. 
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(2013).  In looking at these perspectives, I want to focus on three aspects of the 
interpretations: the role of comparison with a mind-independent reality, the role 
assigned to epistemology in perspectivism (focusing on Doyle‘s reading for these 
former two), and the operative conception of truth that epistemological readings have 
(focusing on Mitcheson‘s for the latter). An examination of these three core aspects 
will capture the most insightful features and consequences of Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism. In order to proceed, it will now be helpful to indicate some basic 
points motivating perspectivism at the outset: it seems evident enough that Nietzsche 
rejects traditional metaphysical realism (or at least attempts to), the notion that there 
is a mind-independent reality (most immediately, things-in-themselves) apart from 
human subjectivity, accessible to them or not. Hence, the requirement that 1) truth, 
and 2) knowledge principally conform to a mind-independent reality above and 
beyond all perspectives (human or otherwise) appears unintelligible within such a 
framework because there is no such thing to conform to. In lieu of either radical 
relativism or idealism, then, how are claims to knowledge and truth substantiated 
within perspectivism? 
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2.1 Epistemological Perspectivism – Crtitique of Perspectivism as 
Epistemology 
 
A strong recourse to solving these problems has been the epistemological 
interpretation of perspectivism, and the attempt to understand the consequences of 
perspectivism on epistemological grounds. One such interpretation of Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism is Tsarina Doyle‘s (2009), which highlights both Kant‘s influence on 
Nietzsche and perspectivism‘s purported epistemological basis as a theory. Framing 
perspectivism as a response to a Kantian problematic, Doyle writes that ‗Nietzsche‘s 
project entails not a rejection of Kant but rather a modification of him‘ (35). Where 
Kant had argued that human subjectivity constitutively structured our experience of 
the world, leading to an epistemic gap between the world as it was in itself and our 
experience of it, Doyle argues that Nietzsche (recognising the unintelligibility of the 
notion of a perspective-less noumenal reality) instead claims that those features of 
human experience that Kant saw as constitutive (the categories) were in fact 
regulative: ‗although all our knowledge is directed by our points of view, they do not 
constitute objects. Objects knowable by us, according to [Nietzsche], are neither 
reducible to nor determined by our point of view‘ (39). Doyle thereby sets out a 
fundamental point about perspectivism: human experience isn‘t fundamentally 
separate from reality taken as a whole, nor, however, is reality reducible only to 
human experience. This means that perspectivism ought not to reduce to a form of 
scepticism or naïve anthropocentrism. Doyle elaborates this crucial point throughout 
her work. Likewise, she addresses another important, basic problem in the relation 
between becoming and perspectivism by pointing out that becoming, according to 
Nietzsche, should not be understood as a radical flux, because this simply re-
instantiates the Kantian world of thing-in-themselves by positing a flux-in-itself, a 
becoming that is above and beyond the forms of human knowledge and perception 
incapable of grasping it. Instead, she claims that  
‗[…] Nietzsche‘s conception of Becoming applies to both our manner of knowing 
the world and the character of the world. Nietzsche suggests that the knowing self 
is immersed in the process of Becoming and consequently that our knowledge is 
not to be understood independently of this process. He thereby removes the 
epistemic gap that was opened up by Kant‘s constitutive account of knowledge. 
According to Nietzsche, the forms of our knowledge do not stand over and above 
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a world of Becoming constituting it from without, but rather are provisional 
maxims subject to revision and enclosed within the world‘ (43). 
This in turn resolves another core question: what is the relation between becoming in 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy and his doctrine of perspectivism? Doyle‘s answer is that 
becoming is interwoven with the perspectival character of our experience and 
knowledge, and also the character of the world at large, and therefore there is no 
fundamental conflict with either doctrine. Having looked at how Doyle addresses the 
core difficulties in interpreting a holistic perspectivism, it is now appropriate to 
examine what Doyle sees in the practical and theoretical implications of Nietzsche‘s 
perspectival reality. For Doyle the implications of perspectivism are most readily 
apparent in our epistemology: she bears out Nietzsche‘s dismantling of 
correspondence-style approaches to truth and knowledge by claiming that 
Nietzsche‘s perspectivism instead offers us a form of contextualism, ‗[b]y adopting a 
form of contextualism, Nietzsche aims to replace the metaphysical realist view from 
nowhere with the perspectivist view from somewhere‘ (61). This is a contextualism, 
Doyle holds, because our perspectival standards and (descriptive) evaluations ‗must 
undergo a process of justification in the context in which they are entertained‘ (62) 
and can still therefore be considered objective. Likewise, perspectival truth is 
defended against the epistemological possibility of our knowledge being massively 
at error by being subject to the same justification: ‗By emphasising that the 
acquisition of such new information must enter the justificatory arena Nietzsche 
rules out the possibility of such acquisitions casting our beliefs into massive error‘ 
(64). Justification itself is made possible according to Doyle by drawing on the 
distinction between cognitive capacities and cognitive interests. Truth must not 
depend on our cognitive capacities (which would threaten to relegate truth to 
anthropocentric realism, and also, as Doyle shows, would not ‗allow for the real 
possibility of increased observational abilities and discovery‘ (ibid.) which we seem 
to have), it must instead depend on our cognitive interests, because as Nietzsche 
points out, all truth is perspectivally grounded, and as Doyle writes, the formerly-
mentioned discoveries we make must be ‗justified and intelligible to us‘ (ibid.). This 
form of justification, Doyle highlights, appears to ensure a secure enough degree of 
certainty in our knowledge because what is presented for justification will never be 
unintelligible to us, or radically different, it will be intelligible to the extent that it 
reflects our cognitive interests (and to the extent that it reflects our cognitive 
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interests, it cannot be radically false). Of course, there are a range of cognitive 
interests, and not all will be properly epistemological, so Doyle further clarifies how 
some will be more conducive and reliable as epistemological standards than others: 
‗By emphasising the importance of justification and the giving of reasons, Nietzsche 
distinguishes between an interest that has entered the arena of justifying its epistemic 
credentials as opposed to any interest that we may have whatever. An interest is 
cognitive when it seeks to support its view with reasons for and against in a 
particular context‘ (65). 
 
In piecing together a coherent epistemological position from Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism, Doyle captures some of its most fundamental features, particularly the 
rejection of a reality-appearance problematic and its equivalent in the area of 
knowledge, and also clearly positions perspectivism, within an epistemological 
tradition in highlighting Kant‘s influence, and this research agrees with the above 
key points. Given the nature of Nietzsche‘s fragmented and aphoristic style of 
writing, it is necessary for any contemporary commentator who addresses 
Nietzsche‘s writing in a consistent and comprehensive manner to either construct or 
situate that work in a theoretical position with an accompanying terminology. In 
doing so, commentators run the risk of being anachronistic, of interpreting the work 
in terms that were inapplicable at the time of the philosopher. Nevertheless, an 
anachronistic reading may be helpful, and may be justified, insofar as it captures the 
spirit of the idea being put forward by the text, albeit in contemporary terminology. 
It may even be enlightening in the sense that the original author may not have had 
the language now available with which to better express the idea. One concern with 
Doyle‘s reading of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism is that it may be anachronistic in the 
sense that it interprets Nietzsche‘s writings and remarks pertaining to perspectivism 
in a contemporary analytic framework. For example, she describes Nietzsche‘s 
position as ‗adopting a contextualist argument claiming that our practices of 
justification determine truth‘ (61). Doyle‘s reading of perspectivism and the 
consequences it has for truth, knowledge and the appearance/reality distinction 
emphasizes the doctrine as having an epistemological nature. She writes, for 
example, that ‗‗Perspectivism thus aims to induce a form of epistemological modesty 
by claiming that we cannot acquire extra-perspectival knowledge‘ (66), likewise that 
‗Nietzsche‘s main contention with metaphysical realism thus centres on the issue of 
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the dissociation of truth and justification‘ (58), thereby foregrounding a 
preoccupation with the concerns of epistemology. There is no significant issue 
insofar as the terminology Doyle uses to interpret Nietzsche‘s writings is insightful 
and leads to a better understanding of the core ideas involved. It is, however, an open 
question in scholarly debate whether the sort of epistemological project that Doyle 
describes is present in Nietzsche‘s work. 
In contrast, this thesis holds that the project of finding a stable basis for 
knowledge appears to be among those ends of philosophy, along with the need (in a 
certain form) that motivates such projects, that Nietzsche hopes to have given later 
philosophers further resources to overcome with doctrines like perspectivism, 
understood ontologically. In an 1887 note Nietzsche appears to briefly outline the 
‗fundamental innovations‘ he foresees for the future of philosophy. They prove to be 
insightful regarding the role of epistemology, classically construed with the 
justification of knowledge: ‗In place of "epistemology," a perspective theory of 
affects (to which belongs a hierarchy of the affects; the affects transfigured; their 
superior order, their "spirituality‘ (WTP 462).   Likewise, Nietzsche also expresses 
distrust towards the classical epistemological project in another earlier note of 1885-
1886: ‗Deeply mistrustful of the dogmas of epistemology, I loved to look now out of 
this window, now out of that; I guarded against settling down with any of these 
dogmas, considered them harmful -and finally: is it likely that a tool is able to 
criticize its own fitness?- What I noticed was rather that no epistemological 
scepticism or dogmatism had ever arisen free from ulterior motives -that it acquires a 
value of the second rank as soon as one has considered what it was that compelled 
the adoption of this point of view‘ (WTP 410). What compels the adoption of this 
perspective, as far as Nietzsche sees it in Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, is a moral 
origin (ibid.). There are further notes in which Nietzsche appears to denigrate the 
traditional epistemological concern over knowledge: an 1887 note claiming that 
‗[t]he measure of positive knowledge is quite subsidiary or a matter of indifference: 
as witness the development of India‘ (WTP 580). Given such writing, this research 
would rather examine the ways in which Nietzsche might be considered to be 
overcoming the project of epistemology, as he is concerned with overcoming 
conventional morality. One way to understand what overcoming the traditional 
project of epistemology means is to fundamentally turn away from considering 
knowledge as a problem of justification to considering knowledge in purely 
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practical, efficacious terms, as ‗know-how‘ and ‗knowing to‘. Thus, as Schacht 
writes,  
‗‗Knowing that‘ is thus a function of ‗knowing how,‘ which relates to the 
attainment of practical objectives in our dealings with the world and each other, 
and in which efficacy takes precedence over all other considerations. ‗Knowledge 
works as a tool of power,‘ not merely in the superficial sense that theoretical 
insight often can be turned to practical advantage, but also in a more fundamental 
sense. For the character of ‗knowing‘ reflects both a ‗will to power‘ and the 
contingencies of our constitution on the one hand, and on the other the sorts of 
possibilities presented to us by the world.‘ (Schacht 1983, p. 87) 
A shift in terms of practicality is implied to a certain extent with Doyle‘s treatment 
of perspectival knowing, as she highlights in writing how, for Nietzsche, ‗cognitive 
interests represent our best standards of rational acceptability (our best reasons for 
holding a theory to be true‘ (Doyle, 2009:65). Indeed, philosophical reflection on our 
cognitive interests and their practical use in the role of knowing seems to be well 
advocated by Nietzsche, and an entirely compatible fit with Nietzsche‘s renewed 
understanding of knowledge explicated by Schacht. Schacht‘s reading of a renewed 
conception of knowledge in Nietzsche philosophy, however, still represents a 
philosophical endeavour sizeably different to one in which the core aim is motivated 
by justified, verifiable access to a reality. By undermining the distinction between 
human perspective and mind-independent reality, and revealing its genealogical 
history in philosophy, Nietzsche shows that the traditional concern in epistemology 
is an unintelligible demand, and can thus be dispensed with. Doyle appears to 
recognize that Nietzsche works in part towards a conclusion like this, but maintains 
that Nietzsche foremost works toward establishing a basis on which we can 
reasonably assure ourselves that we are not in complete error in our beliefs, that we 
have access to mind-independent reality in a particular form. These are projects part 
of a traditional epistemological conception. This work would instead hold that the 
aim and importance of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism is not to provide a stable basis for 
human knowledge and to ensure justifiable access to reality, it is to show that the 
demand for either can be dispensed with, and that epistemology as a whole, 
traditionally understood, is a project that can be dispensed with by Nietzsche‘s future 
philosophers.  
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In the following sections, I aim to show that Nietzsche‘s underlying process 
ontology (understood in terms of expression of force) and the overlying will to 
power doctrine makes the notion of fundamental epistemological error trivial: strictly 
speaking there are no beliefs that are in error, because beliefs have no significant 
semantic content when considered as being as being reducible to expressions of 
power. There can be epistemological errors in Nietzsche‘s power ontology only in 
the sense that one perspective ‗runs up against‘, is subsumed or contradicted by a 
more powerful, broader perspective. Likewise, a belief cannot be justified in 
anything but the trivial sense stated above because Nietzsche‘s power ontology 
shows that a process of justification is nothing more than an expression of power that 
demonstrates the growth, subsumption, and health of whomever holds the belief. 
Such a position appears to dangerously resemble a more simplistic ‗might makes 
right‘ position: I hold that this, to a significant extent, may be true of Nietzsche‘s 
epistemology, with the substitution of the term ‗power‘ for ‗might‘. And that a form 
of power-pragmatism would be more accurate in the description of Nietzsche‘s 
position in this regard. In order to more satisfyingly explain why this is the case, I 
want to finally draw on the key notion of truth in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, and its 
relation to perspectivism. I will argue for a reading of truth as equivalent to power in 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy, because such a reading shows how perspectivism and will to 
power can be continuous with each other. In order to bring such a reading out 
further, I also consider and address criticisms from another proponent of the 
epistemological reading, Katrina Mitcheson. 
 
2.2 Epistemological Perspectivism - Perspectivism and Truth 
 
If Nietzsche rejects the framing of correspondence-type epistemologies and 
truth, and the implications of perspectivism make it unnecessary for him to adopt the 
contextualist position that Doyle suggests, then how does he propose distinguishing 
between what we want to call real and illusory (ontologically speaking) or true and 
false (epistemologically speaking)? What appears to be the most effective candidate 
in Nietzsche‘s philosophy is power, or degrees of power. Given that power 
(equivalent to expression of force) constitutes perspectives, it will soon become clear 
why power is the standard according to which claims about ontology and truth 
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should be evaluated. A number of commentators, such as Ruediger Grimm and 
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, have already suggested similar theories
26
. I will now 
examine the core points of this position, and consider a recent criticism and opposing 
thesis by Katrina Mitcheson. 
 
In what follows I will mainly draw on Grimm, who argues that Nietzsche‘s 
understanding of truth is an outgrowth of the will to power. Grimm summarises his 
position succinctly: ‗Nietzsche's criterion for truth is not concerned at all with the 
logical content of the proposition. The content, in fact, is largely irrelevant. Its truth 
or falsity lies in the degree of efficacity, in the degree of power increase or decrease, 
with which the proposition functions when I employ it in my behavior.‘ (Grimm 
1977, p. 19, my emphasis). Truth and falsity, according to Grimm, is equivalent to 
efficacy. The more efficacy something has, the truer it is. The same can be said for 
ontological questions about reality and appearance: ‗An object is "real" (or a "true" 
object) because it resists me, because it does not conform to my every whim. I know 
that the wall is real because I cannot walk through it: it resists my passage. 
Something which offers no resistance has no objective reality‘27 (20). Such a 
conception of truth, of course, has to be strongly qualified. However, most 
immediately, Grimm draws on the notion of resistance as a means of differentiating 
greater or lesser truths and reality from appearance. A truer idea, according to 
Grimm, is one that requires ‗straining my intellect, pushing it beyond its previous 
limits, overcoming resistance and thereby growing in (intellectual) power‘ (ibid.). 
Likewise, in terms of reality, whether an object is real or not depends on the amount 
of resistance it offers against another expression of force, a notion which strongly 
resembles the Eleatic principle. 
Such a radical understanding of truth prompts a number of difficult issues 
which I will soon address. Before I do so, I would like to consider Katrina 
Mitcheson‘s recent argument against this interpretation of truth as a means of 
addressing some core misunderstandings. Although Mitcheson focuses on Grimm‘s 
and Müller-Lauter‘s readings, I will draw only on Grimm‘s because Grimm‘s 
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 See Grimm, Ruediger Hermann, Nietzsche‘s Theory of Knowledge. Berlin; New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1977, and Müller-Lauter, Wolfgang. Nietzsche: his Philosophy of Contradictions and the 
Contradictions of his Philosophy. Translated by David J. Parent. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1999. 
27
 Such a conception may go some ways towards explaining claims like WTP 534: ‗The criterion of 
truth resides in the enhancement of the feeling of power‘ 
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account presents an extended treatment of the issue. Mitcheson writes of these 
arguments that they ‗confuse Nietzsche‘s analysis of what has often been taken to be 
true, which is that which has maximised power for a particular perspective, or 
provided the only outlet of the expression of power for a weak perspective, with his 
own criterion for truth‘ (Mitcheson 2013, p. 49). Expanding her argument, 
Mitcheson highlights how Nietzsche, through his critical methodology, reveals as 
‗illusions‘ those ideas that have provided humans with ‗enhanced power‘, doctrines 
as pervasive as the ascetic ideal, and fundamental features of human thought like the 
notion of identity. She goes on to point out that these illusions are ‗contrasted to the 
truths that emerge from a new truth practice. These truths include the analysis of 
why these illusions have been taken as truths in terms of the wills to power, or 
perspectives, they serve‘ (ibid. 49). What enhances power, therefore, cannot 
necessarily be equivalent to what is true, because we seem to be aware of cases 
where an apparent enhancement of power (the ascetic ideal, the notion of identity) is 
seen to be illusory or false. Mitcheson also briefly offers another reason why power 
cannot be considered equivalent to truth: ‗although Nietzsche remains committed to 
the value of truth, he does not value truth in itself. It is a mistake, therefore, to equate 
what he ultimately takes as true with the evaluative standard of what maximises 
power or, to put it another way, with what enhances life‘ (ibid. 49). 
 
By proceeding in a manner that persists in holding that Nietzsche‘s 
methodology as revealing the traditional epistemic falseness or ‗illusoriness‘ of 
doctrines like the ascetic ideal, Mitcheson seems to neglect a central point that 
Grimm emphasizes about understanding truth as a function of power. Grimm 
devotes a portion of the writing in his chapter on truth to what is called the 
‗Revaluation of the Disjunction True-False‘ (1977, p. 21). In it, Grimm very clearly 
points out that with such a conception ‗the traditional concept of truth and falsity 
scarcely applies anymore to this context of resistance and power differences‘ (ibid.). 
We can see that it scarcely applies anymore because, strictly speaking, the 
conception effectively implies that there are no actual illusions or falsities in the 
world (which is a power-flux ontology shaped by Nietzsche‘s will to power 
doctrine). Although Nietzsche often uses the terminology of illusion or falseness 
conventionally, his power ontology allows us to reduce talk of illusions or falseness 
to a basic way of describing contrasting perspectives of greater or lesser power. Such 
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reducibility may be partly reflected in claims by Nietzsche that ‗the will to power is 
the primitive form of affect, that all other affects are only developments of it‘ (WTP 
688). 
It might be objected that Nietzsche rarely uses the true/false terminology in a 
way that suggests their direct reducibility to will to power. This can be readily 
admitted, and it makes sense to say that in attacking other perspectives as false, 
dishonest or illusory Nietzsche not simply trying to expose a perspective as that of 
greater or lesser power. In drawing on the language of truth and falsity, Nietzsche‘s 
critique of perspectives has a transformative aspect. In exposing the will to truth as 
influenced by the ascetic ideal, for example, we have the capacity to transform our 
practices in the areas of knowledge and life. As Mitcheson points out, ‗a change in a 
drive, habit or practice, themselves wills to power, can effect a change in the unity of 
wills to power which make up an individual‘ (Mitcheson 2013, p. 128), and such 
changes may apply to communities and societies in the long run. Nietzsche‘s use of 
terms such as honesty and dishonesty in the intellectual sense reflect a constructive 
aspect, and this aspect may not be directly appreciated we only talk in terms of 
power. What Nietzsche‘s power ontology nonetheless showcases is that these 
processes of transformation are essentially processes of power: a change in the 
practice of truth for the better or worse is a growth or diminishment of power. 
To continue along these lines, one might say that according to this 
understanding of truth, there is no falsity, there are only greater or lesser degrees of 
truth
28
. Consider briefly the case of hallucinations: we conventionally assume that 
when we experience a hallucination, auditory or visual, we are seeing or hearing 
something in the world that doesn‘t actually exist; it isn‘t ―real‖. Properly speaking, 
however, the hallucination is entirely real, but only as an activity in the brain, we 
have simply misinterpreted that activity as something that is an existing object in the 
world. Grimm‘s interpretation holds something similar about all phenomena relating 
to the true/false distinction; there are no real non-existent objects like hallucinations, 
for example, only misinterpretations of existing ones (that is to say, less powerful 
interpretations positing a false object contrasted more powerful ones drawing on 
                                                          
28
 The same might be said of Nietzsche‘s evaluative philosophy ultimately: there are no true 
negations, only veiled affirmations. Such a dictum is partially reflected in Nietzsche‘s observation 
that humans would rather will nothing than not will at all (OGM III, 1) 
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psychology
29
). According to this conception, then, when Nietzsche reveals doctrines 
like the ascetic ideal as ―illusory‖ he is essentially showing that they are 
misinterpretations of power differences, or less efficacious interpretations than his 
own, more life-affirming one. This is why genealogy as an investigative 
methodology is so important in Nietzsche‘s mature philosophy: it provides a 
concrete means of demonstrating how a thing is ‗illusory‘ or ‗false‘, in efficacious 
terms, after one abandons conventional standards of truth and reality as 
correspondence, by evaluating the power differences between ways and doctrines of 
living. 
With this clarification in mind, it seems as though Mitcheson, in her 
criticisms, is assuming a conception of truth that Grimm‘s interpretation is calling 
into question in the first place. When understood with the renewed conception, 
Mitcheson highlighting that ‗[w]hat has enhanced power […] and what has been 
useful […] are often shown by Nietzsche‘s methodology to be illusions‘ (Mitcheson 
2013, p. :49)  simply means that the degree of truth involved in the prior 
interpretation of phenomena like the ascetic ideal is inferior to Nietzsche‘s 
genealogical interpretation, and when truth is understood as a function of power this 
means that the former interpretation is less powerful, less ―true‖ than the latter. 
Hence, the ascetic ideal and other doctrines may be useful and enhance the power of 
those who adopt them, but they are only illusory in the sense that they are not as 
powerful as instinctually healthy ways of life of higher types, or the life-affirming 
philosophical doctrines that Nietzsche prescribes
30
. Nietzsche does not expressly 
draw on this viewpoint in criticising other perspectives, he rather uses the 
conventional language of falsity and dishonesty. However, if we take his power 
ontology seriously then we are committed to viewing these perspectives as 
ontologically real, existing in the world as expressions of force with some degree of 
power. In such instances the only way of describing such perspectives in terms of 
falsity is through a relational comparison of power. 
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 The power disparity between interpretations could be understood in direct terms of efficacy: 
treating a hallucination as a real-life object limits ones‘ capacity to act in many cases, whereas the 
psychological interpretation reducing the hallucination to brain activity is a means of understanding 
and potentially curing the ailment, which increases the capacity to acts. 
30
 This partly reflects Nietzsche‘s view in BGE 30 that ‗What helps feed or nourish the higher type of 
man must be almost poisonous to a very different and lesser type. The virtues of a base man could 
indicate vices and weaknesses in a philosopher. […]. There are books that have inverse values for 
soul and for health, depending on whether they are used by the lower souls and lowlier life-forces, or 
by the higher and more powerful ones‘. 
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If the world is power, and truth is power, how should Nietzche‘s questioning 
of the value of truth be understood? When Nietzsche critiques truth in such 
instances, it appears that he is critiquing truth in its classical correspondence form, or 
a ‗truth in itself‘ the will to truth as a will to comprehend a world apart from 
appearances and perspectives, and at any cost
31
. BGE 2, for example, conveys the 
impression that Nietzsche critiques the value of truth residing in ‗the lap of being, 
the everlasting, the hidden God, the ―thing-in-itself‖‘ and opposes his future 
philosophers as ones who reverse these values. There is also a key part of this 
aphorism in which Nietzsche questions ‗[t]he fundamental belief of metaphysicians 
is the belief in oppositions of values‘ (ibid). In this aphorism Nietzsche evidently 
directs his criticism towards truth as it is metaphysically construed, as being the 
thing-in-itself or world-in-itself. One particular point stands out from Nietzsche‘s 
critiques: truth is often portrayed as something that is sometimes good for life and 
sometimes not. How do we reconcile this if truth is power, and power is intrinsically 
valuable in an ontological sense? The key point to note is that there is no single 
‗life‘, there are various forms of life, various perspectives that make up the whole. 
Hence, to say that truth can be good and bad for life is effectively to say that it can 
be good for some forms of life, bad for others. Likewise, the classical desires to 
know absolute truth writ large is incoherent within Nietzsche‘s power ontology, 
because the world is not describable in terms of a single perspective, hence it is not 
describe in terms of absolute truth. A perspective will always be limited. 
Comprehending the world as a whole as will to power will aid higher types and 
allow them to act in a more empowered manner, whereas such a comprehension 
would be detrimental for a lower type and hence be a check or diminishment of their 
power. 
 
Mitcheson‘s critique raises a second point worthy of extended consideration. 
She writes that ‗although Nietzsche remains committed to the value of truth, he does 
not value truth in itself. It is a mistake, therefore, to equate what he ultimately takes 
as true with the evaluative standard of what maximises power or, to put it another 
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 One thinks of sections in which truth is rendered as a quasi-metaphysical or theological concept, as 
in GS 344, where truth is ‗a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests - that even we 
knowers of today, we godless antimetaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the 
thousand-year old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato‘s faith, that God is truth; that truth is 
divine‘. 
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way, with what enhances life. Rather, truth is valuable for Nietzsche if its pursuit and 
our commitment to it are found to be life-enhancing‘ (ibid.). In order to address this 
point, we have to consider very carefully the relationship between truth and power if 
they are taken as equivalent, firstly, and then the relationship between power and 
life-enhancement. If there are clear discordances in either, then we have reason to 
reject the equivalence of truth to power. It appears that Nietzsche doesn‘t value truth 
in itself as far we understand truth according to the conventional, epistemic 
conception. What does this mean, however, in terms of the renewed conception of 
truth as power? It is important to note that with this renewed conception, there is 
nothing like an abstract ―power-in-itself‖; power is understood as expression of 
force, and is therefore embodied in everything from activities to beings. With power 
understood as such, it seems fairly clear that this is indeed what Nietzsche does value 
in itself, as power is both the means and the end
32. Now, Mitcheson writes that ‗truth 
is valuable for Nietzsche if its pursuit and our commitment to it are found to be life-
enhancing‘ (ibid); with what has already been said about power, it seems clear that 
an enhancement of life is essentially an enhancement of power, a greater degree of 
power. Following from the renewed conception, it is therefore a greater degree of 
truth. Contrary to what Mitcheson would claim, then, truth is not independent of its 
value. 
It‘s clear that there are some interpretive issues with the reading offered here. 
Nietzsche does not make a direct equivalence between power, truth, and value. There 
is some evidence of a considered relationship, as in WTP 534 where Nietzsche 
claims that the ‗criterion of truth resides in the enhancement of the feeling of power‘. 
Likewise, Nietzsche hints at a relationship between truth and the feeling of power in 
GS 13:  ‗Whether benefiting or hurting others involves sacrifices for us does not 
affect the- ultimate value of our actions. Even if we offer our lives, as martyrs do for 
their church, this is a sacrifice that is offered for our desire for power or for the 
purpose of preserving our feeling of power. Those who feel "I possess Truth"-how 
many possessions would they not abandon I order to save this feeling!‘. 
In AC 2 Nietzsche seems to link power with value in asking: ‗What is good? - 
Everything that enhances people's feeling of power, will to power, power itself‘. 
Hence, there are several different references through parts of Nietzsche‘s work 
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 John Richarson‘s article ‗Nietzsche‘s Value Monism: Saying Yes To Everything‘ (Nietzsche on 
mind and nature) is an extended reading of Nietzsche‘s philosophy in similar terms. 
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suggesting various relations between these concepts, but no direct instances of 
equivalence. Rather than attempting to argue that this may have been Nietzsche‘s 
definitive view, I would rather claim that it is a fruitful avenue of thought to develop 
an equivalence on the basis of these relations. Nietzsche‘s remarks invite us to 
consider an equivalence but they do not themselves establish one. Thus, reading truth 
as equivalent to power may lack direct textual evidence, and may not ultimately 
reflect Nietzsche‘s textual view. However, I hope to have shown foremost that truth 
can be rendered as equivalent to power coherently within Nietzsche‘s philosophy, 
and doing so offers us further means of cohering ontology with epistemology within 
such a philosophy. This would then be a strength of such a reading. 
 
 
2.3 Psycho-biological Perspectivism: A Critique 
 
Having examined various facets of epistemological perspectivism, it appears 
that such a reading seems to underestimate key practical elements that run against 
the concerns of traditional epistemology: namely, Nietzsche‘s pre-occupation with 
radically re-understanding epistemology as a concern with efficacy, ‗know-how‘, 
along with the relationship between truth and power, as described above. This strong 
link between power and truth brings us to alternative readings of perspectivism that 
appear to link the doctrine to psychology, biology, and even ontology. One 
promising and prominent reading of perspectivism is that of it functioning as a 
psychobiological principle. Ken Gemes has recently suggested that perspectivism be 
considered a psychobiological claim with two components, one that is ‗overt 
descriptive‘ and another that is ‗hidden normative‘ (Gemes 2013, p. 564). Gemes 
describes the descriptive component as such: ‗Each drive has its own perspective/ 
interpretation of the world and seeks to express that interpretation of the world, often 
at the expense of other drives‘ (ibid.), while the normative aspect is the claim ‗that a 
healthy life involves the maximal expression of the richest set of drives‘ (ibid. 572). 
The advantages over the epistemological reading are claimed to be: 1) that it fits with 
Nietzsche‘s writing about how organic life is perspectival33, 2) it shows how 
perspectivism links with Nietzsche‘s evaluative philosophy of power by linking it to 
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 ‗There would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspectival evaluations and appearances‘. (BGE 
34) 
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organic life and how life extends itself, and 3) it neatly links in with what Nietzsche 
writes about perspectivism in GM III
34
. There remain a number of questions, 
however, that Gemes‘s suggested reading does not address. Most importantly, if 
(according to this reading) Nietzsche thinks that each drive interprets the world and 
expresses its interpretation at the cost of others, and if humans are totalities of such 
drives (these drives being the relevant perspectives in question) then is Nietzsche‘s 
psycho-biological description itself a perspectival interpretation by the drives? If so, 
the further questions implied by the status of such a view lead the dispute back into 
epistemological-ontological territory. 
To some extent, these questions are addressed through Gemes‘ alignment 
with the position outlined by John Richardson, of equating drives with the will to 
power: ‗drives are ‗will to power‘ in that they essentially pursue the continual 
enhancement of their distinctive activities, enhancement that consists in their 
mastery of others. So the level of a drive‘s activity, its strength, is measured by ‗how 
much‘ it rules over others. (Richardson, 1996: 33)‘. According to Richardson‘s 
understanding, ‗Nietzsche takes his power ontology to generate a 'perspectivism' (35) 
and the 'perspectives' this teaching speaks of are those of drives or wills to power‘ 
(ibid.) The most important aspect of how Richardson thus understands perspectives 
is an intentional aspect that he expands upon: ‗as will to power, a drive aims at 
ongoing growth in its distinctive activity. Nietzsche's perspectivism begins in the 
thought that this telic directedness goes together with an intentional one, with being 
a perspective, 'at' or 'on' some intentional content. Just by virtue of striving in the 
way it does, every drive involves, is partly, a particular ―view‖: a view of its purpose 
or end and of the surroundings as helps or hindrances to that end‘ (ibid). Unlike 
Gemes, who seems reluctant to admit any significant role that a preceding ontology 
might have in understanding perspectivism, Richardson seems to more explicitly 
recognise its importance, and even if he resists completely equating power ontology 
with perspectivism, he comes very close to doing so on occasion: ‗Nietzsche's 
thought includes both a metaphysics and a perspectivism, once these are more 
complexly grasped. But I argue that the metaphysics is basic: it's an ontology of 
perspectives‘ (1996, p. 12). I will return to Richardson‘s reading later, when I 
examine its treatment of will to power compared to perspectivism. 
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 ‗All happening in the organic world is an overpowering, a becoming-lord-over ; and . . . in turn, all 
overpowering and becoming-lord-over is a new interpreting . . . ‗ (OGM II, 12) 
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Even if taken as the psychobiological doctrine suggested by Gemes, 
perspectivism still requires elements from an underlying ontology to be properly 
understood. Gemes draws on Richardson‘s conception in order to explain what 
perspectives actually are, but it seems clear that Richardson implicates power 
ontology with perspectivism at a number of points. Nonetheless, strong links 
between the two philosophical ideas may not be sufficient to equate the two in a 
fundamental sense, and my claim will be that indeed power ontology is 
perspectivism, and vice-versa, and as such, that perspectivism is foremost an 
ontological principle.  The psycho-biological interpretation of Gemes may be 
insufficient, to conclude, because it still leaves us with questions about whether a 
fundamental distinction between psychobiological types of phenomena and all other 
types can be fundamentally maintained. Troublingly, it seems that psychobiological 
phenomena are reducible to more basic expressions of force best understood in 
ontological terms. The reason that perspectivism cannot only be understood wholly 
in psychobiological terms is that the fundamental notion of ‗drives‘ that interpreters 
draw on cannot be understood only on fundamentally psychobiological terms. This is 
because drives can be explained in more fundamental terms as power quanta, and 
power quanta include phenomena not limited only to the psycho-biological realm; 
that is, phenomena that we don‘t consider to be only life, organic or psychological in 
nature. Indeed, Nietzsche sometimes seems to cloud the distinction between both on 
the basis of his power or force terminology
35
, and so it will be necessary to examine 
a last variety of perspectivism that treats it as fundamentally ontological, and that 
inter-relates it with the doctrine of will to power. 
 
2.4 Ontological Perspectivism (or Perspectival Ontology) 
 
This brings us to the final influential interpretation of Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism, which claims that perspectivism extends to a characterisation of the 
world itself, that the world is perspectival in structure. Hales and Welshon have 
previously advanced a strong example of this interpretation, which also implements 
                                                          
35
 Cf. WTP 655: ‗The drive to approach-and the drive to thrust something back are the bond, in both' 
the inorganic and the organic world. The entire distinction is a prejudice. The will to power in every 
combination of forces, defending itself against the stronger, lunging at the weaker, is more correct.‘ 
 81 
 
Nietzsche‘s doctrine of will to power. As a basis they draw on Nietzsche‘s claim that 
the world ‗is composed of quanta of power that organize into sets of increasingly 
complex structures‘ (Hales and Welshon 2000, p. 62). As I have previously 
discussed, this is a common feature in commentaries on becoming and will to power, 
in which the world is characterised as atomic or monadic units of force. Hales and 
Welshon qualify their reading by making clear that these quanta are not concrete 
substances but rather ‗events of power‘ (63), terminology reminiscent of process 
philosophical vocabulary. Nietzsche‘s doctrine of will to power figures into 
perspectival ontology according to Hales and Welshon in the sense that it is the 
manner in which quanta of power organize themselves into ‗structure bundles or 
alliances of power, each such alliance concerned with extending its power‘ (64), it is 
this latter point concerning extension of power in particular that characterizes the 
doctrine. Having established the groundwork, Hales and Welshon claim that this 
ontology is comparable to bundle-theory type descriptions in Philosophy by figures 
such as Berkeley, Hume and Russell (66).  
 
It is with this bundle-theory conceptualization of things in the world that 
there lies a significant question concerning Hales‘ and Welshon‘s reading. If quanta 
of power are grouped together in various bundles that we might ascribe thing-hood 
to then we must ask whether this is a process that goes on without external 
interpretation (that bundles are somehow intrinsically so-formed), or whether 
bundles require a ‗bundler‘: a perspective in virtue of which quanta are grouped. Just 
as important, we must ask whether (if things are constituted as bundles of power 
quanta) any part of a bundle could change without the bundle itself going out of 
existence That things do appear to change and yet remain stable as things is taken as 
a point against bundle theory. Likewise, how is bundle individuation conducted? 
What makes more or less of an aggregate of power quanta a thing-- for example, 
what is it that makes my hand a distinct thing and not ‗my hand, the table, and the 
laptop‘ all a single thing?  
Hales and Welshon outline three different responses for this question that can 
be seen in Nietzsche‘s writing: conjunctivism, constellationism, and organizationism. 
Under conjunctivism, every bundle or organization of power quanta is 
simultaneously a thing: this means that the number of things in the world is 
equivalent to the number of all combinations of power quanta. According to this 
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view the world is ‗pre-furnished‘, already maximally populated with objects mapped 
to bundles (so, ‗my hand‘ is a thing, ‗table‘ is a thing, ‗laptop‘ is a thing, and ‗my 
hand-plus-table-plus-laptop‘ is also a thing) , what changes is not the objects in the 
world but our capacity to perceive and appreciate a different number of these 
objects: ‗finite human perspectives cannot incorporate all combinations of power 
quanta, so we focus instead on certain subsets of them […] Such redirections may be 
construed as some kind of change in the external world, but, given that the world is 
impacted, it is in fact only an epistemic change in view‘ (73). The second option is 
constellationism: constellationism allows for change in bundles on the basis that it is 
perspectives which form, modify and individuate those bundles. Under this reading, 
things come into and go out of existence, and change, on the basis of perspectives. 
Hales and Welshon point out that there a number of questions concerning 
constellationism: ‗introducing interpreters as the individuators of bundles leaves 
mysterious just how interpreters are capable of forming bundles. Just what power do 
these interpreters have? How is it used?‘ (71). Likewise, a fundamental issue raised 
for constellationism is Peter Poellner‘s argument that generates problems for any 
such anti-essentialist stance by showing that if all quanta are mutually dependent on 
each other for existence through interpretation, then there must be some intrinsic 
property that is generative, itself independently outside this circle of relationality 
(thus refuting anti-essentialism) or quanta are ultimately not truly separate from 
each, giving way to monism
36
. Compared with these two readings, both 
commentators agree that Nietzsche holds closest to a form of ‗organizationism‘ 
about bundles, the view that bundles are individuated intrinsically without external 
interpretation. Organizationism avoids the issue of changing bundles ceasing to be 
things, and both commentators write that Nietzsche ‗is happy to agree that things do 
not change, or, viewed another way, there is change only and no continuing things 
that undergo change‘ (72) (one might be inclined to think of this claim as a type of 
monism).Hales and Welshon also draw on this form of organizationalism to respond 
to Poellner‘s criticisms of anti-essentialism: they claim that there may be some 
relational properties that are also essential properties, giving as an example the 
relation one has to one‘s parents, as on the one hand you would not be who you are 
without them (or if one had different ones), making them essential, while at the same 
                                                          
36
 See Peter Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics (1995, pp. 108-110) for an extended discussion of 
this problem in more analytical terms. 
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time they are two distinct entities and therefore partly relational. Having essential, 
relational properties thus fits nicely with Hales‘ and Welshon‘s organisationalism 
because such properties may come about and coalesce into a bundle according to an 
internal principle of organization rather than depending on a particular perspective. 
Organizationism is also significant in that it is compatible with another core doctrine 
in Nietzsche‘s philosophy: amor fati. The idea that every part is essential to power 
bundles to make them what they are and cannot be changed without fundamentally 
changing the bundle is one that resonates with the necessary sense of amor fati. If 
bundles are individuated intrinsically without external interpretation, what is left for 
Hales and Welshon is to show how they can be so and yet also perspectival at the 
same time. Hales and Welshon put forward the view that for each quantum of power 
there is a corresponding perspective mapped onto it, that ‗perspectives can be 
mapped to both discrete quanta of power as well as more complex bundles of power‘ 
(74). So, for every quantum of power there will be a perspective, at all levels of 
complexity. There are still other questions concerning organizationism that deserve 
to be explored: primarily, what is it in virtue of which bundles of power quanta are 
organized. This is a point both commentators recognise, admitting that 
‗organizationism leaves unexplained what is that in virtue of which the quanta form 
these agreements‘ (72).  
Hales and Welshon make a powerful argument for perspectival ontology, and 
it is surprising how convincing their basis in a relational, essentialist and pseudo-
monistic ontology is. These features do blanch with his writings on various issues, 
however, often as much as the other positions they outline do
37
. There also some 
outstanding issues: what is the organizing principle that makes quanta of power 
group in the ways that they do? Furthermore, there appear to be some questions 
worth asking about the interaction between the distinctly perspectivist elements and 
the ontology these commentators put forward. According to Hales and Welshon, 
perspectives are generated by the will to power, ‗a locus of will to power generates a 
perspective‘ (21). Adopting a perspective by a locus of power (such as a human 
being) affords a degree of change in that locus according to both commentators: 
                                                          
37
 The ‗bundle‘ conception of power quanta may be taken to read something like an atomistic 
conception, which Nietzsche criticises as a linguistic prejudice in OGM, prologue, § 13: ‗Natural 
scientists are no better when they say ―Force moves, force causes,‖ and so on—our entire scientific 
knowledge, for all its coolness, its freedom from feelings, still remains exposed to the seductions of 
language and has not gotten rid of the changelings foisted on it, the ―Subjects‖ (the atom, for example, 
is such a changeling, like the Kantian ―thing-in-itself‖)‘. 
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‗Adopting a perspective is then a way of mastering one‘s experiences, of coming to 
grips with them‘ (ibid.). However, Hales and Welshon seem to de-emphasize the 
causal power of perspectives when they adopt organizationism and claim that things 
do not change. According to their reading, perspectives ‗can be mapped to both 
discrete quanta of power as well as more complex bundles of power‘ (74) but it is 
unclear what need there is for them, ontologically speaking, if they do not have any 
causal influence. This does, however, seem at odds with Nietzsche‘s writing because 
that a perspective interprets means that it has some causal effect on the world: to say 
that adopting a perspective is a way of mastering one‘s experiences must be cashed 
in through causal terms, otherwise it is effectively superfluous. To allow that the 
interpretive work of perspectives is causal (that is to say, efficient) and can affect 
other perspectives would seem to undermine organizationism, however. How do 
Hales and Welshon respond to this issue? They claim that, following from their point 
that every power quantum has a distinct, mapped perspective, that causality must 
also be ‗a species of the genus interpretation-perspective‘ (108) and therefore for 
every power quantum there will simply be ‗a distinct causal interpretation-
perspective‘ (ibid.). Causality, then, is reduced to the form of interpretation of 
perspective, and is thus thoroughly perspectival on every level, and this would 
resolve any sort of issues of extra-perspectival causality.  
However, this point should also be considered in terms of the previous debate 
between organizationism and constellationism. According to organizationism, 
perspectives do not affect each other: things cannot change, there is only an infinity 
of perspectival interpretations for each variety and instance of thing. This then 
amounts to claim that on the one hand there is a brute ontology of unchanging things 
(or simply change itself) along with perspectives, and among these perspectives is 
causality, causality as efficient force is thus assimilated to perspectives. One problem 
that can be seen, however, is whether causality has any meaningful function within 
this organizationalist ontology. There is no causal interaction between quantum 
bundles on a basic ontological level, there is no causal interaction between 
perspectives, and there is no causal interaction between causal interpretations—
because there is no causal interaction going on, what is it in the first place that makes 
interpretations causal? This account of causality and its underlying ontology is, as 
Hales and Welshon recognize, ‗strikingly similar traditional views of substance, with 
power quanta serving as the fundamental nuggets out of which intrinsically 
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individuated objects are composed‘ (110). Nietzsche, however, criticizes the notion 
of substance at length, and it seems unlikely that his writings were aimed at 
establishing another variety of a substance-type ontology. This highlights a potential 
lacuna in both commentator‘s account: they spend hardly any time discussing in their 
chapters on causality and ontology what role becoming has in Nietzsche‘s 
metaphysical thinking, and as we have already seen in earlier chapters, becoming is a 
fundamental part of Nietzsche‘s thought. It would be strange, then, that his 
ontological insights reflect a position in contradistinction with that part. As we have 
seen, both Hales and Welshon claim that Will to Power is intertwined with 
perspectivism in the sense that perspectives are generated by will to power. Will to 
power is effectively equivalent to an ontology of force, in which particular 
individuations of such force is driven to growth and overcoming, and through this 
drive tend to form groups or bundles of force. For every individuation or group of 
force there is an equivalent interpretation or perspective, and this is perspectivism.  
 
2.5 Theories of Will to Power 
 
We have already briefly examined various points made about will to power, 
but before finally putting forward an interpretation that attempts to resolve 
perspectivism and will to power simultaneously, it is necessary to examine other 
preceding interpretations of will to power in order to establish how to proceed. As 
with perspectivism, there are a variety of different interpretations of will to power, 
which themselves range from ontological (Richardson 1996, Sorgner 2007) to 
biological-psychological (Clark 1990, Reginster 2006). I will not attempt to fully 
detail each branch, but it will be necessary to discuss ontological readings as a basis 
for my own interpretation. Furthermore, instead of attempting to analyse every 
particular theory within the ontological branch, I want to draw out the general 
features I see operative in them and evaluate those features as to how well they mesh 
with perspectivism. A common tendency with ontological theories of will to power 
is the attempt to render will to power sensible in terms of distinct quanta. We saw 
this already with Hales and Welshon: monadic or atomic language appears to be 
necessary at times to describe will to power working ontologically. Will to power is 
equivalent to force, and we can describe that force in terms of singular quanta (a 
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quantum of power) or grouped quanta (constellations). There are greater and lesser 
degree to which theorists engage in this practice, and different ways in which they do 
so: Richardson ascribes an autotelic sense to the drives that make up his version of 
the will to power ontology. According to Richardson drives have an internal 
directedness: 'Nietzsche, despite his repeated attacks on (what he calls) "teleology", 
really has such a theory himself: the beings or units in his world are crucially end-
directed, and to understand them properly is to grasp how they‘re directed or aimed. 
Above all, it's to grasp how they‘re aimed at power, an end somehow essential to 
them' (Richardson 1996, p. 21). Power, however, does not exist abstracted from 
other phenomena, nor is it separate from all the drives: ''Power [isn't] definitionally 
separable from some (or other) "drive", some pre-existing pattern of effort, with its 
own internal ends; power isn't an independent state, that could be described without 
supposing some such effort as given.' (Richardson 1996, p. 23). For Richardson the 
importance and place of power, as the ontological equivalent of will to power, 
consists in the growth in activity of a drive. Drives don't merely aim to discharge 
themselves, the telic aspects of drives is their tendency towards a growth complexity 
and richness: 'power is a movement of growth or enhancement rather than a 
persisting state (or repeated event). As will to power, a drive's essential end is that it 
wants to be more than it is; a drive's essential aim isn't even to arrive at some better 
state.' (Richardson 1996, pp. 24-25). The core language used in Richardson‘s 
account of will to power is thus activity growth: we can understand a phenomenon 
by considering it in terms of the drives that constitute it and the activities that grew 
out of those drives. 
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner also suggests an ontological reading of will to power. 
How does Sorgner conceive of individuation within ontological will to power? 
Sorgner, arguing for Nietzsche, claims that will to power is 'a continuum (like most 
of the traditional metaphysical systems), though, in his case it was modified around 
certain centres which are in a permanent struggle with each other' (Sorgner 2007, p. 
48) So far, these ideas align with the interpretations of will to power we have 
previously covered. Sorgner goes on to give an account of the functioning of these 
'centers' in the will to power, writing that 'centers' work together or against each 
other, in accordance with their relative superiority or inferiority, having 'fairly 
clearly defined' (48) radii and a 'certain area at the outer end of the radius, where the 
interaction with the other power-quantum takes place' (48). Describing the 
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interaction of power-quanta, Sorgner claims that '[i]f a power-quantum works 
together with surrounding power-quanta, if it is far superior to them, or if they are 
indifferent to it, then its borders will (in most cases) be fairly stable, because then the 
struggle between the power-quanta is at a minimum. However, if there are two 
hostile power-quanta fighting with each other, both being equally strong, then their 
borders will usually be less clear' (Sorgner 2007, p. 48). Sorgner also draws a 
distinction between 'internal' power and 'external' power. For Sorgner, external 
power is the 'relation a power-quantum has with its environment' (ibid. 53). Someone 
born into a powerful family has a great degree of external power, as this familial 
authority seems not to rely on anything directly bodily in the individual. In contrast, 
internal power 'depends upon the abilities of the respective power-quantum' (ibid. 
53). Internal power instead identifies the capacities one has derived from one‘s 
bodily condition and attributes.  These distinctions of will to power are in place, one 
can assume, in order to individuate development and progression of power in will to 
power more easily, to give us a framework based in will to power with which to 
evaluate phenomena.  
We can now come to a central question that must be asked of ontological 
readings of will to power: how can one individuate phenomena within the will to 
power in such a way that Richardson and Sorgner without rendering will to power 
incompatible with perspectivism? Discussion of activity growth when it comes to 
drives immediately highlights the perspectival nature of our terminology: it is from a 
human perspective that we describe the activity of drives and their growth. Likewise, 
when we attempt a geography of will to power in the manner that Sorgner suggests, 
differentiating between internal and external will to power, we already describe an 
ontology that is infused with an anthropocentric perceptual basis. We can, however, 
hypothesize that there would be different ways in which to individuate will to power 
depending on the system of cognition and thought of the theorizer. Describing will to 
power with such language thus commits us to an anthropocentric ontology that is at 
odds with perspectivism. We must therefore be able to describe will to power as a 
theory in a manner that is compatible with perspectivism or clearly explain how one 
depends on or is subordinate to the other. 
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2.6 Will to Power: Epistemological-Valuational Perspectivism 
 
Having examined the view, through Hales and Welshon, that Nietzsche‘s 
basic ontology is that of perspectivism, I want to propose an alternative theory that 
attempts to reconcile both will to power and perspectivism, although I will argue for 
a constellationist basis. This means to say that the world essentially consists in a 
multiplicity of expressions of force considered as perspectives, and that perspectives 
interact with each other. It is important to consider the evaluational issues arising 
from will to power, as these would appear to be those elements most in conflict with 
perspectivism. We‘ve already seen that perspectivism addresses some of the 
fundamental epistemological problems in traditional western Philosophy, but we 
have yet to see how Nietzsche‘s perspectivism accommodates his evaluational 
philosophy without contradiction. What I am referring to when I describe 
Nietzsche‘s ‗evaluational philosophy‘ are those aspects of his thought that imply 
significant forms of value judgements, particularly his estimation of ways of life and 
values in terms of will to power
38
 (which is the focus of psycho-biological 
interpretations). Nietzsche has an evident interest in ordering these various 
phenomena in terms of order of rank
39
. Indeed, he fundamentally sees the world as a 
whole in terms of different hierarchies (heavily drawing on the master/slave 
distinction in OGM (referring to his distinction between master and slave in the first 
essay), along with the accompanying estimation of ways of life in terms of 
affirmation and ressentiment) which, taken as a whole, I claim to be his ‗will to 
power‘ evaluative philosophy.  Such an evaluational philosophy, of course, 
immediately seems at odds with a perspectival ontology, because it appears to posit 
itself as a ‗true‘ perspective among all others. 
                                                          
38
 There are numerous places where Nietzsche appears to evaluate or link life in terms of power and 
will to power. These are notably AC 2, 6 (‗I consider life itself to be an instinct for growth, for 
endurance, for the accumulation of force, for power: when there is no will to power, there is decline. 
My claim is that none of humanity's highest values have had this will‘), BGE 13 (‗life itself is will to 
power‘), BGE 23,  BGE 259. 
39
 Nietzsche distinguishes an order of rank of human beings at various times in his writing. Note, for 
example, AC 57, in which Nietzsche writes that order of rank ‗is just a formula for the 
supreme law of life itself, splitting off into three types is necessary for the preservation of society, to 
make the higher and highest types possible‘. Nietzsche mentions order of rank in BGE also, notably in 
BGE 30, and especially in 228 claiming that ‗what is right for someone absolutely cannot be right for 
someone else; that the requirement that there be a single morality for everyone is harmful precisely to 
the higher men; in short, that there is an order of rank between people, and between moralities as 
well.' 
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It is worthwhile to briefly consider some suggested responses by 
commentators to this problem. I‘ve already discussed how Richardson argues that 
drives (perspectives, that is) have an intentional aspect; this consists in activity 
growth. From this point, Richardson elaborates that such drives can be understood 
hierarchically on the basis of how much one drive, or a collective, can grow and 
dominate over others. He raises a number of initial points meant to show the means 
of hierarchy Nietzsche draws on, that (for example) ‗growth involves an advance in 
internal complexity; a will that is now complex, is so because of successful power 
willing in the past, by itself or others‘ (49-50) . Given a basic level of consensus, the 
principles of rank Richardson sketches are quite helpful and sufficient, but they are 
too fundamentally anthropocentric to have any motivating force on the level of a 
truly holistic perspectivism. Can humans, for example, conceive of what complexity 
would be for other organisms? There are a wide number of non-anthropocentric 
factors humans can conceive of that may not be bound in the least by the distinctly 
human forms of differentiation Richardson specifies. To be clear: the issue is not that 
hierarchical ranking according to Richardson is a merely subjective, human 
perspective, to be contrasted to things in themselves. Nietzsche shows, and 
Richardson recognizes, that this would be a Kantian criticism that relies on a 
transcendental reality. Instead, the issue is that there are conceivable perspectives, 
vastly different to our own, capable of esteeming phenomena in vastly different 
ways, and we have not yet established why the manner of ranking that Nietzsche 
often uses in his texts (as referenced above) should be any more truthful on a 
fundamental level than others. That is to say, why should we believe that there are 
‗higher men‘ in the way he describes in the first essay of OGM (i.e. in section 11)? 
Likewise, why should we believe that there are traits that designate humans of lower 
rank, describing those who suffer from ressentiment (again described in the first 
essay, section 10)? Why not accept the opposite perspective, that slave values are 
higher and master values are lower? This points to the possibility that the 
fundamental problem of perspectivism (how Nietzsche evaluative statements and 
hierarchies can have any motivating force) cannot be addressed on a conventional 
level, it has to be taken seriously in its most radical form and defended against the 
most radical perspectivists. 
One potentially more promising approach is what I refer to as the 
‗concession‘-based response. Nietzsche sometimes acknowledges that his 
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evaluational philosophy is only constituted by his own perspective, and some 
commentators indeed resolve the tension between a perspectival ontology and 
Nietzsche‘s philosophical critiques and evaluations by highlighting that they are 
themselves essentially only perspectival critiques and evaluations
40
. Understood in 
such a way, it is reasonable to say that Nietzsche does not posit his own evaluational 
perspective as a universal or extra-perspectival perspective. The problem with 
resolving the tension in this way, however, is that much of Nietzsche‘s critical 
insights and his evaluational philosophy lose a great deal of their motivational force. 
If Nietzsche‘s evaluational philosophy is just a perspective among any number of 
others, again, what would motivate me to adopt it over those other perspectives? I 
cannot appeal to other parts of Nietzsche‘s philosophy (such as an appeal to higher 
and lower types) for that motivation because it is again perspectival, there is only 
motivation from within the perspective. Part of Nietzsche‘s own response to this 
question is to remind us that his is not a general or universal philosophy, his writing 
is to be appreciated and practiced by a relatively select few who he deems to be 
similar ‗types‘, particularly his philosophers of the future. In that case, what might 
motivate me to adopt Nietzsche‘s perspective is that it may be beneficial to me if I 
am the sort of person it is aimed for. This is partially what sets Nietzsche, as a 
philosopher, apart from the majority of his predecessors, who prescribe their 
philosophies for others on a wholesale level. Nietzsche does not pretend to give an 
evaluative philosophy for all beings, only similar ones. Such an admission, however, 
does not mean that Nietzsche did not see himself as one of many thinkers essentially 
engaged in a tradition of thought that encompassed a grand scale, he intends his 
philosophy as holistic thought that explains the most phenomena with the greatest 
depth, as most of his predecessors do, but he does not claim that all can appreciate or 
practice his philosophy in the same way, or at all. Such a view is strongly influenced 
by Nietzsche‘s understanding of human beings as different ‗types‘41, as being 
constituted essentially differently by their physical characteristics and environment 
such that they interpret and respond to events differently to those who are differently 
constituted. This is again where the problem of inter-perspectival critique comes into 
play; given that these types have different perspectives, different interpretations of 
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 See Danto (1980: 77),  
41
 Note again AC 57: ‗In every healthy society, three mutually conditioning physiological types 
separate out and gravitate in different directions, each one having its own hygiene, its own area of 
work, its own feelings of perfection and field of mastery‘.  
 91 
 
phenomena, and that (what ultimately then follows) different philosophies constitute 
different perspectives, how can Nietzsche critique one perspective from another with 
any significant force? If there is no fundamental commensurability or outside 
perspective (we might say ‗objective reality‘ in this instance) to appeal to, how do 
Nietzsche‘s criticisms or analyses of other perspectives have any motivating force?  
Returning to the ‗concession‘-based approach, one could say at this point that 
Nietzsche is really doing nothing more than elaborating his own perspective and the 
perspectives equivalent to his own when he critiques fundamentally different 
perspectives. Hence, when he critiques the features of other perspectives of lower 
‗types‘ (those that largely suffer from ressentiment, for example), he is essentially 
elaborating the features abhorrent to or unhealthy for his own perspective, just as 
much as when, in elaborating on features like amor fati, he is elaborating on features 
inconceivable by those lower types, that may likewise be entirely abhorrent for those 
perspectives (many may be too resentful to will the necessity of everything that 
happens to them, a core requirement of amor fati). This view has a certain amount of 
appeal to it. When Nietzsche castigates other perspectives, or praises his own, his 
aim is not to show the ‗rightness‘ or ‗wrongness‘ of those perspectives with regard to 
an objective reality, because there is no such thing beyond different perspectives. 
Oftentimes his philosophical point is to highlight the indissoluble differences in 
perspectives that make certain features of experience or certain ways of thinking 
incomprehensible to each other.  
However, many elements of Nietzsche‘s philosophy, such as his conception 
of truth and the affirmation or enhancement of life, are concepts whose proper 
understanding involves an appreciation of both higher and lower perspectives. 
Commentators have often described how it appears that Nietzsche advocated that his 
higher, more fruitful types have a capacity to inhabit and project themselves into a 
variety of different perspectives: as Richardson points out, ‗Other persons and points 
of view are far from inaccessible, far from being ―closed books,‖ Nietzsche chiefly 
thinks them accessible in his power ontology's terms : by a person's bearing these 
other interested viewpoints as occasional or adoptable attitudes of his own; by his 
being able to inhabit or occupy these viewpoints‘ (Richardson 1996, p. 264). With 
regard to the ‗concession‘ approach I have elaborated, how is it possible for 
Nietzsche to claim, on the one hand, that he is effectively only elaborating his own 
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perspective, while on the other simultaneously being able to appreciate those of 
others?  
Properly understanding the ontological implications of perspectivism allows 
us to address this issue. Because the world is constituted by a multiplicity of 
perspectives, the criterion for ranking or comparing perspectives cannot be a world 
in itself above and beyond these perspectives; hence Nietzsche‘s perspective cannot 
be a better or worse perspective because it corresponds to a true world. The biggest 
fear at this point would be that perspectivism seems to be nothing more than the 
most radical version of relativism: nothing can be established about the world 
beyond that it is perspectival. Thus, contrasted with how Nietzsche orders the world 
according to one perspective (his ‗will to power‘), another might order it an opposite 
manner, with, in the absence of any interstitial world-in-itself, there being no reason 
to adopt one over the other. Again we are faced with the issue that neither appears 
more or less right or wrong, just that there are two different perspectives at play with 
different relational interests, and that because of this there is no fundamental reason 
to choose Nietzsche‘s perspective over the other. If Nietzsche‘s perspective is to 
have any motivational force beyond that of appeal to similar perspectives, there has 
to be a response to the above radical relativism, one that shows how perspectives can 
be of greater or lesser rank without simply appealing to a circular perspective.  
The response is to point out that perspectives are always situated and 
relational in perspectivism, and therefore that the relativist‘s criticisms are also 
situated and relational. What I mean in saying this is that these criticisms are 
themselves part of a perspective among other perspectives, with no privileged 
epistemic status. Taken conventionally, the radical relativist makes claims that 
appear to be meta-epistemological: Nietzsche‘s perspectivism is itself a perspective 
(I will address this criticism further at a later point, particularly in relation to truth). 
If Nietzsche‘s perspectivism is assented to, this claim is not meta-epistemological 
because claiming that perspectivism is only a perspective (contrasted to e.g., realism) 
is itself a concrete perspectival claim, and one that might be said to further prove the 
truth of perspectivism; it is thus merely an ‗expression of the inevitable perspectivity 
of a perspectivist ontology‘ (Hales and Welshon 2000, p. 80).  
If this addresses the issue that perspectivism is claimed to be itself just a 
perspective, then it is still unclear how we can address incommensurability between 
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perspectives. That perspectives are always relational and situated hints at a more 
fundamental point about perspectives. Perspectives are not atomically self-contained 
epistemological units, instead we find that the key insight behind Nietzsche‘s will to 
power doctrine is an agonistic view of ontology in which he posits that its basic 
elements, perspectives, are in contest among each other, that ‗Every center of force 
adopts a perspective toward the entire remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, 
mode of action, and mode of resistance‘ (WTP 567). Perspectives can thus be 
understood in the constellationist sense as described because these valuations, modes 
of actions and modes of resistances can themselves be understood to be a matter of 
interaction with each other. Nietzsche understands these different forms of 
interactions in terms of the will to power, as each drive aims at an expansion of 
power. It is at this point that the inter-relation between perspectivism and the 
doctrine of will to power becomes most tenuous: we can reasonably freely describe 
the different perspectives as different modes of interactions without running the risk 
of anthropocentrism (what we might call the closest to ―pure‖ ontological 
perspectivism), but we risk missing those qualitative and evaluative components that 
are characteristic of Nietzsche‘s philosophy. If we describe those aspects as inherent 
in these modes of interaction at this point, however, we do risk anthropocentrism. 
The evaluations inherent in the doctrine of will to power must therefore be admitted 
to be a perspective within perspectivism: this will resolve the issue of 
anthropocentrism by admitting that the features of will to power are not themselves 
an ultimate reality (this instead being perspectival flux. If will to power is not a 
strictly ontological doctrine and yet considered by Nietzsche to be his theory of the 
world, how can it be defended as a greater perspective among others (as Nietzsche 
seems to think it is)?   
This thesis holds that one effective means of establishing an organic order of 
rank of perspectives as Nietzsche describes it (with will to power seeming to be at 
the top) is to say that some perspectives are more or less pervasive than others. It is 
already evident that there is no pre-established hierarchy or objective reality beyond 
perspectives, so such a hierarchy must come from the structure of and inter-relation 
of perspectives themselves because they are what constitute the world. If we try to 
discuss the contest of perspectives in a more derivative way (i.e. if we try to describe 
a hierarchy from a particular perspective), we fall victim to the previous criticism of 
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perspectival anthropocentrism. Perspectival pervasiveness is sufficient to provide 
motivating force beyond perspectival similarity because it makes commensurability 
between perspectives irrelevant while maintaining elements of the ‗concession‘ 
approach: we can concede that perspectival critique applies only to like perspectives, 
but pervasiveness is ultimately what determines the motivating force of whether a 
perspective is adopted or not.  While all other features of a perspective might be 
relative to perspectives (and some incommensurable), pervasiveness is not. This is 
because pervasiveness is not a feature of any particular perspective, it is a feature 
that is shared between perspectives and arises from their interaction. In concrete 
terms, we might ―cash in‖ pervasiveness in terms of the degree of causal influence 
any perspective (or a multiplicity of similar perspectives) has. Plato‘s philosophical 
perspective, for example, is pervasive in its causal influence throughout Western 
history and civilization, whereas any mundane, singular individual‘s is not42. This 
then, is a fundamental ontological feature of perspectivism: some perspectives are 
more or less pervasive than others, and this provides a response to the radical 
relativist criticism that Nietzsche‘s perspective lacks motivational force above and 
beyond appeal to similar perspectives. Highlighting the pervasiveness of 
perspectives shows that motivational force is fundamentally not a matter of 
voluntary adoption of perspectives, but rather how far a perspective has extended 
itself through the net of perspectival relations that constitutes the whole. It‘s not that 
I am motivated to adopt a particular perspective or set of values, it is that a 
multiplicity of perspectives is so pervasive that I have unconsciously adopted them, 
through cultural upbringing and biological physiology. One immediate concern is the 
possibility that pervasiveness itself could be a relative feature of perspectives like 
any other, that what we might see as pervasive according to our own perspective 
might be seen to be oppositely non-pervasive according to another. Firstly, it is 
certainly true than when one attempts to appreciate perspectivism on a holistic level, 
on a level beyond human existence, it is difficult to use the language of a 
pervasiveness of perspectives in this way when we extrapolate to organic and non-
organic form of existence. However, insofar as we are concerned with human 
existence or anything that resembles human existence, we can intelligibly talk about 
the pervasiveness of different perspectives.  Secondly, attempting to show that 
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 Nietzsche makes this point about philosophers in general, that they are the most spiritual wills to 
power (BGE 9) and the most pervasive perspectives in human history 
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pervasiveness is relative to perspective encounters further difficulties because it is 
not a relative feature of perspectives in an important way that other features are. In 
contrast to more concretely relative features of a perspective, such as color or sound, 
the pervasiveness of a perspective is not reducible to any one individual, group, or 
collective perspective(s), it is an emergent aspect whose greater appreciation 
ultimately itself depends on a holistic perspective. We are ourselves only in a 
position to appreciate the pervasiveness of any particular perspective when we have 
an increasingly wide and deep grasp of the whole multiplicity of perspectives: the 
history of western philosophy may not be pervasive to a secluded castaway from that 
castaway‘s perspective, but this is only reliably indicative of the limitedness of the 
castaway‘s perspective and that castaway‘s own lack of causal influence on the 
world.  
Returning to an earlier point about the situatedness and relationality of 
perspectives, something to keep in mind is that insofar as a perspective exists it is by 
nature caught up in this relation of pervasiveness, just as it is caught in in the relation 
of being a perspective. A perspective that makes the claim ―what seems pervasive to 
perspective(s) [x] is not pervasive to perspective(s) [z]‖ is itself either a more or less 
pervasive perspective. Again, the claim of the castaway that the western 
philosophical perspective is not pervasive regarding the castaway‘s own perspective 
is itself not a claim that can be evaluated on its own terms, as perspectives are once 
again inter-related. That said, it is still important to recognize that pervasiveness is 
still relative in an ultimate sense, because no individual perspective could 
conceivably appreciate it on a universal scale. Hence, we might concede that the 
radical relativist is right, and that, for example, the relevant perspective [x] may not 
be altogether the most pervasive in the world, because it‘s entirely conceivable there 
are beings on the other side of it with an opposite notion of pervasiveness. We can 
still say that this is not a major problem with pervasiveness as the means of ordering 
perspectives, because Nietzsche is mostly concerned with our most familiar 
perspectives, life on earth, and all known inorganic material. When it comes to these 
perspectives it seems fairly conceivable that we are capable of ordering the rank of 
different perspectives within this group according to their influence on the whole.  
The manner in which Nietzsche does this is encapsulated in his will to power 
evaluative philosophy. Will to power therefore presents itself both as Nietzsche‘s 
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own evaluative interpretation of the multiplicity of perspectives, and as the greatest 
competitor in the field of philosophical perspectives yet (those that Nietzsche thinks 
are the most pervasive, most powerful perspectives in human life), given its own 
depth and breadth of holism. As such Nietzsche estimates that his evaluative 
philosophy, in being the broadest and deepest perspective yet, will become the most 
pervasive as a "philosophy of the future". It‘s important to clarify in what sense 
Nietzsche thinks his philosophy will become the most pervasive: above all, he is not 
claiming that all human beings will explicitly adopt teachings contained in his 
philosophy. Nietzsche‘s philosophy is a description, rather than a prescription, of 
conditions under which the greatest affirmation of life can occur. Nietzschean 
philosophy will be the most pervasive philosophy of the future insofar as the 
conditions which prevail reflect, and influence, those that Nietzsche foresees in his 
evaluative philosophy. Another issue that has to be clarified further is the relation 
between Nietzsche‘s ontological perspectivism and his own ‗will to power‘ 
epistemological-evaluational perspective. What has to be made clear is that there is 
no fundamental gulf between perspectivism as an ontology, and Nietzsche‘s own 
perspectival interpretation within that ontology. As has already been discussed, 
process ontology, flux or becoming, is not to be understood in terms of a ‗becoming-
in-itself‘ behind perspectives that impose their interpretation on that flux; this would 
simply be a reiteration of the Kantian noumenal/phenomenal distinction. As was 
explored earlier, becoming and perspectivism must be understood to be continuous 
with each other, because perspectives are reducible to the very expressions of force, 
constantly changing, that constitute becoming as a whole. Among these expressions 
of force is Nietzsche‘s own philosophical perspective. Hence, there is a direct 
continuity between becoming, perspectivism, and will to power. 
To conclude, I hope to have illustrated a number of important points 
regarding perspectivism and its relation to Nietzsche‘s overall philosophy. To begin 
with, I considered the epistemological reading of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism, taking 
Tsarina Doyle‘s recent reading as an adequate representative. I acknowledged that 
Doyle‘s interpretation foregrounds a crucial point about perspectivism that is a 
strength of epistemological readings in general: the rejection of the real-apparent 
distinction in ontology. Likewise, her focus on Kant‘s influence on Nietzsche serves 
as an important historical grounding for understanding perspectivism and its role in 
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the tradition of epistemology. However, I argued that Nietzsche‘s perspectivism, 
understood as a rejection of the real-apparent ontological distinction, and especially 
coupled with renewed understanding of knowledge informed by Nietzsche‘s power 
ontology, abandons the traditional concerns of epistemology (establishing access to 
mind-independent reality, guaranteeing our beliefs aren‘t in vast error). I instead 
claimed that Nietzsche treats epistemology as a matter of power and degrees of 
efficacy, and his means of establishing greater or lesser perspectival validity is 
through the notion of power. Considering Katrina Mitcheson‘s criticisms of such a 
view, I further explored this by arguing for a conception of truth as equivalent to 
power in Nietzsche‘s philosophy; in lieu of a world apart from all other perspectives 
to compare their veracity with, the ‗truest‘ perspective would be that which is the 
most powerful, the world as a whole with everything in it being that which has the 
most truth. Lastly, I looked at ontological interpretations of perspectivism in an 
effort to link perspectivism to flux and will to power. Hales and Welshon offer a 
significant reading along these lines, but face some difficulties regarding the manner 
in which they ―map‖ perspectives to a power ontology, raising concern over whether 
(causal) efficacy has a meaningful role in Nietzsche‘s ontology so understood. 
Likewise, I examined potential difficulties in describing will to power similarly from 
the point of view of structures of power quanta, raising the question of how it is 
possible to speculate will to power as an ontology if done so through language that is 
anthropocentric. In order to resolve this tension I suggested that will to power can be 
considered Nietzsche‘s evaluative perspective within a power-flux ontology. 
Addressing the concern over how Nietzsche‘s will to power, as one perspective 
among many, can have any motivating force to be adopted, I claim that a hierarchy 
of perspectives according to will to power is possible in virtue of a feature of 
ontological perspectivism: pervasiveness. Pervasiveness provides an organic 
hierarchy of perspectives according to the will to power because it exists not in 
virtue of any one perspective but out of the interrelation between perspectives. 
Perspectives do not establish hierarchies, the relation between them does. It might be 
instructive to think about pervasiveness as described here similarly along the lines of 
intersubjectivity: rules are a good example in this sense because rules do not exist 
independently of agents, but they are likewise not reducible to any single agent. 
They are constituted intersubjectively through shared meanings and norms. The key 
difference of course, is that one may consciously break from the rules, whereas one 
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cannot break from the influence of pervasiveness, which precedes perspectives and 
in a sense is imposed upon them.   
The last section of this chapter concerns the generalities that can be drawn 
from the process-power ontology I have previously discussed, along with its relation 
to evaluative philosophy (truth, ranking of perspectives). What general features can 
be extrapolated from this account for the purposes of constructing a comparative 
process ontology? I now want to describe those features, along with providing a 
comparative account of such features that can be found in strands of ancient Chinese 
thought. From our study of Nietzsche‘s philosophy, the link between process-flux, 
perspectivism, and will to power has raised the core point that there is a continuity 
between ontology and evaluation. What motivates this continuity from the Western 
perspective is a rejection of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction: the world is 
constituted by a variety of perspectives understood as force, and there is no world 
apart from those perspectives. 
2.7 – Epistemologic-Evaluation and Ontology in Early Chinese 
Philosophy 
 
Compared with the totality of process-flux perspectives that make up the 
process ontology we have so far seen on the Western side of this comparison, the 
concrete process ontology of ancient Chinese thought places less emphasis on the 
perspectivism of processes. Namely, there is a trifold structure of humans (which 
encompasses culture and society, and extends to language, literature, all forms of 
knowledge, and social, emotional distinctions), earth (animals, natural objects, the 
geographic environment) and Heaven (traditionally understood as the celestial field: 
the sky, sun, moon and stars, but the also the cosmos and world more generally) 
which constitute the totality (although classical interpretation of ancient Daoism 
holds that there is a further, ineffable totality beyond heaven that is the Dao). The 
notion of Heaven in Chinese thought is worth extended consideration in particular as 
it features prominently as a core consideration in Chinese cosmological and political 
thinking. In terms of comparative process ontology, we previously established some 
fundamental principles regarding the conceptualization of change. With this present 
chapter we have concerned ourselves with epistemology and evaluation, in the 
context of a totality. Heaven serves the role of such a totality in the texts I have 
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covered in ancient Chinese philosophy, although there are other means of conceiving 
the totality (the Daoist reading of the great Dao of emptiness, for example). Heaven 
was originally derived from the notion of a ‗High Lord‘ a mythical-ancestral god 
figure in Chinese culture in the Shang period (c.1600-1046 BC). The notion of High 
Lord developed onwards through the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BC) but was 
supplemented by the ruling dynasty with the idea of a ‗mandate of heaven‘ 
(tianming) for regime justification. The mandate of Heaven figures as a central 
notion in Chinese philosophy and is concerned with whether a ruler (or a ruling 
dynasty) is acting in accordance with Heaven, which is concretized after the Zhou 
period as ‗as a constant order of cosmos, governing both nature and human‘ (Weimin 
2012, p. 139). Although Heaven begins to recede as a dominant ideological 
motivation with the onset of Confucian philosophy, it remains a key notion through 
Chinese thought, either as an element of cosmology that required harmonisation with 
or as one that was fatally indifferent to humans
43
. In one way or the other, the 
cosmos as Heaven becomes fundamentally bound into Chinese cultural and political 
thought. As Nathan Sivin specifies: ‗[i]n the third century B.C., as the process of 
invention got under way, intellectuals bound the structure of heaven and earth, and 
that of the human body, to that of the state. This was not unprecedented in China, but 
now the links were made systematic and tight. In every instance their creators were 
preoccupied with political authority and its effective use. As a result, macrocosm and 
microcosms became a single manifold, a set of mutually resonant systems of which 
the emperor was indispensable mediator. The structure between humans, heaven and 
earth is one of inter-relation, all three spheres are connected, mutually dependent, 
and mutually affecting each other‘ (Sivin 1995, p. 7). What is most important to 
remember for the project of a comparative process ontology is that the development 
of such a structure reflects a direct link from ontology as cosmos to evaluation in the 
political and human spheres: ‗The link [between heaven, humans and earth] was a 
great deal more than a simple causal relationship. Cosmology was not a mere 
reflection of politics. Cosmos, body, and state were shaped in a single process, as a 
result of changing circumstances that the new ideas in turn shaped‘ (ibid. 7).  
                                                          
43
 The mandate of heaven can be seen to function in Chinese thought in contemporary times through 
commentaries on the Chinese Communist Party‘s  regime legitimacy in China, where the ‗the Chinese 
government does not accept ―legalized opposition‖ which is a common phenomenon in modern 
democracies. It is really more concerned about popular protest and violent uprising from society, as 
that could represent the Tianming challenge which will destroy the existing political and legal 
framework‘ (Zhu 2011, p. 130) 
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Perhaps what crowns the series of notions I have just described, from the 
trifold structure of Heaven, humans and earth, and its political continuity in the form 
of  a mandate of rulership that may be gained or lost in accordance with appropriate 
action towards Heaven, is the fundamental political idea in Chinese thought of 
tianxia or ‗All-under-Heaven‘. This is the Chinese political idea of an ideal empire, 
or world governance. All-under-Heaven retains the direct relationship between 
humans and the cosmos in the sense that it draws together two meanings: as 
Tingyang Zhao explains, ‗[i]t is almost equivalent to ‗the universe‘ or ‗the world‘ in 
western languages. Its second meaning is the ‗hearts of all peoples‘, or the ‗general 
will of the people‘. […] All-under-Heaven therefore consists of both the earth and 
the people.‘ (Tingyang 2006, p. 30). It is this sense of political holism as world 
governance that is emphasized with the notion:  
‗Chinese political philosophy defines a political order in which the world is 
primary, whereas the nation/state is primary in western philosophy. Certainly, 
westerners do think about the world, but the western imaginations of the world 
are nothing higher and greater than international alliances or unions of 
nation/states, not going beyond the framework of nation/states. Such projects 
have essential difficulties in reaching the real integrality of the world for they are 
limited by the perspectives of nation/states, due to the lack of a vision of world-
ness. To see the world from its world-ness is different from seeing it from part of 
it.‘ (ibid. 31) 
The account of the Western perspective given here may be subject to some criticism 
in the sense that it is just as easy to suggest that what is proffered by the notion of 
‗All-Under-Heaven‘ is merely a form of exceptionalism or imperialism among many 
other historical examples
44
. However, I think a consideration of the basis of this idea 
from a process-ontological perspective will provide a number of significant points. 
What separates a comparative process ontology from traditional theory is the 
prospect of a transition from ontology to evaluation that is continuous, that is one in 
which there is no un-bridged leap from an objective reality to a subjective reality 
(which brings with such issues as the naturalistic fallacy). ‗All-Under-Heaven‘ is an 
example of such a continuous transition in ontology to evaluation (in this case 
political evaluation), and it reflects perhaps a grand theory of politics similar to the 
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 A key point to note about both the mandate of Heaven and All-under-Heaven is that the mandate 
for rulership and empire does not necessarily stipulate specifically Chinese cultural rulership. 
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manner in which we have seen that Nietzsche pursues a grand perspective in 
philosophy. What is it that is conducive within a process ontology or cosmology that 
facilitates the notion of ‗All-under-Heaven‘ on comparison to a substance-style 
conventional ontology? It is argued that the Chinese emphasis on relations rather 
than things and individuals is what makes such a political viewpoint more tenable:  
‗The Chinese system of families, states and All-under-Heaven, which differs 
fundamentally from the western system of individuals, nations and internationals, 
is often criticised for its neglect of the individual as well as individual rights, but 
this is a misunderstanding of Chinese philosophy and a poor understanding of 
political  society. There is no Chinese denial of the value of the individual, but 
rather a denial of the individual to be a political foundation or starting point, 
because the political makes sense only when it deals with ‗relations‘ rather than 
‗individuals‘, and the political is meant to speak for co-existence rather than a 
single existence. In a very Chinese way, politics aims at a good society of 
peaceful ‗order‘, which is the first condition for any possible happiness of each 
and all, and at keeping a society from the ‗disorder‘ that destroys all possibilities 
of individual happiness. This political conception could find a strong argument in 
Chinese ontology, the ontology of relations, instead of the western ontology of 
things‘ (ibid. 33) 
Thus, in the course of this brief examination of political notions we have seen 
that an ontology of relations, one that is fundamentally process-based, traces a 
continuity through all the way to human society and the grandest political ideals. I 
have already discussed in the last chapter the central role of change (bian) as the 
constituent of these processes, and its central description in the Yijing. We can now 
look at some of the underlying ontological assumptions surrounding this work. One 
very important assumption is of different ontological categorization of the world: 
ancient Greek philosophy‘s tendency towards atomism and particulars can be 
contrasted with the ancient Chinese tendency to conceive the world through a part-
whole model. As Chad Hansen writes, regarding this model: ‗Reality is not a 
multitude of independent, fixed objects, but a ground out of which a linguistic 
community carves distinctions and marks them with names. Each part-whole 
assignment is relative to some presupposed standard and purpose. A part, in turn, has 
parts. Any whole can be a part of some larger whole‘ (Hansen 1992, p. 50). Thus, to 
use Hansen‘s view to contrast, Greek philosophy aimed at a view of the world in 
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which the notion of objecthood is fundamental: there are objects and it is the task of 
the perceiver to categorize those objects according to some conceptual scheme, to 
classify an object as belonging to a particular type. As Hansen writes, objecthood in 
Chinese ontological categorization is not fundamental, it is derivative: ‗[t]he 
primitive particular objects of Western ontology emerge as a result of dividing stuffs 
into smaller (and incidentally, contiguous) clusters for some purposes‘ (ibid.) Reality 
can thus be ―carved up‖, or categorized, in a variety of ways different to Western 
categorization, and the manner in which parts are related to the whole: ‗[w]e can 
discuss individuals of human-stuff, families of human stuff, and cities or states of 
human-stuff‘ (ibid.), where we might say that these are distinctly different objects 
according to the Western general philosophical conceptual scheme. However, it is 
only once we have individuated ―stuff‖ into smaller and smaller groups that the 
notion of ‗object‘ emerges within the Chinese model of categorization. Also 
important is that, compared with the Greek-type ontologies of substances and 
particular objects (the ―building blocks‖), these distinctions in Chinese thought of 
the period are not considered ultimately real in the same manner. They are instead a 
matter of relative pragmatism. Richard Nisbett has offered a sociological theory for 
why both traditions develop as they do, draw on the social and economic conditions 
that prevail behind both types of philosophy. Nisbett claims that the city-state type of 
political environment in Greece fostered a strong sense of both personal agency and 
individualism for Greek citizens, and he highlights the points that citizens could 
travel between cities (and indeed, that certain prestigious individuals were attracted 
to certain cities) (Nisbett 2003,  pp. 30-32).. Likewise, the ecology surrounding the 
Greek way of life itself influenced Greek thought: because economic activities in 
which wide-scale co-operation were not strictly necessary (namely, hunting, fishing, 
herding and trade) were predominant before the arrival of agriculture, Nisbett claims 
that Greeks ‗were therefore able to act on their own to a greater extent than were the 
Chinese. Not feeling it necessary to maintain harmony with their fellows at any cost, 
the Greeks were in the habit of arguing with one another in the marketplace and 
debating one another in the political assembly‘ (Nisbett 2003, p. 35).  
In contrast, the general terrain of China favoured agriculture, and hence drew 
more on centralized control and co-operation. This ecology inculcated a strong focus 
on harmony and relation, and as Nisbett suggests ‗provided both the chief constraint 
in their lives and the primary source of opportunities. The habit of looking toward 
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the social world could have carried over to a tendency to look to the field in general; 
and the need to attend to social relations could have extended to an inclination to 
attend to relations of all kinds‗(ibid. p. 35). Sivin echoes this characterization in his 
estimation of the ancient Chinese political situation, claiming that ‗The Chinese 
ideal, during the anomic and violent period from the late Zhou through the first 
phase of the Western Han, as well as the period of expansion and grandiose projects 
from the middle of the second century to the first quarter of the first, remained 
unifying and central. In the Warring States period the yearning for a stable order was 
overriding; from the Qin on, union seemed a feasible goal‘ (Sivin 1995, p. 32).  
These social and economic factors can be claimed to significantly influence the 
development of what is succinctly called the ―folk metaphysics‖ embodied in the two 
philosophical traditions we are discussing. The folk metaphysics of Chinese culture 
might be speculated to arrive at its focus on relationality and continuity of processes 
because the social and economic conditions involved in strong centralized rulership 
and reliance on co-operative agriculture influence the sense of self, which in turn 
influences the manner in which one theorizes about one‘s world: ‗Causality would be 
seen as being located in the field or in the relation between the object and the field. 
Attention to the field would encourage recognition of complexity and change, as 
well as of contradiction among its many and varied elements‘ (ibid). Likewise, the 
Greek city-state politic with its emphasis on isolated trade and resource practices 
produce a greater sense of autonomy and individuality, allowing certain citizens to 
more freely do things like planning harvests, travelling to cities or cultural events, or 
investigate the profitability of a particular commodity, all without necessarily 
consulting significantly with others. Sivin echoes this sentiment by writing that 
‗[g]iven the diversity of Greek states, constitutions, and political tastes, the cosmos 
might be seen as a single order, a balance of opposed powers, or a state of strife. 
There was no shared ideal to build on, and no hope of a consensus‘ (Sivin 1995, p. 
32).  The focus on particulars that these circumstances inspired, Nisbett claims, 
‗might have made it natural for the Greeks to focus on the attributes of objects with a 
view toward categorizing them and finding the rules that would allow prediction and 
control of their behaviour. Causality would be seen as due to properties of the object 
or as the result of one's own actions in relation to the object. Such a view of causality 
could have encouraged the Greek assumptions of stability and permanence as well as 
an assumption that change in the object was under their control‗ (ibid.). It is worth 
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noting that Nisbett‘s analysis is not without significant criticisms. Geoffrey Lloyd 
has criticized this account at length: ‗Nisbett‘s account of ancient Greek thought—
their mentality, as he calls it—is full of oversimplifications and plain errors. While I 
have been at pains to point out that there are different foci of interest, and styles of 
enquiry, among different Greek writers, as indeed also among Chinese ones, Nisbett 
ignores the major differences between Aristotle, say, and Democritus, or the Stoics 
and the Epicureans, and writes as if all Greeks shared the same basic atomist 
ontology‘ (Lloyd 2007, p. 161). Lloyd is eminently correct in pointing out that 
Nisbett oversimplifies throughout his account. Clearly, however, Nisbett is not 
primarily concerned with providing a comprehensive understanding of the different 
schools and systems of doctrinal thought within Greek and Chinese culture, he is 
more concerned with making evident two different and conditioned modes of 
reasoning. Nisbett‘s point in this description of the development of these modes of 
reasoning does not appear to be simply that both modes are composed of structures 
of thought with elements that are completely foreign to either mode. As many 
commentators have shown, both Chinese and Greek thought share elements of 
thought (the Mohist school, for example is held to be a consummate example of 
thought approximating logical reasoning in the West). The point appears to be rather 
that a fundamental tendency towards certain elements that shape those modes of 
reasoning in important ways, enough to form the dominant character of thought. In 
this sense Sivin does well to remind us that ‗[t]he Hellenistic world was not, of 
course, Athens in the heyday 
of Plato. Intellectual, social, and political authority had been realigned. That 
is not to say that forms of technical discourse are simple products of social forces‘ 
(Sivin 1995, p. 34), and likewise that ' [i]n China general agreement was more 
common. Even so, a consensus on broad principles does not imply that doctrines 
were standardized. To take an example from medicine, yin-yang, the Five Phases, 
and the Six Warps […] in the Inner Canon and later doctrinal works provided 
sophisticated alternative languages for describing changes in the somatic microcosm‘ 
(ibid. 35).  The usefulness of the material provided here does not hang on whether 
Nisbett‘s extended studies45 of Asians and Westerners are right or wrong nor to what 
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 The core of Nisbett‘s research focuses rather on establishing whether, generally speaking, Asians 
differ to Westerners in terms of sensitivity to others and feelings of group solidarity versus 
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degree both traditions of thought are generalized, it is rather concerned with whether 
the material provides a reasonable understanding of how thought in both cultures 
developed the tendencies that they have, and what can be gained from such 
understanding for the project of developing a comparative process ontology. 
With some explanation of the differences between cultures of thought 
hypothesized, we can examine the consequences of these differences. The 
consequences of these different factors engender a significant change in the 
philosophical pre-occupations of ancient Chinese and Greek thought: many 
conceptual problems over metaphysics or categorization are either radically different 
in nature or absent from one tradition compared to the other. For our purposes, as an 
example, the traditionally conceived Heraclitean problem of flux, of how something 
can remain the same while its formative stuff is constantly changing, is absent in the 
Chinese conception of change: ‗No philosophical problem arises from the mere fact 
that change takes place in a part-whole ontology. Stuff changes. But that 
observation, by itself, raises no philosophical difficulty‘ (Hansen 1992, p. 50.). 
Instead of being an ontological problem, Hansen‘s strongly linguistic reading of 
Chinese philosophy locates philosophical pre-occupations with practices in 
language, pragmatics and semantics, and how it is used to partition reality
46
. This 
pre-occupation with practical categorization extends even to the Daoist 
understanding of a great Dao, regarding which Angus Graham writes that ‗the 
purpose of seeking the one behind the many [the Dao] is to find, not something more 
real than what appears to the senses, but a constant Way behind the changing and 
conflicting ways of life and government claimed by competing schools as the Way 
of the sage kings‘ (Graham 1990, p. 223), which in Daoism will be a Way based, in 
fact, on non-discrimination and non-differentiation, while in Confucianism may be a 
guiding discourse based on tradition and appeal to roles, and in Mohism may be 
based on utility and universal love.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
individualism. These are separate studies to a socio-psychological account of the tendencies of each 
culture‘s thought. 
46
 Again, it is highly important to remember that when discussing language we are not describing a 
model of language or reality in which a subject imposes language upon an external world, as in 
traditional correspondence-style views of language and reality. This will be explored further in the 
next chapter. 
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This then, provides some explanation as to how Chinese thought of the 
Warring States period, as a process-based structure of thought, differs from the 
concerns we have seen in examining Nietzshe‘s philosophy as a process philosophy: 
our formulations of perspectivism and epistemology in the latter are ineluctably 
shaped by the folk metaphysics of Greek thought (atomism, substance thought), 
which itself heavily influenced Cartesian thought, and led to the transcendental 
idealism of Kant with its  subject-object and noumenal/phenomenal distinctions that 
Nietzsche is reacting to in his critical philosophy. The character of Nietzche‘s 
processual philosophy, considered through the formulation of will to power and 
perspectivism, can be considered an attempt to re-situate Western philosophy within 
a Heraclitean tradition that is stalled by the arrival of Parmenidean philosophy, and 
the principles and pre-occupations of Chinese philosophy can provide some clues as 
to what that re-situation might have partially resembled had it been more fully 
formulated. The idea of perspectivism as post-epistemological, or as a re-
conceptualization of the ends of epistemology, can be compared with the pragmatic 
concerns of Chinese schools we have just described, in which the disputation 
between schools is analogous in many respects to a contest between perspectives that 
is not grounded by the framework of correspondence to a true or external, 
transcendental world, yet is similarly not subject to the complaints of idealism or 
sceptical relativism because of an underlying cosmology of change. It is particularly 
the absence of this framework in the Chinese tradition that demonstrates that for 
comparative process ontology that it is unnecessary to philosophize in a manner that 
necessarily demands reaction to the above dichotomies. This has the consequence of 
giving us two conclusions, 1) within commentary on Nietzsche‘s work, it may go 
some way to demonstrating that a treatment of his epistemological and ontological 
views need not be in the vein of trying to reconcile them with conventional 
approaches in Western philosophy (whether these be either Analytic or Continental 
philosophy), 2) more generally for a comparative process ontology, it demonstrates 
key points about its theorization, namely that a common starting point may be from 
the inter-relation between a process-based cosmology and pragmatic epistemology. 
Having established the relation between becoming, power and perspectivism in this 
chapter, I will now pursue its consequences in an area of human thought that is still 
strongly embedded in a real-apparent correspondence view, language. 
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Chapter 3: Re-Thinking Language through Comparative Process 
Thought 
We have so far covered two key areas in a tentative comparative process 
ontology that are central: ontology and (broadly speaking) epistemology, and we 
now have a beginning framework with which to analyse several case studies, both 
theoretical and practical. I will examine practical issues of technology, economics 
and socio-political efficacy in the last chapters of this work. Regarding the former, I 
will now apply what has been outlined in previous chapters to the issues of language 
(in this chapter), as a general theoretical question, and appearance and reality (in the 
next chapter), as a conventional philosophical question. The conclusion that is hoped 
to be reached is that the application of the comparative process ontology outlined 
will provide an informative alternative to contemporary and classical approaches to 
these issues. While the focus in this chapter will be on Nietzsche‘s philosophy, I 
briefly consider a several perspectives on language within Warring States period 
Chinese philosophy, focalized through several structural  features, in order to suggest 
a further basis for comparative work along these lines.  
As with previous chapters, it will be necessary to set some interpretive 
groundwork before addressing the issue of language and meaning head on. I will 
therefore offer an extended study of Nietzsche‘s considerations of language, running 
through the early period, to speculating on how language and meaning could be 
conceived in his later philosophy drawing on perspectivism and will to power. 
Although Nietzsche considered the issue in various ways throughout his developing 
philosophy, language and meaning understood in their conventional correspondence 
sense a present themselves as a significant barrier to understanding the full 
implications of his later philosophy of will to power and the insights of a 
perspectival understanding. These implications involve how one relates to the world, 
understood as the will to power, a prospective relation that is unmediated by 
representation. Thus, this chapter could be seen as a follow-on of the previous 
chapter, in the sense that I am attempting to show how the conception of language 
according to Nietzsche‘s philosophy overcomes the traditional 
noumenal/phenomenal distinction in the realm of language, and what its 
consequences are. Nietzsche recognised that human experience was necessarily 
perspectival and anthropocentric, but the degree of anthropocentrism imposed by a 
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representational understanding of language and meaning hinders the conclusions of a 
prospective comparative ontology by re-instating traditional distinctions at the level 
of language. If the implications of the comparative ontology-evaluation continuity 
dealt with in prior chapters are to be considered possible or coherent, it will be 
necessary to follow the conclusions reached there through to the relationship of 
language and meaning with respect to the frameworks previously drawn on: will to 
power and perspectivism on the Western side of comparison, which will then be 
briefly compared with the folk metaphysical assumptions of language in Warring 
States period Chinese philosophy. Will to power and perspectivism will provide a 
holistic and naturalistic methodology with which to consider the genesis of language 
and meaning, both of which are shown to be unmediated expressions of force as will 
to power, while the considerations of Chinese philosophy will serve as an alternative 
perspective through which to demonstrate that a comparative process ontology need 
not adhere to classical theoretical demands.  
I will make a number of points. First, I explain how a representational, 
mediated understanding of language is a problem for comparative process ontology: 
it hinders the fullest appreciation of the consequences of the ontology and how 
individuals can relate to the world by instantiating a form of idealism. I then provide 
an analysis of two major works relating to language by Nietzsche: On Truth and Lies 
in a Non-Moral Sense and On the Genealogy of Morals, both of which are works 
that stand on opposite ends of the progression of Nietzsche's thought. I show that 
while these texts establish key aspects of Nietzsche's understanding of language, it is 
only through the additional, speculative final considerations provided by will to 
power and perspectivism that the break with traditional conceptions of language can 
be fully discerned. In the last section of the Western side of comparison, I analyse 
the consequences of an ontological reading of will to power and perspectivism for 
language, specifically in semiotic terms. 
 
3.1 - The Problem of Language: Semiotics and Representation 
Firstly, what is understood by a representational understanding of meaning, 
and what is the problem that it poses for a holistic relation to nature? A brief 
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recapitulation of the dominant direction of philosophical theories on language is 
required in order to answer the first of these questions. Through aspects of 
Platonism, Christianity, and Cartesian thought, the structure of relating to nature in 
language has traditionally foundered on two extremes, either conceiving language as 
referring to things in themselves (strict correspondence or nomenclaturism) or 
mediated to a potentially alienating degree by the role of the subject, making 
language 'arbitrary'. I will focus on the latter variety of these two approaches, as it is 
the view that has more influence in contemporary theory. Indeed, much of western 
thought cannot in good conscience conceive of a relation to nature or 'external' 
phenomena that is unmediated by forms of representation or symbol, a relation 
effected by the subject-object distinction. This is not without reason: often, 
correspondence or nomenclaturist views on language are considered irreducibly 
anthropocentric, and at the very least, that they fail to recognise the human 
contribution to the interpretation of a phenomenon, and the shaping forces of body, 
culture and society on that interpretation. In contrast, language, while not something 
that may be totally mind-independent itself, has come to be seen primarily in a 
mediatory sense, mediating the experience of the subject. 
In the humanities, a predominant, contemporary form of understanding this 
mediation has come to be theorised in terms of semiotics, the study of signs or 
representations. A sign, generally understood, is what represents something other 
than itself. For our purposes, semiotics will be important in its study of how 
representations 'construct' reality, and what role ontology has in such a process. The 
contemporary field of semiotics is mostly derived from two major thinkers, 
Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce. Both figures have inspired 
greatly divergent lines of thought in semiotics. Saussure's influence is key in 
continental thinkers of critical theory such as Barthes, Kristeva, Foucault, Derrida 
and Baudrillard, and in the general movements of structuralism and post-
structuralism. Peirce's writings (along with those of other major figures like Jakob 
von Uexküll and C.W. Morris), on the other hand, greatly influenced work devoted 
to the extension and comprehension of semiotics beyond distinctly human language 
as a general theory or methodology. This influence is palpable in authors like Sebeok 
(who expands semiotics to include non-human signalling and communication 
systems, or zoosemiotics), Kull (whose work argues that sign processes characterise 
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all living systems and life in general, biosemiotics), and Deely (who claims that the 
action of signs extends past life to permeate the universe, physiosemiois).  
Inheritors of both traditions have arrived at fundamentally distinct 
conclusions about language and its relation to the world. In order to show this, I'll 
briefly summarise the differing conceptions of semiotics in both the Saussurean and 
Peircean foundations, before I interpret the most relevant conclusions of the 
Saussurean system in the work of Derrida and Baudrillard. I will then briefly sketch 
out the conclusions of the Peircean aspects of semiotics in John Deely's work, before 
returning to Deely again in the latter section of this chapter. 
The key difference between the basic systems of signs in Saussure and Peirce 
is that while Saussure conceives of the system as a dyadic relationship, that of 
signifier (the form a sign takes) and signified (the concept a sign represents), Peirce 
considers it a triadic relationship between representamen (roughly equivalent in 
function to the signifier), interpretant (the sense made of the sign, not, as the word 
suggests, an interpreter, also similar to the signified), and object (what the sign refers 
to). The fundamental difference relevant to this chapter is the inclusion in Peirce's 
system of the object. What the object achieves, in Peirce's system, is to maintain 
some form of relation to an 'objective reality', where Saussure's system is further 
abstracted from such a relation. By no means, of course, is the Peircean system 
merely a form of nomenclaturism, of direct correspondence or reference: the object 
also stipulates reference to 'subjective' aspects like concepts and fictional entities. In 
the Peircean system, experience is also mediated by signs. The implementation of 
this third aspect does, nonetheless, have the function of initially extending the 
possible field of semiotics (what later thinkers indeed did) and the degree of input 
outside specifically human semiotics, in contrast to the Saussurean model, which 
conventionally locates its analyses in the area of human language and culture
47
.
 
Peirce's legacy in semiotics, through zoosemiotics, biosemiotics, and 
physiosemiotics, thus vastly expands the field of study of signs and what counts as a 
sign. There are two fundamental philosophical questions that must be considered 
here. The first is whether such a system might run the risk of slipping into strict, 
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 Some properly consider the Saussurean system a 'semiology', more limited in its purely cultural 
approach than what is taken as the broader term of 'semiotic(s)', which encompasses a greater degree 
under the study of signs . 
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fallibilistic anthropocentrism or correspondence in its positing of an object of reality 
to which signs are relation. The second is whether this system of semiotics, extended 
to phenomena in the furthest, results in a form of 'semiotic idealism' in which signs 
are taken as an ontology. I will address these concerns in the latter stages of the 
chapter, when I explicitly compare Nietzsche's perspectivism and will to power with 
contemporary semiotician John Deely's theory of the semiotic; both are views which 
stress the interrelation of perspectival interpretation on a basic ontological level 
without a strict subject-object dualism. 
In any case, this second criticism of the Peircean system concerning semiotic 
idealism may also be made of the Saussurean system. This problem of idealism 
relates to the pars-pro-toto fallacy that Saussurean semiology is charged with
48
, that 
of mistaking the part (human semiotics, or anthroposemiotics) for the whole. Due to 
the dyadic conception in Saussurean semiology the relation between connected signs 
and interpreters and any grounding object in the relation between them is capable of 
being effaced. Deely writes:  
'Things in the sense of objects signified, as, for example, when ordering a steak 
prepared medium rare in restaurant, and then being satisfied or unsatisfied with 
the steak finally presented (as it were) "in the flesh": that was no part of the 
signifié in Saussure's sense. Objects signified as things had no formal place in the 
Saussurean semiology/semiotics system' (Deely, 2009: 1) 
If objects signified as things
49
 have no place in the semiotic system then, to extend 
the theory, their importance in relation to grounding an ontology is diminished. In 
this sense the Saussurean system reflects what Deely suggests is 'at worst a last gasp 
of modern philosophical idealism' (ibid. 3). Deely is surely correct in linking the 
two, along with his analysis of how, with the onset of Modernity, through to Kant 
and onwards, the development of the Cartesian subject and the thing-in-itself 
distinction has restricted language to ens rationis (objects which have no dimension 
outside of human society and thought) and has wholly separated it from ens reale, 
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 Cf. Deely, "Pars Pro Toto from Culture to Nature." The American Journal of Semiotics 25.1/2 
(2009): 167-192. 
49
  A radical sceptic about the boundaries of language will may debate the degree to which there can 
be a difference in language between objects and things in such instances. In any case, Deely is not 
here suggesting the object as an 'object-in-itself'. His use of the term 'object' aligns with the sense in 
which Nietzsche considers how a phenomenon is constituted not in-itself but inter-perspectively. This 
will be elaborated in the latter stages of the essay. 
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the world of nature, two fundamentally linked notions from the Latin age that Deely 
draws on to highlight a discontinuity with Modernity in the history of semiotics
50
. 
This discontinuity is preserved in certain undercurrents of twentieth century post-
structuralist thought that draws on the Saussurean tradition, and has culminated in 
(among other things) what Dieter Freundlieb has termed 'semiotic idealism'. This, 
Freundlieb (1988, p. 807) writes, is an ―epistemological assumption that linguistic 
signs or certain other linguistic or discursive structures are not representations of an 
extra-linguistic reality but that these signs are somehow constitutive of reality, i.e., 
that reality cannot be known as it is but only in the form it appears to us through 
language‖.  Freundlieb's characterisation of this idealism concerns epistemic 
possibility, but this will not be our primary concern. Rather, according to Nietzsche's 
genealogical understanding of idealism (as expressive of a particular will to power, 
in this case the will to deny life), what will be highlighted is a strong evaluational 
aspect, wherein the dualistic, transcendental tendencies of conventional Judeo-
Christian thought and certain forms of metaphysics are expressions of a nihilistic 
will deemed dangerous for life. What crucially distances Nietzsche's philosophical 
position from 'semiotic idealism', as with other similar idealisms, is the latter's 
tendency towards a dualism that implicitly devalues the immanent, apparent world.  
This tendency, by no means explicit, may be discerned in certain 
undercurrents of post-structuralist thought derived from the Saussurean tradition 
(itself, as Deely writes, carrying its own elements of idealism). Two different forms 
of consequences resulting from this idealist aspect of Saussurean semiotics may be 
seen in elements of the work of Derrida and Baudrillard. The pervasiveness of 
(semiotic) idealism derived from Saussurean semiology is such that although Derrida 
is critical of the metaphysical tradition, Saussure, and the ideology of structuralism, 
his account of meaning exacerbates the idealism of the Saussurean system of 
language and meaning through stressing the dis-unity of signifying difference and 
the lack of any tangible origin underlying that difference
51
. While there are surely 
aspects of Nietzsche's thought that are sympathetic with his own position, Derrida's 
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 Cf. Deely, John. "The primary modeling system in animals." La Filosofia del Linguaggio come arte 
dell‘ascolto: Sulla ricerca scientifica di Augusto Ponzio [Philosophy of Language as the Art of 
Listening: On Augusto Ponzio‘s Scientific Research], Bari: Edizione dal Sud (2007). 
51
 Derrida is certainly aware of the 'closure imposed by this system' (Derrida, 1973:141), but his use 
of the 'trace' in the production of difference appears less of a way out of this system than a 
recapitulation, given that it is 'no more an effect than a cause' (ibid.). 
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conception of language and meaning is at odds with Nietzsche's later understanding 
of language, specifically in his use of différance in claiming that 'every concept is 
necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, within which it refers to 
another and to other concepts, by the systematic play of differences. […] (Derrida 
1973, p. 139). Insofar as this represents Derrida's stance on language, he is not in the 
same company as Nietzsche. Nietzsche, as Gary Shapiro argues, is more in line with 
the views of the other central figure of semiotics, C. S. Peirce:  
'[…] Nietzsche's view of semiotic history, or at least of this portion of it, more 
closely resembles that of C. S. Peirce than it does that of Jacques Derrida. Derrida 
frequently cites Nietzsche in behalf of his idea that all writing refers back to an 
earlier writing and so on ad infinitum; he believes that an infinite regress of 
writings implies that in following back the chain of texts and interpretations we 
will never reach a point prior to the writing process itself. Peirce on the other 
hand makes a crucial distinction between the continuity of the sign-process and its 
indefinite or infinite extension. According to him the sign process is continuous in 
that it has no absolute first or last term. But there are many cases of continuous 
series which are not indefinitely or infinitely extended-such as a line segment. We 
can consistently conceive of a sign-process beginning (or ending) at some point in 
time, even though it makes no sense to talk of the absolutely first (or last) sign in 
the series.' (Shapiro 1981, p. 132) 
If there is affinity between Derrida's notion of différance and Nietzsche's 
philosophy, it is not at the level of language, the genealogical origins of which 
Nietzsche eventually aims to uncover. It is rather at the ontological level of 
becoming in Nietzsche's philosophy that différance has significant affinities
52
. 
Becoming more properly instantiates the endless, affirmative play that Derrida 
describes, which has no origin, and this is what distinguishes it from the ordered 
process of human language. As Shapiro writes, 'Both Peirce and Derrida see the 
impossibility of a Cartesian account of meaning which would found all meaning on 
the intuitive presence of clear and distinct ideas, a first sign. Every sign is also an 
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 Christoph Cox has already properly located these areas of continuity: 'Derrida's neologism (or 
neographism) is perhaps a better name for the complex notion of "becoming" [...]. It captures both 
senses of "becoming" […] at work in Heraclitus and Nietzsche: becoming as "self-change" and as 
"aspect-change." As "self-change," différance designates difference within "the order of the same ": 
the one that, in time, becomes-other, postponing any definitive characterization' (Cox 1999, p. 203). 
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interpretation, as Nietzsche and Peirce would agree. But it does not follow that the 
process is without beginnings, ends, or limits' (ibid. 133). To posit total difference at 
the level of language is therefore premature, and potentially undermines the link 
between ontology and language. Similarly, if language is understood foremost as 
mediated by signs or representation, the possibility arises wherein the object (and 
considered as a whole, the ontology or world) outside of signification becomes 
irrelevant in our theoretical (and ultimately practical) considerations, leading to a 
form of semiotic idealism in which language, and ultimately reality
53
, is constituted 
only by the play of signs between themselves, with no interstitial object. As with 
Derrida, one may contend that a semiotic idealism is covertly advanced in radical 
theories such as Baudrillard's, which claim that contemporary society and its values 
are dominated by signs which now increasingly refer only to and between 
themselves
54
. A position like this is one of the severe possible consequences that 
follows from privileging representation and interpretation in the Saussurean system 
and neglecting the object. It will therefore be necessary to highlight how Nietzsche 
theorizes language apart from this basis. When Nietzsche approaches the problem of 
meaning in language, it appears to be in relation to overarching concerns as a part of 
conscious language, itself a major issue for Nietzsche, and as an existential issue 
relating both to nihilism and the affirmation of life. Truth also figures largely in his 
concerns with language and meaning. I will minimise my treatment of these themes 
over the course of this chapter because they have been dealt with at length by various 
commentators. I will instead focus on language itself and its origins, and what can be 
related to it from what Nietzsche has written in key texts. 
 
3.2 – Language in On Truth and Lies 
On Truth and Lies is an early, unpublished work by Nietzsche that anticipates 
the subordinate role he will later ascribe to conscious, socialised language. This is 
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 The thesis extends to reality insofar as it can be combined with two related theses: 1) denial of the 
appearance/reality dichotomy, and most importantly, 2) rejection of substance ontology. The rejection 
of a substance ontology often leads to an ontology in terms of force, for example. In such ontologies, 
strictly speaking, signs, insofar as they exist in any respect, have no essential difference as force in 
their causal power with any other form of human action and can therefore be considered just as 
constitutive of reality. Ideas, under certain interpretations, can thus be 'real' in the same way that 
material objects are in their causal power. 
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 Cf. Baudrillard, Simulations and Simulacra (1994) 
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understood in OTL through the degeneration of intensity from metaphor to concepts. 
For the purposes of this analysis, what is of foremost interest is not the conception of 
truth that Nietzsche considers, but the naturalistic explanation he offers concerning 
the role and status of concepts in language, how language develops. To begin with, 
Nietzsche claims that language is not nomenclaturist (it does not represent things-in-
themselves), we merely 'believe that we know something about the things 
themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess 
nothing but metaphors for things -- metaphors which correspond in no way to the 
original entities' (OTL I 83). Although Nietzsche here recognises that while language 
does not refer to things-in-themselves, it is neither wholly self-generated nor self-
referential in its origin. Nietzsche describes a hierarchical understanding of language 
in which concepts as generalised, standardised models, are derived from metaphors, 
bodily translations of sensory states:  
'To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The 
image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a 
complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and 
different one.' (OTL I 82) 
According to Nietzsche, this is a process that entails aspects of falsification 
and degeneration. Falsification occurs in the transference between the nerve stimulus 
and 'image'
55
, an interpretation which Nietzsche here understands in terms of a 
metaphor. The imitation of this image (as a perception) expressed in sound is a 
second metaphor, an interpretation of an interpretation, and so 'the genesis of 
language does not proceed logically in any case, and all the material within and with 
which the man of truth, the scientist, and the philosopher later work and build, if not 
derived from never-never land, is at least not derived from the essence of things' 
(OTL I 83). There is a fundamental break in falsification with the 'essence of things' 
in the genesis of language: the form interpreting the image is itself not in the 
imagistic form, it is rather interpreted through a subordinate form.  
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 It seems adequate, in order to avoid pictorial connotations, to describe what an 'image' consists of 
here as Sousa does in his reading of this text, as a 'pre-conceptual perception of a thing' (Sousa  
2012, p. 51) 
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This process is also thereby one of degeneration. What begins with the 
potency of a 'unique and entirely original individual experience' (ibid.) is diminished 
and made 'less colorful, cooler' (ibid. 84). This degeneration initially occurs for the 
purposes of adaptation and communication, producing a generalised concept that 
effaces individual differences and distinguishing features, equalising the unequal. 
What makes this a degeneration, qualitatively speaking, is that it supplants a primal, 
unique experience with one manufactured from a conceptual framework, a self-
produced simulation: 'we produce these representations in and from ourselves with 
the same necessity with which the spider spins. If we are forced to comprehend all 
things only under these forms, then it ceases to be amazing that in all things we 
actually comprehend nothing but these forms ' (ibid. 87). Our comprehension of 
things under our particular forms of perception therefore ceases to be edifying not 
simply for the recognition that it is only our forms we are perceiving, but because 
those degenerated forms were developed out of a spirit of necessity and inadequacy. 
For Nietzsche, a related mechanism in degeneration is a capacity for 
forgetfulness in the human being: 'It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can 
ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a "truth" of the grade [of an 
adequate expression of reality]' (OTL I 81). This first occurs at the level of the 
perception, where individual differences are 'forgotten' in order to facilitate survival 
of the organism. Nietzsche suggests that our language proceeds in a similar manner: 
'Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain 
that the concept "leaf' is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences 
and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects' (OTL I 83). A further extension of this 
sense of forgetfulness is found on the cultural level in On the Use and Abuse of 
History, where Nietzsche refers to forgetfulness in terms of the ability to live and 
feel 'unhistorically'. On one end of the spectrum, an 'unhistorical' life is equated with 
the life of animals, where there is total forgetfulness and therefore the possibility for 
continuous, simple pleasures. However, this comes at the cost of 'historical' 
conditions of complexity in the individual and society from which higher states and 
types may emerge. Contrasted with this is a state of life that is too 'historical', where 
the weight of history and culture bears down on both individual and culture, 
paralysing them: 'he who cannot sink down on the threshold of the moment and 
forget all the past […] will never know what happiness is – worse, he will never do 
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anything to make others happy' (UAH I 62). The healthy, sustainable mean between 
the two poles is what Nietzsche terms the 'plastic power' of individuals and culture. 
This power consists in 'the capacity to develop out of oneself in one's own way, to 
transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to 
replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds' (ibid.)
56
.  
 
If the genesis of language in the human being represents both a falsification 
and a degeneration, then according to Nietzsche's thought in the essay, there is a 
novel process of complexification indicated in On Truth and Lies, in which humans 
'place [their] behaviour under the control of abstractions' (OTL I 84), when humans 
increasingly act according to the frameworks or schemata they have developed 
through the generalisation and de-intensification of images into 'less colorful, cooler 
concepts' (ibid.). Nietzsche recognises two effects of this process. On the one hand 
humans are alienated from a more powerful, more ‗authentic‘ mode of existence 
implied in a life of metaphors and pre-conceptual experience. Also, as noted earlier, 
human experience is stripped of its potency and sense of awe when it is understood 
to be a fabrication necessitated by a weakness. In a process similar to that described 
in The Birth of Tragedy, humans are distanced from the primal, immediate 
experience of the way of things by nature, a Dionysian unity. However, as Nietzsche 
writes,  
'something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be 
achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order 
according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, 
subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries- a new world, one which now 
confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more 
universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, 
and thus as the regulative and imperative world' (ibid. 84) 
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 Note Confucianism, for example, a philosophy with a tremendous degree of 'plastic power' , 
wherein one develops oneself in one's own way by incorporating and elaborating pre-existing cultural 
rituals that constitute the structure under which such self-development is meaningful. As a significant 
author puts it, '[Rituals] are formal structures which, to be efficacious, must be personalized and 
reformulated to accommodate the uniqueness and the quality of each participant. In this sense, ritual 
actions are a pliant body of actions for registering, developing, and displaying one's own sense of 
importance' (Ames 1993, p. 153). 
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A conceptual framework in language creates the conditions under which a 
complexification of lived experience can occur, an idea that Nietzsche will return to 
in describing the onset of bad conscience in the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche's 
conditional praise for such a complexification is grounded in this essay on the sense 
of human beings having established their framework, in contrast to the bee who 
'builds with wax he gathers from nature' (ibid. 85), with their own 'far more delicate 
material which [they] first have to manufacture from [themselves] (ibid.). The 
human being here displays a relative superiority to the bee in the sense that he/she 
produces the materials through which he/she will function, extend themselves, and 
ostensibly dominate their environment. However, the material out of which they 
build appears much more delicate and intricate, and susceptible to catastrophe, than 
the wax a bee collects. Nietzsche accords the human being praise on this account, 
noting as he does in other contemporary works (UAH I) that such a conceptual 
framework is subject to a precarious balance over the abyss of the primitive, 
dangerous natural world of constant change.  
The power of forgetfulness is again an indispensable element of such 
construction, furnishing the ability to build in 'repose, security, and consistency' 
(ibid. 86). Whereas in the primal experience of dionysian intoxication one's identity 
with the whole is affirmed, in the contrasting activity of conceptual creation the 
human being's overt role must be effaced. The stage of conceptual production in 
language is a degenerated response to the powerful force of experience, 'the 
primitive world of metaphor' (ibid.). The strength of originary experience is too 
much for human perception to bear. It is bearable only through a subordinated 
interpretation, and in order to be productive, the subordination and degeneration 
inherent in the interpretation must be 'forgotten'. The nature of the force constituting 
conceptual production is, in the first place, that it 'forgets' its nature. In terms of the 
active/reactive distinction it is reactive, as that which understands itself in response 
to something else
57
. Thus, the form of 'forgetting' inherent in conceptual activity is a 
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 Gilles Deleuze has incisively characterized this understanding of the reactive, insofar as it can be 
considered a consistent idea in Nietzsche's philosophy. Consider, for example, his claim that 'we can 
only grasp reactive forces for what they are [...] if we relate them to what dominates them but is not 
itself reactive' (Deleuze 1983, p. 41) and that '[t]he reactive is a primordial quality of force but one 
which can only be interpreted as such in relation to and on the basis of the active' (ibid. 42). 
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product of reactive forces in relation to the wholly active force of pre-conceptual 
experience.  
Similarly related to such a state of affairs is the status of the human as the 
'artistically creating subject' (ibid.) who must 'forget' his role in production or as 
artist in order to continue to produce. Nietzsche's emphasis on the artistic in this 
essay is strongly influenced by how he understands the relation in language between 
humans and things-in-themselves. Having denied that language refers to things-in-
themselves, and that the reference we assume is in fact arbitrary in its origins, he 
posits that, in lieu of some sort of prior connection, 'between two absolutely different 
spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and no 
expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation' (OTL I 86), also translated as 
behaviour or disposition. Nietzsche characterizes the relation in terms of 
arbitrariness, in the sense that signs, as mediatory units of meaning, are not grounded 
by any direct relation to the preceding experience. The relation is also described 
ultimately as an aesthetic one, however, and here a question might arise as to how 
positing the relation itself as aesthetic is arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, the imposed limitations of humans' perspectives are the 
conditions under which they can produce a conceptual framework in order to live 
and extend themselves in the world. The radical extension or breach of those 
limitations, as Nietzsche points out both in this essay and The Birth of Tragedy, 
constitute a corresponding limitation on the ability to act or live: 'If but for an instant 
[the human] could escape from the prison walls of this faith [in his own perspective], 
his "self consciousness" would be immediately destroyed. It is even a difficult thing 
for him to admit to himself that the insect or the bird perceives an entirely different 
world from the one that man does' (ibid. 86). There is thus a tension in the text 
between two polarities of human life. It is necessary for humans to erect the barriers 
of a conceptual framework, beneficial in its own right, in order to live and flourish in 
an uncertain, dangerous world of flux. However, such barriers inhibit our ability to 
engage the world non-anthropocentrically, they fundamentally disturb the possibility 
of an intuitive relation to the 'essence' of things. A return to the undifferentiated flux 
of pre-conceptual experience would be suicidal, but the structure of conceptual 
language vastly constrains and impoverishes the human perspective. 
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How does Nietzsche resolve this tension? He delineates a drive in humans for 
the formation of metaphors, 'the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a 
single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man 
himself' (ibid. 89). This description of the fundamental human drive and its activities 
is the section of OTL most consonant with Nietzsche's later, more holistic 
philosophical thought. Anticipating the human being as an expression of the will to 
power, what is fundamentally human is here considered as a drive to metaphor
58
. 
While we have encompassed a great deal of our experience in conceptualisation, 
Nietzsche maintains that our metaphorical production continues unobstructed in the 
areas of myth and art, where the more vital, primal aspects of life are once again 
appreciated and tolerated. Similarly, the complexity of intellectual thought that 
conceptual framework enables is co-opted by the fundamental drive for metaphor. 
The drive is allowed full expression, even though its expression threatens to 
undermine the conceptual framework, through entertainment: 'man has an invincible 
inclination to allow himself to be deceived and is, as it were, enchanted with 
happiness when the rhapsodist tells him epic fables as if they were true [...]. So long 
as it is able to deceive without injuring, that master of deception, the intellect, is free; 
it is released from its former slavery and celebrates its Saturnalia' (ibid. 89-91). 
Those more primal, experiental aspects of the drive are conditionally allowed a 
greater degree of free play through sublimation. The expression of the metaphor-
making drive leads to an aestheticisation of life, a beautiful and illusory disguising of 
life through art. Further, art, through its shared expression of the drive to metaphor, 
impinges on the anthropocentrism that frames the human perspective. The 
intelligibility of the 'language' of other forms of life is made possible through 
expression of the metaphor drive, as Sarah Kofman has pointed out:  
'When a poet makes a tree speak like a nymph, by thus transgressing the natural 
order he indicates the possibility of speaking according to a different order than 
the one created by our habits. Letting vegetation speak when it 'ought' not to be 
able to signifies that the absence of words conceals another system of metaphors, 
'proper' to the plant, and unmasks our language, too, as metaphorical' (Kofman 
1993, p. 78) 
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 As Kofman writes, 'The drive which urges man to make metaphors, repressed in one area, is 
displaced and manifests itself elsewhere: it is indestructible, for it coincides with life itself' (Kofman 
1993, pp. 74-75) 
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The insights Nietzsche displays here regarding the intelligibility of language 
in other forms will be developed much further in his later work. There are 
nonetheless a number of points that make the human as an expression of the drive to 
metaphor discontinuous with Nietzsche's later understanding of the human as an 
expression of will to power. Most immediately, if Nietzsche demonstrates how 
humans have developed the web of conceptual framework like spiders, he also 
shows how much we are now entangled in it. Del Caro notes that '[t]he grim tone of 
the essay of 1873, with its tendency to reduce human activity to the formation of 
metaphors and concepts, is made even more grim by Nietzsche's own use of 
metaphors to make his point – this has the effect of underscoring the hollowness of 
the human stance in relation to the earth' (Del Caro 2004, p. 39)
59
.
 
 
Then, methodologically, Nietzsche's claims about the role of reference in 
language come into conflict with each other throughout the essay. He argues that our 
language does not correspond to things-in-themselves, 'further inference from the 
nerve stimulus to a cause outside of us is already the result of a false and 
unjustifiable application of the principle of sufficient reason' (OTL I 81), but neither 
is language merely self-contained, because Nietzsche describes how concepts are 
derived from interpretations of nerve stimuli. Nietzsche concludes that this sort of 
indirect reference cannot establish whether our language is a correct or incorrect 
representation of the world. Nonetheless, it seems as though there are two senses in 
which this sort of relation does represent the world. The relation in the interpretation 
of a nerve stimulus may only be concluded as 'arbitrary' in two qualified senses: a) in 
the naturalistic sense of being nothing more than the determinations of selection 
processes in the organism which vary according to circumstances, and b) the sense 
that the nature of the relation is fundamentally (i.e. beyond the naturalistic sense to 
the level of primal experience) aesthetic, and in being aesthetic, the relation is 
derived from primal experience. 
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 J. Hillis Miller has similarly argued that in this essay '[Nietzsche] too is entangled in the situation 
he is attempting to clarify. He can by no effort survey that situation as if from above, in a species of 
aerial photography of the human predicament. Nietzsche's language is neither purely conceptual nor 
purely metaphorical, neither scientific nor artistic. It is an example of that perpetual casting of 
figurative constructions over the mysterious X which the figures attempt to describe. This torsion 
makes of the essay as a whole an extended example of what I call "the linguistic moment." It attempts 
the impossible task of defining in unambiguous signs the functioning of signs' (Miller 1981, pp. 46-
47) 
 122 
 
Both of these senses constitute the formation of language in different ways. 
The naturalistic sense shows how concepts are formed according to biological 
aspects; forgetfulness is shown to be a major biological mechanism for the formation 
of concepts, for example. The nature of the relation as aesthetic is expressed through 
the drive to metaphor, which bypasses the more thoroughly degenerated conceptual 
framework in language. In describing the transference from stimulus to image 
Nietzsche claims that 'there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the 
middle of an entirely new and different one.' (OTL I 82) but the naturalistic and 
aesthetic aspects of the relation undermine, if not contradict, this idea. These aspects 
show that there is no 'overleaping' in language, there is actually continuity, albeit 
through interpretive degeneration and falsification of experience. This seeming 
contradiction is evident in the essay because Nietzsche is drawing on, as Sousa 
explains, 'an idealism based on a full-fledged naturalism, which is in fact the natural 
development of Schopenhauer‘s view on the intellect as a natural product' (Sousa 
2012, p. 56). The relation between language and primal experience appears 
inadequate due to Nietzsche's continued recourse to the idea of the thing-in-itself in 
the essay.  
Thus, for example, any sort of relation between nature and language is 
precluded by Nietzsche in the first section when he claims that 'we believe that we 
know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, 
and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things– metaphors which 
correspond in no way to the original entities' (OTL I 83). The notion of a noumenon 
lurking in 'things themselves' and 'original entities' totally precludes a continuous 
relation between language and a natural state. If, however, we subtract the idea of a 
thing-in-itself against which to contrast pre-conceptual experience and the metaphors 
that interpret it (as Nietzsche mostly does in section 2 of OTL), then this relation is in 
fact tenable, in a qualified sense. Both the naturalistic and aesthetic aspects of the 
relation show how a continuity is maintained between originary experience and 
language, albeit with the contribution of (falsified) interpretation and degeneration. 
The greatest (i.e. least degenerated and falsified) continuity with pre-conceptual 
experience is retained in the drive to form metaphors, which proceeds unabated in art 
and myth, as Nietzsche shows in section 2. 
 123 
 
In section 2, however, the possibility for an unmediated connection to the 
world through language is further obstructed by the sense that any such relation 
would be untenable. The capacity of art and myth to furnish such a relation is 
described by Nietzsche as requiring it as a deception in order to live. Section 1 
presents a problem in relating language to nature through the positing of noumena. 
Section 2, however, problematizes any relation by maintaining a view of nature and 
world, or the essential way of things, that renders the possibility of lived, human 
experience irreconcilable with an unmediated relation to nature. This view is evident 
in several of Nietzsche's important early works. In UAH, for example, Nietzsche 
presents two analogous examples that show that an unmediated, holistic relation to 
nature is unbearable: the man 'who did not possess the power of forgetting at all' 
(UAH 1) and the true pupil of Heraclitus who recognises the essence of the world as 
becoming, who can 'hardly dare to raise his finger' (ibid.). A life needs the necessary 
illusions of adaptive perceptual and conceptual stability in order to persist in the face 
of unliveable flux.  
This view of the nature of things is similarly present earlier in The Birth of 
Tragedy. It may be seen in both section 2 and The Birth of Tragedy that Nietzsche 
presents an originary relation to the world which requires mediation through the 
development of an aesthetic perspective, 'under the influence of the Apolline drive 
(Trieb) for beauty, the Olympian divine order of joy developed out of the original, 
Titanic divine order of terror in a series of slow transitions, in much the same way as 
roses burst forth from a thicket of thorns' (BT II 23). Not only is the originary state of 
things, in ontological terms, an unliveable flux which must be mediated by an 
alienated perceptual apparatus, it is also, once structured, as a primal, tragic state of 
existence that must be mediated by the deceptive drive to aestheticize.  Insofar as 
one is capable of achieving an unmediated relation to nature, it is when '[n]ature 
expresses itself with its highest energy in Dionysiac intoxication' (DWV I 122-123) 
so that it ' [...] binds individual creatures together again, and it makes them feel that 
they are one with each other, so that the principium individuationis appears, so to 
speak, to be a perpetual state of weakness of the Will. The more degenerate the Will 
is, the more everything fragments into individual elements; the more selfish and 
arbitrary the development of the individual, the weaker is the organism which it 
serves' (ibid.). Such a position problematically frames the possibility of an authentic 
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relation to nature. This relation, according to the conception of nature that Nietzsche 
has at his disposal in the earlier works, must be self-destructive by its inherent logic. 
A dionysian relation to nature is only possible through the complete and irreversible 
effacing of the individual. As long as there is a self present to recognise the fact of 
having had a dionysian experience it is not a totally dionysian experience, it is still 
tempered by the apollonian drive. The prospects for relating to nature are grim in 
either case: nature must either be aestheticized, falsified, in order to live in it, or one 
must destroy oneself to achieve an unmediated relation. We will see that Nietzsche's 
later thought gives him the fundamental insights that allows him to posit a relation to 
ontology through language that avoids either unhappy conclusion, and this is 
achieved through a consideration of how language intervenes between human beings 
and nature. 
 
3.3 – Language in On the Genealogy of Morals 
By the time of On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche has developed an 
account of the origins of language that fundamentally differs from the one contained 
in OTL. There is the same emphasis on language as derived in and through nature, a 
naturalistic understanding of language, but this understanding embraces the positive, 
life-affirming aspects of Nietzsche's genealogical method. This method is coupled 
with a greater holistic picture of the world developed through the teaching of will to 
power and a fuller understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. In OTL 
Nietzsche's concern is a denunciation of a correspondence-type understanding of 
language and truth, with the effect that the human alienates himself from the 
overwhelming totality of nature in order to live and prosper. In Nietzsche‘s later 
philosopher, will to power now also factors in as the holistic aspect of Nietzsche's 
philosophy
60
, and this restructures the question of how language develops less as a 
critical response to historical conceptions of truth and reality and more as an issue of 
competing interpretations and evaluations understood on the basis of power
61
. 
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 Richard Schacht similarly argues that the unity of apollonian and Dionysian in the early work 
becomes the overhuman and will to power (Schacht  1983, p. 482) 
61
 Hence, as Alan Schrift neatly summarises the transition, 'Nietzsche's theory of language functions 
as an essential aspect of his later thinking. Insofar as language is a mere semiotic, a simplified, 
falsified, man-made sign-system, and insofar as all thinking is possible only in and through the means 
which language provides, the "knowledge" and "truth" which are derived from language are seen by 
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Although brief in length, the essay provides evidence of a new stance on an 
evaluative origin of language, both positive and negative. The positive conception of 
language is here developed in relation to the 'pathos of distance' of the higher type: 
'The right of the masters to confer names extends so far that one should allow oneself 
to grasp the origin of language itself as the expression of the power of the rulers: 
they say ―this is such and such‖, they put their seal on each thing and event with a 
sound and in the process take possession of it' (OGM I 2, 13). According to 
Nietzsche, originary language may be understood foremost here as an expression of 
power, a sizeable, but not discontinuous, development from seeing language 
emerging simply as a process of transference (e.g. from nerve stimulus to image). As 
Tracy B. Strong highlights: 
'The very ability to give names- to extend the control of language over the world- 
must then be a masterly trait, for it consists of saying what the world is. To name 
is to define and bring under control; the allocation of names creates the world in 
the image of he who names. Such creations are properly termed meta-phors, they 
are artifacts which carry an intellectual process beyond the mind into the world' 
(Strong 1976, p. 256)
62
 
Naming is 'masterly' because it is auto-generative: it is an interpretation borne 
from itself which feels itself both as good and as the only interpretation. However, 
because it is a relatively narrow interpretation or perspective, it cannot sustain itself. 
Hence, this originary, affirmative production of language by the masters is then 
succeeded by a 'herd-instinct' that emerges with the decline of the aristocratic 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Nietzsche to fail to do the job which they are thought to perform. Thus, Nietzsche concludes that 
"knowledge" is merely a collection of perspectival illusions which, while necessary for the 
preservation of the human species, stands as a function not of truth but of power.' (Schrift 1995, p. 
389) 
62
 What is specifically understood by 'naming', and any differences between 'naming' and language is 
hard to gauge. Strong's reading is problematic for it claims that to name is 'to define and bring under 
control'. But definition is surely a later phenomenon in language that proceeds 'naming', which seems 
more like a brute expression of power or an imposition of perspective. The need to define something 
arises out of a (conceptual) ambiguity which is not present at 'masterly' stage. Nietzsche explicitly 
discusses definition later in the Genealogy by saying that all concepts in which an entire process is 
semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has no history is definable' (OGM 2 13, 
57). Kofman similarly presents a troublesome reading when she suggests that '[…] imposing a name 
is enough to make one believe one possesses a thing in its essentiality, or to change its meaning: thus, 
thanks to a simple change of name, the priests were able to perform the veritable conjuring trick of 
making what had until then been hated appear beneficial' (Kofman 1993, p. 83). But surely at the 
'masterly' stage one imposes a name because one already assumes one possesses a thing (although 
perhaps without concern for its essentiality), as the 'masters' do. It seems rather that it's with the 
priests that the imposition of a name is equated with power, possession (and essentiality). 
 126 
 
determination of language and values. A well-known aphorism on consciousness in 
the fifth book of The Gay Science, published in the same time-frame (1887) as OGM, 
elaborates the sense in which Nietzsche thinks that conscious, socialised language 
degenerates: '[…] everything which enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, 
thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming conscious 
involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and 
generalization.' (GS 354).As with On Truth and Lies, the sense of degeneration from 
more a vital, fundamental experience is maintained. However, in OGM this 
degeneration is focalized in the distinct field of human types and values: 
'what was the real etymological significance of the designations for "good" coined 
in the various languages? I found they all led back to the same conceptual 
transformation- that everywhere "noble," "aristocratic" in the social sense, is the 
basic concept from which "good" in the sense of "with aristocratic soul," noble," 
[...] necessarily developed: a development which always runs parallel with that 
other in which "common'" "plebeian," "low" are finally transformed into the 
concept "bad‖' (OGM I 4, 27-28) 
Both accounts of language, from OTL to GM, appear to be continuous insofar 
as Nietzsche is describing transformations at two different levels. The former 
transformation is a transference from stimulus to metaphor in the organism, which 
effects a degeneration in terms of force: the organism is unable to bear the totality of 
primal experience, becoming, and therefore develops a weaker interpretation of it in 
static forms. Language, from the outset, is a weakened interpretation. The latter 
transformation then occurs on a later, more developed anthropocentric level within 
the 'order of rank' of types: the 'naming' of the masters is pre-conceptual, consisting 
of 'spontaneous, aggressive, and conquering forces which are usurpatory and which 
never cease to give new exegeses and new directions' (Kofman 1993, p. 87), and is 
therefore more 'active' (but by no means wholly 'active', as the nature of the initial 
transference implies) in its expression than the later development in language of 
concepts. The major contribution of GM to Nietzsche's understanding of language is 
to show that an equivalent degeneration occurs at the stage of concepts and values, 
that ' weak wills can impose their meanings only by reaction, by inverting, 
disfiguring, and displacing the meaning attributed by the strong' (ibid.). In the 
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process of emphasizing the power of the masters to produce their own meanings, to 
'take possession' of an event, Nietzsche says little about the natural context on which 
this possession depends and takes place in. For the masters, it is not simply an issue 
of designating something 'as it is' in nature, it is an issue of an active interpretation of 
that thing or relation, to put a 'seal' on that thing or relation as an expression of will 
to power. This expression is both an affinity and discontinuity with the natural: the 
expression is itself felt as a natural act and is therefore an affinity with nature 
inasmuch as it is what is done 'naturally'. However, the narrowness of the masterly 
interpretation prevents a fuller, deeper relation with nature. Of the masters' 
perspective Richardson points out that its 'wholeness or single-mindedness makes it 
hard for the master even to understand or empathize with other drives' (Richardson 
1996: 56). In this sense the masters are 'ignorant' of the difference between their 
active interpretation and the underlying interpretation of nature. 
In their conceptions of language, neither contrasted works in the spectrum of 
Nietzsche's philosophy by themselves appear to furnish the possibility for a 
satisfying conception of a relation to nature and world unmediated by language. On 
Truth and Lies cuts the human off from the natural through the process of 
falsification and degeneration through metaphor transference; the 'thing-in-itself' can 
never be ascertained due to necessary, limited conceptual frameworks that produce 
falsifications, allowing the human to live and flourish in the world. The closest 
humans get to an authentic relation is problematically framed in terms of a self-
effacing dionysiac intoxication; if there is any hope for a closer relation to nature it is 
through the resurgence of the drive to metaphor in art and myth, which maintain a 
more direct relationship with nature than otherwise possible.  
The Genealogy of Morals focuses on the evaluative development of types, 
where language develops as an interpretation or expression of the will to power in 
the originary act of masterly 'naming', the product of an active, if narrow perspective. 
This perspective comes to be subverted by the priestly mode of aristocracy, but the 
human is thereby ultimately complexified to a more 'interesting' state through the 
reversal of values effected: 'it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of 
human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that 
only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil-and 
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these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other 
beasts!' (OGM I 6 33)
63
. This complexification ultimately comes at the cost, 
historically, of the human becoming less 'natural' by being 'sick'. Thus, in OGM, an 
unmediated relation to nature is initially inhibited insofar as the narrowness of 
masterly interpretation is too much of an anthropocentrism, and slavely 
complexification 'de-naturalises' the human. This is not a pessimistic evaluation by 
any means. The task that thus emerges in philosophy, for Nietzsche, is to undo the 
sickness that has befallen the human animal in the process of his magnificent 
complexification, and to re-naturalise the human once more on this basis. This 
naturalisation is not a process of regression; it isn't the case that the human is to 
become more of an animal once more, more 'narrow-minded', nor is Nietzsche 
advocating a form of primitivism. Rather, the complexification that has occurred in 
the human creates the conditions under which a deeper, fuller relation to nature can 
be achieved, the conditions which Nietzsche thinks are necessary for the 
development of future philosophers
64
. 
 
3.4 - Language Through Perspectivism and Will to Power 
I will now argue that a non-correspondence, non-representation relation to 
world through language can be better discerned in Nietzsche's philosophy through an 
interconnected understanding of perspectivism and will to power, and this relation, 
contrasted against those views taken to facilitate idealism (of the pernicious variety 
Nietzsche critiques). This has two significant consequences: firstly, it makes a 
comparative process ontology further realizable in the sense that potential difficulties 
relating its ontology to language are resolved. Secondly, this account of how 
language relates to perspectivism and will to power may itself help to further make 
Nietzsche's own philosophy of the future realizable even in principle. On this second 
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 Consider also an important aphorism in the earlier HAH that describes a similar process: 'the danger 
in […] strong communities, founded on similar, steadfast individual members, is an increasing, 
inherited stupidity, which follows all stability like a shadow. In such communities, spiritual progress 
depends on those individuals who are less bound, much less certain, and morally weaker' (HAH § 5 
224) 
64
 Note BGE 203: ‗The conditions that one would have partly to create and partly to exploit for their 
genesis, the probable ways and tests that would enable a soul to grow to such a height and force that it 
would feel the compulsion for such tasks; a revaluation of values under whose new pressure and 
hammer a conscience would be steeled, a heart turned to bronze, In order to endure the weight of such 
responsibility‘ (trans. Kaufmann) 
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point, this is because both of these aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy provide the 
necessary scope to develop an account of meaning in language that is unmediated to 
the extent that it is a direct extension of the more fundamental drives of nature and 
world, tracing its genealogy through the vegetal, animal and mineral drives that 
constitute and precede the human being
65
. Both notions, when fully appreciated, will 
allow us to see how the origin of language, how language itself, can be conceived 
within Nietzsche‘s philosophy as an extension of the will to power (understood in 
conjunction with perspectivism) as implied in OGM, an extension of will to power 
that is not essentially anthropocentric
31
 nor mediated by representation. Throughout 
my description I will also draw on comparisons between these concepts and the 
semiotic theory of John Deely. In doing so, I hope to show the confluence between 
Nietzsche's philosophy and holistic semiotics as it is currently developing outside of 
the Saussurean system. Deely's theory in particular stresses the inextricability of 
human language and signs from the 'inert' processes of the world, while also aiming 
to be a holistic methodological doctrine, similar to the will to power (as discussed 
explicitly in BGE 36). 
 
Again, it is necessary firstly to understand perspectivism in its broadest sense 
as the play of a multiplicity of perspectives, a play of interpretations described in 
terms of ever-changing forces (the power-process ontology, or becoming). In The 
Gay Science, for example, Nietzsche asks whether 'all existence is not essentially 
actively engaged in interpretation' (GS 374). In contrast to the dominant 
subject/object model of epistemology and experience traditionally posited in western 
philosophy, Nietzsche advocates necessarily inter-related processes of interpretation 
as the site of experience, rather than any one atomic entity. As described in the 
previous chapter, perspectivism also forms a rejection of the noumenal/phenomenal 
distinction, as perspectives are never constituted in and of themselves. Like Indra's 
net, they are constituted by a network of interpretive activity that, given their holistic 
interdependence, preclude at any point the role of a noumenon.  
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 See Parkes, Graham (1994, pp. 157-249) for an extended discussion on the metaphors of the natural 
world and their importance in Nietzsche's philosophy. 
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Roughly speaking, in a conventional understanding of language there is an 
out-standing phenomenon (text or work, specifically in the literary or aesthetic 
traditions) from which we derive ostensibly subjective meanings; we typically ask, 
for example, what the 'meaning' of a text or event of, and thus imply a text or event 
in itself apart from these various interpretations. Nietzsche attacks this assumption 
more generally in an unpublished note from 1885-1886:  
'A ―thing-in-itself‖ just as perverse as a ―sense-in-itself,‖ a ―meaning-in-itself.‖ 
There are no facts-in-themselves,‖ for a sense must always be projected into them 
before there can be ―facts.‖ The question ―what is that?‖ is an imposition of 
meaning from some other viewpoint. ―Essence,‖ the ―essential nature,‖ is 
something perspectival and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom 
there always lies ―what is that for me?‖ (for us, for all that lives, etc.)' (WTP 556).  
In contrast, Perspectivism establishes that there is no object or text in itself against 
which a mediation of interpretation can occur. The insights of perspectivism 
specifically applied to language hold that, instead of a text or object 'meaning to' me 
something that is in the process mediated by subjective representation, it is that the 
totality of drives that constitute me engage in a play of interpretation, or express 
themselves as will to power, by 'interpreting' (expressing force) on a contesting 
interpretation (the 'object' or text). Similar notions about language that draw heavily 
on Nietzsche's thought may be found in post-structuralist debates about textual 
interpretation, ideology and the role of the author, but few authors are willing to 
maintain the characteristic qualitative and originary aspect of genealogy that 
Nietzsche stresses
66
. 
Similar to the ground of Nietzsche's perspectivism, the semiotician John 
Deely stipulates an inter-related model of cognition where the subject is inextricable 
from environment as part of his semiotic theory. Instead of an anthropocentric, 
realist understanding of experience (i.e. to consider that a cloud mimics this or that 
animal), or a purely subjective view (the mimicking as an aspect of cognitive 
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 As Gemes points out, this constitutes a key difference in Nietzsche, who develops (with the 
necessary aid of a genealogy that traces the drives) 'his vision of the architect of the future as one who 
constructs a unifying goal, as one puts the pieces into a highly structured whole under a singular 
vision [which] runs counter to the whole postmodern appropriation of Nietzsche as celebrating a 
fragmentary decentered world' (Gemes 2001, p. 348-349) 
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experience imposed on a phenomenon), there is, Deely states, the possibility for 
conceiving 
'"data" or "impressions" of external sense, semiotically, [...] neither as intrinsic 
properties of physical things nor as mere modifications of the subjective faculties 
("effects" wholly within the cognitive organism), but precisely as features or 
properties exhibiting how things are in their action here and now on an organism 
possessed of this determinate range of sensitivities […] i.e., as "properties" 
neither of "things in themselves" nor of "knowers of their subjectivity," but of the 
situation of interaction as co-determined by the structure of the stimulating source 
on the one side and of the receiving organs and organism on the other side' (Deely 
1982, p. 115). 
According to Deely, this understanding would retain the relativeness of 
interpretation without wholly confining it to subjective experience: 'The initial 
contact between cognizing organism and environment, on this view, is indistinctly 
subjective and objective. The world appears thus [...] only to a subject, but it really is 
that way given that totality of conditions' (ibid.).  
This emphasis on the totality of conditions is crucial. Perspectival interpretation 
appears "subjective", singular, but it is simultaneously constituted by all other 
perspectives, and vice-versa. The cloud really does mimic this or that animal 
according to my perspective, because my perspective (being sufficiently developed) 
is interwoven with and acting on other perspectives. This claim about the world is 
not reducible only to my perspective as subjective interpretation; rather, it is an 
instantiated interpreting
67
 or acting on of other perspectives, while it is 
simultaneously interpreted and acted on by others. But my perspective is not 
totalisable either: it is only given the totality of perspectives or conditions relative to 
my own, and the limited depth and development of my perspective, that it can be 
said that the cloud mimics this or that. Outside of this totality, such a claim does not 
universally obtain; the cloud isn't only a mimicking thing. In an unpublished note, 
Nietzsche makes a similar point about definition: 'A thing would be defined once all 
creatures had asked "what is that?" and had answered their question. Supposing one 
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 I understand the process of interpretation throughout the remainder of this chapter foremost as the 
expression of force. 
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single creature, with its own relationships and perspectives for all things, were 
missing, then the thing would not yet be "defined.‖' (WTP 556). Accordingly, the 
fullest ―definition‖ or interpretation for Nietzsche would thus be one that most 
appreciates the totality of the web of perspectives, not just a localized totality within 
that web. Nietzsche acknowledges that while our particular interpretation is an 
inescapably human, localized perspective, its depth of appreciation can certainly be 
extended: 'today we are at least far from the ridiculous immodesty that would be 
involved in decreeing from our corner that perspectives are permitted only from this 
corner' (GS 374). In other words, we can recognize our unique contribution to the 
interpretive process on the one hand, but also recognize that this process is not one 
wholly encompassed by our own perspective.  
Hence, we see that both Nietzsche's perspectivism and the basis of Deely's 
semiotic theory develop an understanding of interpretation on the basis of an 
inseparable cognitive resonance between perceiver and perceived, treating the effects 
of an interpretation as fundamentally 'real', part of the world and not just the 
interpreter, without establishing a nomenclaturism that would assume those effects 
as the only possible ones or interpretations. Further, in response to the direct issue of 
how a phenomenon can be (interpreted) as two things at once, even contradictory 
things, Nietzsche's perspectivism favors a greater holistic perspective under which 
these differing, subordinate interpretations can be appreciated. By delineating no 
essential distinction between perspective and interpretation, or cognition and 
environment, Nietzsche's perspectivism and Deely's semiotic theory establish from 
the beginning an inherent continuity that is essential to understanding how human 
language will emerge as a direct, unmediated expression (and unique development) 
of pre-existing natural forces. What remains is to explicate how human language 
proper develops itself as a unique expression of these forces without becoming 
essentially anthropocentric. Although it is unique in its particular constitution, the 
human perspective emerges nonetheless as configuration of previous interpretations. 
Parkes, for example, explains the direct processual relationship between 'interpreting 
existence' and becoming: 
'If all existence is interpreting, then all phenomena are expressing through their 
existence: ―This is what it means to be‖ – or rather ―become‖. A rock asserts itself as 
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a paradigm of elemental solidity. Where vegetation prevails is the claim: ―these 
processes, we plants, are what sun and earth, water and air, really are becoming. […] 
Animals supervene, intimating: this is what vegetation can become, as they 
incorporate and assimilate denizens of the plant realm. And humans, presenting 
themselves as the ultimate embodiment of mineral, vegetal, and animal, represent the 
grandest interpretation of all' (Parkes 2005, p. xxi) 
In semiotics, what Deely considers to be a sign is 'anything functioning to bring 
something other than itself into an organism's awareness' (Deely 1982, p. 98). What 
can be understood in comparative terms with Nietzsche's will to power is thus that 
all mineral, vegetal, animal and ultimately human forms are signs of becoming. 
Deely argues for a similarly extensive notion of signs inhering in the basic processes 
of the universe,  
'already at the level of their fundaments, signs are virtually present and operative 
in the dyadic interactions of brute force, weaving together in a single fabric of 
virtual relations the future and the past of such interactions. This is semiosis, but 
semiosis of a specific kind. I propose that we call it physiosemiosis, so as to bring 
out by the very name the fact that it is a question here of a process as broad as the 
physical universe itself.' (Deely, 1990: 93-94) 
Deely must posit the existence of signs in the physical universe in terms of a virtual 
presence
68
, that from the very start these constituents have the potential for 
signification. For Nietzsche, however, there is no such need, because the action of 
signs is not fundamentally different in its nature or causal efficacy from any other 
process or 'interactions of force' in the world, it is simply an expression of force as 
the will to power. Will to power, as the will to interpretation, positions humans 
expressing an interpretation of all prior forms on earth. The human is the continually 
unfolding result of the sum of previous interpretations, of mineral, vegetal and 
animal origin. Humans are derived from and constituted by drives that are prior to 
them, they are a particular continuation of those drives, but their specifically human 
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Deely writes further that '[b]efore there are actually signs, there are signs virtually, that is, there are 
beings and events so determined by other beings and events that, in their own activity as so 
determined, they determine yet further series of beings and events in such a way that the last terms 
in the series represent the first terms by the mediation of the middle terms' (Deely 1990, p. 87). 
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contribution is a unique alteration of the directionality of the totality of drives that 
constitute them and continue through them. 
Language is not an exceptional phenomenon when understood through the 
will to power. Tracing its genealogy back to a cognition which is inseparable from 
its environment, the origin of language is neither entirely reactive and 
representational (wherein language is a falsification wholly the product of a human 
subject) nor wholly active and auto-generative (the stamp of the masters who 'forget' 
nature, being too singular in their perspective to fully appreciate it). While both are 
significant qualitative facets constituting the shaping, production and 
complexification of language, they are not by themselves ultimately sufficient to 
explain the origin of language as a continuity with preceding natural drives. Instead, 
language, like any other phenomenon of will to power, manifests as an ordering 
process in the flux of becoming. As part of a flux, there can be no radical breaks; 
processes and their development are inextricable from each other at every point. 
Signification, which language is derived from, is not something that originates in the 
human, nor is it specific to the human. Rather, it is itself another interpretation 
proffered by the animal, vegetal and mineral drives. Language is a biological, 
situated development out of that basis, and is therefore a continuous expression of all 
prior forms of becoming. 
This can be made clear especially with regard to the idea of meaning in language. 
According to the will to power, when I express a meaning in language, I am 
expressing a relation of force that is historical, genealogical, that both precedes me 
but is also made different through my particular appropriation at a distinct place and 
time. M. J. Bowles elucidates a similar understanding of meaning in Nietzsche's 
philosophy that emphasizes its interrelation with power: 'a concept, a precept, or an 
idea has meaning if and only if it has power'
69
. Bowles then characterizes power in 
terms of the 'feeling of power', it is 'an affect, something we feel, it is not to be taken 
as simply happiness or pleasure. For the affect that Nietzsche is indicating is that 
which life feels when it overwhelms other life' (ibid.)
70
. Rather than conceiving of 
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 Bowles, M. J. "The Practice of Meaning in Nietzsche and Wittgenstein." The Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies, vol. 26 no. 1, 2003, p. 13. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/nie.2003.0019 
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 Although Nietzsche himself characterises power in terms of 'feeling' more than once, it seems to me 
that any general, systemic or holistic sense of power cannot be characterized in such terms. Bowles is 
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power in terms of feeling or affect, power may also be considered as interpretation or 
expression of force. A thing would then 'mean' (Bowles states only ideas, concepts or 
precepts) insofar as it was a degree of expression of force, or interpretation
71
. 
It seems that such a conception of meaning and language aligns Nietzsche's 
philosophy closely with the forms of semiotic idealism that were suggested at the 
beginning of this chapter. What is it that distinguishes Nietzsche's philosophy of will 
to power, in which ideas have equivalent 'reality' as expressions of will to power, 
from semiotic idealism (and idealism in general)? The answer may be found in 
Nietzsche's emphasis both on genealogy and the continuity of becoming. In 
Nietzsche's philosophy the ground of natural relations in the vegetal, animal and 
mineral drives (and ultimately the process of becoming itself) are inextricable from 
humanity's genealogical understanding of itself, determining both its past, present 
and future. The possibility of specifically human signs in human language 
constituting the whole, as in semiotic idealism, is therefore precluded in any 
philosophical appreciation of genealogy. Genealogy preserves the grounding 'object' 
of natural drives between human interpretation and human signs (language). Natural 
drives themselves are signs of becoming, and this appears to frame will to power 
(and perspectivism) in terms of the semiotic, as in both Deely's holistic semiotic 
theory, along with the aspects of semiotic idealism described in Derrida and 
Baudrillard. What separates will to power from Deely's semiotics is, firstly, that the 
semiotic is subsumed within the holism of force. To the degree that there is a 
difference between the semiotic and non-semiotic, it is in terms of the capacity for 
expression of force. More importantly, what separates will to power from idealism, 
in lieu of a material or theoretical distinction (again, because process ontology 
deflates this distinction), is the depth of relation it traces and grounds itself on. What 
will to power and the underlying power-perspectivism demonstrates is that idealism 
is not truly a distinction of the real from the unreal, the material from the idea, or 
                                                                                                                                                                    
quick to point out that the feeling of power cannot of course be likened to a state such as pleasure or 
happiness, but it seems to me that characterizing power as 'feeling' will inevitably call to mind a static 
state of some kind that clashes with Nietzsche's non-substantialist philosophy of becoming. Similarly, 
descriptions of power as 'feeling' renders power an irremediably anthropocentric or at least a vitalist 
notion: it is difficult to understand other entities like rocks or other non-living matter 'feeling' power. 
Power appears to be better understood through the idea of a relation rather than a state, insofar as 
there is a feeling derived from power, it is rather a consequence or derived interpretation of it. 
71
 Deleuze writes similarly that  'Nietzsche's active philology has only one principle: a word only 
means something insofar as the speaker wills something by saying it' (Deleuze 1983, p. 74). A word 
therefore means only when something is willed by it, when it expresses force. 
 136 
 
appearance from reality, all of which are effectively undermined in an immanent 
process or force ontology coupled with the idea of perspectivism. Rather, from the 
perspective of will to power, idealism is a qualitative distinction based on what sort 
of relations in the world are affirmed and upheld or negated and neglected. The will 
to power affirms a deeper, more powerful, fuller set of relations in referring and 
maintaining the natural drives than the diminished set of relations that are located 
with the specifically human in semiotic idealism. 
According to will to power, then, the only legitimate, genealogical sense in 
which to talk about representation or signification is therefore through genealogy and 
force. Insofar as we can intelligibly talk about mediation, it is the mediation of 
specifically human conscious, socialized language. Human language is an 
interpretation of an interpretation, a diminished expression of the will to power but 
nonetheless a unique, human contribution. The holistic understanding of will to 
power allows us to recognize that these expressions themselves are expressions of 
will to power, the will to act on and interpret, and being inextricably constituted by 
drives that preceded them, they do not break with the natural drives, they continue as 
their reverberation. Insofar as there is anthropocentrism, it is not an 
anthropocentrism of mediated subjective representation. It is a localized 
anthropocentrism that consists in a novel configuration of drives (the human) which 
not only alters the directionality of the drives. It alters the history of the drives 
themselves through the most powerful expression of will to power yet, humans being 
thus far the 'grandest interpretation'. 
 
3.5 - Conceptions of Language in Warring States Chinese Thought 
We have seen that, once more, the theoretical pre-occupation of this chapter 
was to present an alternative framework through which to begin to understand 
language, and most importantly, a framework that is not built upon the 
subjective/objective or noumenal/phenomenal distinctions that process ontology 
works to undermine. I have attempted to show that Nietzche‘s doctrine of will to 
power and perspectival ontology, by drawing out their consequences for conceiving 
language, presents such a framework. It is such a framework because it reduces 
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language to a non-representational expression of will to power in which the 
ascription of meaning is interpretation, the expression of will to power of one 
perspective upon another. This makes language and the world fundamentally 
inseparable from each other, with the consequence that certain anthropocentric 
claims about language can be considered to be true (the claim that, for example, this 
or that cloud ‗mimics‘ a certain animal) but are nonetheless recognized to be ‗less 
truthful‘ (consider the argument offered in the previous chapter concerning power as 
equivalent to truth, and hence that there is, strictly speaking, no falsity in the world), 
or false by comparison, to the overarching totality of perspectives. Thus, language 
does not intervene or mediate between the subject‘s perception of the world, 
resolving the prior dichotomies, but yet it likewise does not reduce the world to the 
subject‘ perception (again because of the recognition of a totality of perspectives 
above and beyond human language and cognition). 
Although the focus in this chapter is on a Western philosophy and conception 
of language, it will be productive to briefly consider the manner in which Warring 
States period thought in Chinese philosophy likewise holds a vision of language in 
which language and world are inextricably linked. This is so particularly because the 
present attempt to reach this goal from the Western point of this comparison has 
been through the route of a subject-based metaphysics. In order to understand the 
basis of a Chinese philosophical approach to language, it is necessary to explain 
several key concepts relating to language. Chinese philosophical thought of the time 
relating to language centers on the notion of ming (names). A ming is the smallest 
component of a guiding discourse (dao). Names can be very narrow and refer to 
things like places, a particular person, a kind of animal. Names can also be broad, 
however, and can reflect titles or roles (e.g. father, daughter, professor, minister). It 
is the Mohists and the School of Names within Chinese philosophy of this period 
that are concerned with ming and language in this sense, and it is this sense that is 
most relevant to our considerations. As Hansen writes, it is with the Mohists that a 
philosophical consideration of language and world arises in Chinese thinking: ‗The 
Mohist theories of naming moved the study of language from a pragmatic to a more 
semantic focus. […] They tried to describe a realistic base of naming. They sought a 
reality-based answer to the question, "What is the right way to project distinctions in 
new settings?" The right way, they thought, responded to real similarities and 
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differences in the world‘ (Hansen 1992, p. 233). This semantic concern with the 
manner in which distinctions are established is evident in Mohist writings such as 
Canon  B67
72
: 
‗―Oxen and horses are not oxen‖ and ―oxen and horses are oxen‖ are both 
acceptable, because the oxen and horses form a group. Suppose you deny that 
―oxen and horses are oxen‖ because some of them are not oxen, or you deny that 
―oxen and horses are not oxen‖ because some of them are oxen. You would then 
have to admit that ―oxen and horses are oxen‖ because some of them are oxen. 
Moreover, an ox is not two, and a horse is not two, but an ox and a horse are two 
(so what is true of oxen need not be true of oxen and horses). Hence, even though 
we cannot deny that ―oxen are oxen‖ and ―horses are horses,‖ there is no problem 
with it being the case that ―oxen and horses are not oxen‖ and ―oxen and horses 
are not horses‖‘ (quoted in Van Norden, Bryan William 2011, p. 114) 
In such a dispute, the same grounds can be offered for deeming the assertion ―oxen-
and-horses are not horses‖ impermissible as they can for deeming it permissible. The 
debate asks how we handle names/ming (e.g. oxen-and-horses) that involve more 
than one kind of thing? What is permissible or impermissible to be said about them? 
A Western ontology of categorization might resolve such a dispute 
differently, but the marked distinction that Hansen believes is present is that when 
Chinese philosophers of the period pursued considerations of this kind they were 
developing a mereology rather than a conceptual substance ontology. This 
mereology, so it is claimed, consisted of a ―stuff‖-based ontology. Rather than 
considering, for example, 100 objects, Hansen thinks that Chinese philosophers 
within this school dealt with 100 nameable ―stuff‖ kinds: ‗an ontology of 
noncontiguous stuffs with a part-whole structure‘ (1992, p. 48). Accordingly, early 
Chinese thinkers considered ‗collections of things […] as wholes of which the things 
that constitute the collection are parts. For instance, instead of thinking of all the 
horses in the world as elements of the set or class of horses, ancient Chinese 
philosophers thought of them as spatially scattered parts of the concrete whole that is 
the sum of all horses‘ (Hansen, language and logic in ancient china 1981:30-32). 
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 Similar linguistic quandaries have been read as evident in Gongsun Long‘s ‗white horse‘ dialogue 
as well as the ten paradoxes elaborated by Hui Shi in the Zhuangzi. 
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This is a controversial position known as the ―mass noun hypothesis‖, and various 
commentators have presented arguments against it
73
. Chris Fraser‘s recent critique of 
the mass-noun hypothesis is decisive, as it shows that ‗if the mass noun argument 
were sound, it would establish at most that features of pre-Qin thinkers‘ language 
could have influenced their philosophical views. It gives no reason to think these 
features did influence them. The argument thus does not really meet the demands of 
Hansen‘s own holistic method.‘ (Fraser 2007, p. 447). Even so, the part-whole 
mereology can be accepted as tenable without necessarily committing to the position 
that language played a core role in determining the character of early Chinese 
philosophical writing. This, however, is not the claim this research makes, it is rather 
that Chinese philosophical writing suggests an inter-relation between language and 
world on the one hand and a distinctly different vocabulary for conceiving the world 
in process terminology. In this sense, the part-whole mereology indicates as much. 
Likewise, the pragmatism of the mereology is reflected in what Fraser calls its 
behavioural nominalism:  
‗Early Chinese philosophy of language is nominalistic, in that it is not committed 
to recognizing any entities other than words, or ‗‗names‘‘ […] and the things that 
form their extensions. It does not appeal to universals, essences, concepts, 
meanings, Lockean ideas, or Platonic forms to explain the semantics of general 
terms or the relation between a particular thing and its kind. Early Chinese views 
of the mind are ‗‗behavioral‘‘ in that they explain thought and understanding by 
appeal to the ability to discriminate things and act in appropriate ways. 
Understanding a word (such as ‗‗horse‘‘) is not a matter of having a certain 
abstract object in one‘s mind, but of having the practical ability to distinguish the 
things denoted by the word.‘  (ibid. 421) 
As such, argumentation is strongly affected by this combination of 
mereology and nominalism. The corresponding notion for argumentation in Chinese 
thought of the period is bian (disputation or discrimination). Ancient Chinese 
thought explained the use of general terms, and thus communication, by speakers' 
ability to distinguish (bian) things or ―stuff‖ (shi) as of the same or different kinds 
(lei) and to apply the same name (ming) to all stuff of a kind. Distinguishing things 
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of the same or different kinds in order to apply the same name to all of a kind 
involves a process of judgement called ―shi/fei‖ (this/not-this, right/wrong). 
Different examples of such distinguishing vary according to tradition: an example 
within the Confucianism might be over the right cap for a ceremony, or the proper 
manner of bowing, the dispute being settled by appeal to tradition. Mohists shi 
(deem as ―so‖) the existence of spirits and fei (deem as ―not so‖) the existence of 
fate, argumentation being settled by the Mohist basis of utility. The School of 
Names, generally speaking, appeared prepared to admit that shi/fei distinctions have 
a conventional, social basis, but claim that those distinctions are then guided by 
similarities and differences between ―stuffs‖ in reality (which should not be 
understood as mind-independent existence, but rather the greater field of the 
totality). Hence, the form of disputation in Chinese thought of this period is guided 
by analogy, and questions in disputation for the School of Names are questions about 
how to discriminate ―stuffs‖ in reality appropriately. Dispute between schools is not 
concerned, as is often the case in the West, with whether the guiding discourse of a 
school corresponds to mind-independent reality, but rather with whether it is a 
guiding discourse that can be maintained as constant and repeatable within a cyclical 
and processual world. How, then is disputation further resolved within the Chinese 
tradition? Given its substance-based methodology, the logical framework for 
analysing argumentation in Western philosophy drew on theoretical debate; fallacies, 
absurdities and paradoxes. In the Chinese tradition, while paradoxes could be said to 
be present in a certain form as an argumentative foil (and also strongly present, it is 
arguable, in the writings of the Daoists), the core arbiters in reasoning are the notions 
of admissibility/permissible (ke) and perversity/impermissible (bei). ―Admissibility‖ 
refers to statements that are ―semantically permissible‖: they could be spoken in 
some situation without violating semantic or pragmatic norms. ―Perversity‖ (bei) 
refers to statements that are not ―semantically permissible.‖ In speaking them one 
would be guilty of a semantic or pragmatic contradiction, inconsistency, or other 
error. This raises a number of significant points regarding the relation between 
argumentation and ontology or epistemology. Firstly, note again the strong 
pragmatic element involved in the structure of argumentation: one cannot resolve 
disputation by reference to external, conceptual or a priori truths, or an ontological 
ground that is prior to human beings. At the same time however, disputation is not a 
―closed system‖ relating to humans alone, it involves the greater totality of processes 
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outside of human experience, for the relation and reference of terms have a 
grounding in the greater world. As Bao Zhiming writes, language within Chinese 
thought forms an isomorphic fit between world and humans, in which ‗A is 
isomorphic with B if, for each event E(i) which affects A, there is  corresponding 
event E(j) which affects B, and E(i) and E(j) may, but need not, be the same event‘ 
(Zhiming 1990, p. 195). Although Zhiming draws on the language of 
correspondence when discussing the isomorphic fit between language and world, I 
believe the language of correlation may be more appropriate, particularly in virtue of 
the fact that Zhiming admits that an ‗isomorphic fit‘ may be quite strong given that 
‗it may be impossible to construct a set of all events or other entities relevant to the 
exposition of the relationship between language and the world‘ (ibid. 215-216).  
Hence, instead of claiming that events in language correspond with those in the 
greater totality (heaven) and ‗hence [that] changes in heavenly processes will have 
their manifestation in human society (ibid. 196)‘ and thus that ‗changes in language 
will lead to similar changes in reality, and vice versa‘ (ibid.), it can instead be claimed 
that changes in language correlate with changes in reality and vice versa, which 
captures the interrelation of language and world on the one hand, but does not limit 
the relation to something that is a one-to-one direct causal relationship. 
This conceptual framework described in Chinese thought of the Warring 
States periods goes a significant length in suggesting the shape a framework of 
comparative process-ontological thought may take in addressing the issue of 
language. There are clear commonalities on both sides of thought: language and 
world are fundamentally inter-related, not simply in the sense that one depends on 
the other, but that language is directly manifested as a process in the world, it is an 
expression of the will to power according to Nietzsche‘s philosophy while it is an 
expression of the unity between heaven and man (tian ren he yi) in Chinese thought. 
This captures the basic point of nomenclaturism (that language refers to things in the 
world beyond subjective experience) without implying its anthropocentrism, and it 
achieves this in a theoretical framework outside of the subjective/objective 
dichotomy. Likewise, the distinction of permissibility and impermissibility within 
language highlight the elements of a potentially new evaluative framework for 
comparative process ontology and the development of its epistemology: in contrast 
to the requirement of reference to an objectively true state in mind-independent 
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reality, permissibility/impermissibility provides an evaluation of claims on the basis 
of their pragmatic or semantic function, which is grounded by the various dao 
(guiding discourses) in Chinese philosophy, Daoism most importantly, and which we 
might theorise is grounded in Nietzsche‘s philosophy by the adopted perspective or 
way of life. Importantly, these pragmatic or semantic functions are not independent 
of reality but are inextricably linked to it. 
Through the course of this chapter I hope to have drawn out the fullest 
implications for language that can be seen in the features so far delineated in 
comparative process ontology, focusing on those present in Nietzsche‘s philosophy. 
It is evident that the fullest relation to language is achieved in Nietzsche's philosophy 
through a holistic understanding of will to power and perspectivism, both of which 
are informed by elements from his early and later works. This holistic understanding 
presents a view that can maintain a direct, unmediated link to nature, to the natural 
drives, in contrast to contemporary theories of language derived from Saussurean 
semiology which facilitate a semiotic idealism. The understanding of language that 
emerges from the holism of perspectivism and will to power is one that rejects the 
subject/object distinction, nor is it one that relies on a dichotomy between 
appearance and reality. Rather, the ground of its relation is qualitative, in that it 
determines what is natural through a genealogical understanding of the animal, 
vegetal, and mineral drives that constitute the human being. Such a picture of 
language raises some striking structural similarities with early Chinese thought and 
its relation to language, although posited through a radically different part-whole 
mereology. The will to power doctrine emphasises the pragmatic element of 
language by highlight its reducibility to expressions of force: an utterance is an 
expression of will to power. In a different way, language in early Chinese thought 
also maintains a pragmatic focus through its pre-occupation with differentiating in 
concrete contexts. 
 
Chapter 4 – Case Study 1 (Metaphysics), Case Study 2 (Socio-
Economic overview) 
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To summarize the work of this thesis so far: I have attempted to delineate a 
comprehensive philosophical worldview that is based on process, one that draws to a 
great extent on Nietzsche‘s philosophy but is also comparatively driven in drawing 
on elements within ancient Chinese thought to provide further perspective. This 
worldview is on one hand irreducibly perspectival, but on the other hand establishes 
within this overarching worldview a derivate, evaluational perspective. This is 
Nietzsche‘s doctrine of will to power, argued for as a ‗higher‘ or ‗better‘ perspective 
on the basis of its pervasiveness
74
, and it functions on a basis that is not amenable to 
conventional noumenal/phenomenal or subjective/objective philosophical analysis. 
Likewise, my use of warring states Chinese thought has served as a comparative foil 
demonstrating that such an ontology need not have to address such distinctions, as 
there are other traditions of process thinking which do not engage with them all. So 
far the character of my ontological delineation has been mainly theoretical: I 
sketched out the position in terms of three theoretical areas: 1) ontology, 2) 
epistemology-evaluation, 3) language. I now wish to use this general comparative 
process ontology as a heuristic basis with which to address both a conventional 
philosophical problem and a practical socio-political problem. I do this in order to 
conclude whether the comparative process ontology so outlined allows us to address 
these problems from an innovative or fruitful perspective. Can a comparative process 
philosophy pose any novel and effective solutions to philosophical problems that 
have continued through the western philosophical tradition? I argue that they at least 
provide the grounds to pursue a revitalized attempt, and I want to begin by 
examining one of the core philosophical problems in metaphysics: appearance and 
reality. After addressing this metaphysical case study, I will then turn to more 
applied case studies in which praxis is central. These will be in the areas of 
economics, politics and technology. My analyses in such areas will be less focused, 
but should provide a broad outline of how such areas may be further dealt with or 
conceived as a starting point within the ontology I have been describing. 
 
                                                          
74
 As described before, the notion of pervasiveness at work here does not depend on any individual 
perspectival recognition. Our coming to recognise the pervasiveness of a perspective is not foremost a 
conscious assent but is rather  embodied in how that perspective influences and guides our behaviour, 
practices and culure. 
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4.1 - Case Study 1 (Metaphysics) - Appearance and reality: The Zhuangzi  
 
To begin this examination, I will discuss the famous ‗butterfly dream‘ story 
of the Zhuangzi, quoted in full below given its brevity: 
Last night Zhuang Zhou dreamed he was a butterfly, spirits soaring he was a 
butterfly (is it that in showing what he was he suited his own fancy?), and did not 
know about Zhou. When all of a sudden he awoke, he was Zhou with all his wits 
about him. He does not know whether he is Zhou who dreams he is a butterfly or 
a butterfly who dreams he is Zhou. Between Zhou and the butterfly there was 
necessarily a dividing; just this is what is meant by the transformation of things. 
(Graham 1981, p. 61) 
 
As Hans Georg-Moeller points out, the story has been interpreted and 
translated in a number of ways. The Giles translation that Moeller cites (Moeller 
1999, p. 439) is taken to convey a Daoist insight ‗into the vanity and contingency of 
(human) existence‘ and perhaps ‗an insight into the impermanence of all distinctions 
in our world, and hence into our interwoven-ness with all beings in a continuous 
process of change‘ (ibid.). Interpreting the story in such a way brings to mind the 
familiar philosophical questions, specifically epistemological, that the West has 
struggled with: how can I ever really know whether I am dreaming or not? Am I 
someone else‘s dream? How do I know that what appears before me is actually real 
and not mere appearance? As Moeller points out, these types of reading do not seem 
particularly Daoist in perspective, they instead risk insinuating the problems of 
Western Philosophy into a tradition where many of those problems would be alien. 
Countering such a reading, Moeller highlights that historical Chinese interpretations 
like the second century xuanxue scholar Guo Xiang‘s instead lack any of the 
foregoing philosophical concerns. According to Guo Xiang the character Zhuang 
Zhou does not even remember the dream of the butterfly: ‗The not-knowing about a 
butterfly at this moment is not different from the not-knowing about a Zhuang Zhou 
during the time of the dream‘ (quoted in Moeller 1999, p. 440). Likewise, the 
original Chinese text contains no first-person references to an ―I‖ whereas the 
classical Giles translation in Western readership repeatedly draws on them. The 
philosophical considerations that arise in the Western interpretation appear to stem in 
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large part from an appeal to an underlying, continuous substance that persists 
between the dream-transformations of man and butterfly. When this interpretive 
assumption is undermined, however, no such philosophical issues persist. As both 
Guo Xiang (serving as the original commentator) and Moeller (serving as a 
comparative commentator) point out: 1) both entities are entirely and unmistakeably 
themselves for the duration of the stories, and 2) both existences, that of the man‘s 
and the butterfly‘s, are no more or less real than the other, as neither are cast into 
doubt by a break in the continuity of both (as there would be, for example, if one 
were to wake from a dream one remembered). The lesson of the butterfly dream is 
echoed by the general character of Daoism as a philosophical school: the search for 
an ultimate reality or deeper, absolute truth is not present as an ideological 
framework in Daoism, there is only the concern with explicating and aligning with 
the ground of the fundamental guiding discourse, Dao. As Graham points out, 
‗[u]nlike many mystical schools (including Zen Buddhism, which continued its cult 
of spontaneity), Taoism does not seek an absolute, unique and final illumination 
different in kind from all other experiences. Its ideal state of enhanced sensitivity, 
nourished by withdrawal into absolute stillness, is the same in kind as more ordinary 
and limited sorts of spontaneous dexterity‘ (Graham 1990,  p. 144). Likewise, in the 
butterfly dream there is no ultimate, transcendental reality which would serve as the 
ground privileging one perspective over the other as more ―real‖. Thus, for a 
Western reader, if carefully read the butterfly dream story can serve not as a 
reinforcement of the presence of familiar epistemological questions and problems 
within other traditions, but rather, taken as a comparative foil, that the absence of 
those issues from such traditions signals the capacity to break away from those 
problems in one‘s own tradition taken as formative and inescapable.  
 
4.3 – Case Study 1 (Metaphysics) - Nietzsche on Appearance and Reality 
 
What can this short and poignant story, so interpreted, offer for a comparative 
conception of process philosophical ontology? I believe that this story offers us a 
comparison from another philosophical perspective that will provide the resources 
for better conceptualizing the philosophical direction in which Nietzsche‘s 
conception of epistemology and ontology attempts to lead us. This will in turn 
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illuminate the features of a prospective comparative ontology of process. In one of 
his most well-known aphorisms concerning appearance and reality (TI ‗How the 
‗Real World‘ at last Became a Myth‘), Nietzsche describes the evolution of the idea 
of a ‗real world‘ contrasted to an ‗apparent world‘ through Western philosophy, 
arriving at a conclusion pragmatically similar to that of the butterfly dream‘s. 
Though sparse in detail, he traces the notion of a ‗true‘ or ‗real‘ world through its 
oldest form as higher existence, reflected in the thought of philosophers like Plato: 
‗The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man – he dwells in it, 
he is it‘ (ibid.), through to its Judaeo-Christian interpretation as ‗more refined, more 
enticing, more incomprehensible‘ and promised ‗to the sinner who repents‘ (ibid.). 
He then traces the notion to its most historically relevant stages, reflected in Kant as 
the phenomenal-noumenal distinction (‗the real world, unattainable, undemonstrable, 
but even when merely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperative‘ (ibid.). He 
lastly traces the notion to positivism, reflected as unknowable and without any 
imperatives, but thereby rendered irrelevant according to empiricism (ibid). 
Nietzsche ends his broad summary of this idea‘s evolution on a joyous note (‗Broad 
daylight; breakfast; return of cheerfulness and bon sens‘ (ibid.)) but also, and 
importantly, with a famous denial of the coherence of the real/apparent distinction 
altogether: 
‗We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world 
perhaps? … But no! With the real world we have also abolished the apparent 
world!‘ (ibid) 
Nietzsche‘s conclusion in this passage serves not only to prophesy that our cultural 
and moral concerns will no longer be dominated by the notion of a real-apparent 
world distinction, it also forces us to reconsider our philosophical and 
epistemological pre-occupations in the same way in which the complete absence of 
such pre-occupations in Zhuangzi‘s butterfly dream segment does for Western 
interpreters. 
Fully exploring the implications of re-conceptualising epistemology 
according to comparative process ontology are beyond the capacities of this 
dissertation. I will, however, examine one core issue that we are called upon to 
fundamentally re-understand: distinctly practical questions of appearance and reality. 
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If there is no ‗real‘ world against which to contrast ‗appearances‘ then how do we 
address the many various pragmatic situations that traditionally correspond to this 
distinction? How are we to philosophically understand phenomena like 
hallucinations if we do not have the option of pointing out that they do not 
correspond to the ‗real‘ world? What makes a simulation less ‗real‘ than its authentic 
originator? All such questions require a consolidated response from comparative 
process ontology, one that does not presuppose the real/apparent dichotomy.  
To begin formulating that response, it has to be made clear what this response 
does not entail. It does not entail traditional epistemological concerns: the question 
in comparative process ontology ceases to be ―how do I know x is real/apparent‖. As 
we have previously seen, Nietzsche does not appear foremost concerned with 
formulating a theoretical response to epistemological scepticism. Instead, he re-
formulates epistemology, knowledge, as pragmatic affect. That said, Nietzsche is by 
no means unconcerned with the issue of discerning reality from appearance, but the 
means by which his writing gestures at our doing so is not fundamentally 
epistemological in nature (in the traditional sense of epistemology as justification of 
belief), it is pragmatic and evaluative. According to Nietzsche‘s renewed conception 
of epistemology, the questions that must be addressed in the wake of Nietzsche‘s 
implosion of the real/apparent distinction are: what motivates our rejection of 
idealism? Why, in the most general terms, does Nietzsche think that ―real‖ (that is to 
say, transcendental) worlds are inferior (according to his will to power evaluative 
perspective) to the immanent world we are presented with? Nietzsche, I want to 
argue, ultimately proposes that we distinguish reality from appearance as a practical 
matter of degrees of power. We can discern that transcendental worlds, and idealism 
writ large, are false or not as ―real‖ for Nietzsche because they are less powerful 
than the immanent world we are faced with. Rather, they are expressions of 
ressentiment towards the immanent world, and as such expressions they are 
fundamentally expressions of a sick form of life. 
 
4.4 Case Study 1 (Metaphysics) - Simulated Reality 
 
Robert Nozick‘s famous discussion of an ‗experience machine‘ may serve as 
an instructive grounding point for this discussion. The thought experiment, briefly 
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stated, asks us to imagine that we have a machine which could provide us with 
whatever pleasurable or desirable experiences we could want, further, the machine is 
somehow built in such a way as to stimulate the brain in ways that make the 
‗simulated‘ experience indistinguishable from the ‗true‘ experience. The thought 
experiment, in Nozick‘s original form, is employed as an intuitive example to buffer 
Nozick‘s more precise argument against hedonism and the view that pleasure is the 
only or most important intrinsic value: Nozick anticipates that many of us hesitate to 
enter the machine because we want to concretely take the actions involved in those 
experiences (Nozick 1974, p. 43), we want to concretely develop as a type of person 
in ways unachievable in the machine (ibid.), or the simulation limits what we can 
achieve (ibid.). 
The following discussion of the experience machine will not focus on it as an 
example of the value-debate specifically, it will rather use it as a focal point to 
discuss questions of reality and appearance, and the influence that dichotomy has on 
ways of life. I would now like to discuss how, drawing on his writings on 
appearance, reality, and power, Nietzsche might address this same scenario, as a 
specific example of the broader issue of simulated or artificial realities. Why is it 
important to discuss the area of simulated or artificial realities in this regard? At the 
time of writing, Nietzsche addresses the threat of idealism specifically through the 
vision of an ideal, ‗real‘ or transcendental world. This encapsulates, for example, the 
Judaeo-Christian promise of heaven, which Nietzsche takes to devaluate the 
immanent, imperfect world by promising an ideal world after death. The prospect of 
artificial or simulated realities may be taken to offer the same promises for many, 
albeit in secularized form (it might even be said that the prospect of simulated reality 
offers an improvement over heaven insofar as one doesn‘t have to die to attain 
it).Given the profusion of virtual reality technologies in recent decades, even if they 
are still in embryonic form, we are obliged to take simulated realities seriously as an 
issue concerning Nietzsche‘s philosophy of the future, and to hypothesize what 
Nietzsche‘s response to it would be. If the prospect of simulated reality nonetheless 
seems outlandish, it may be sufficient to highlight the fact that an increasing number 
of humans spend an increasing amount of their time virtually, through social media, 
and this trend is only set to increase exponentially. 
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Having established what the problem is, I want to consider what resources 
Nietzsche offers to address it. In short, I will make the argument that Nietzsche 
would reject the use of artificial or simulated realities as a de facto way of living for 
those of whom he deems as healthy types, although it is could be justifiable to a 
certain extent as a necessary part of the existence of ‗sick‘ types, including many 
humans, because of its narcotizing effects. This can be established by appealing to 
the pragmatic, power-based understanding of truth we have already discussed. 
Returning to the ‗experience machine‘ thought experiment: what must first be 
pointed out with the experiment is that one of its crucial premises is that we are 
already aware that we will be partaking in a simulated reality if we enter the 
machine. Hence, we already know we will not be in the ―real‖ world and that our 
actions will have no effect on anything in the world outside of the machine. On this 
basis already, many of us will already reject the offer of the machine. So far it seems 
as though the problem has already been solved. However, counterarguments to the 
thought experiment have highlighted this premise of prior knowledge of reality as 
being problematic to a fair treatment of the experience machine. Joshua Greene, for 
example, points out that our decision is likely to be influenced by status quo bias, a 
preference for reality as we currently experience it
75
. Greene instead suggests that we 
reformulate the thought experiment such that instead of initially going into the 
machine, we wake up from it and from the experience of our living our lives as we 
have done so far: 
‗you wake up in a plain white room. You are seated in a reclining chair with a 
steel contraption on your head. A woman in a white coat is standing over you. 
'The year is 2659,' she explains, 'The life with which you are familiar is an 
experience machine program selected by you some forty years ago. We at IEM 
interrupt our client's programs at ten-year intervals to ensure client satisfaction. 
Our records indicate that at your three previous interruptions you deemed your 
program satisfactory and chose to continue. As before, if you choose to continue 
with your program you will return to your life as you know it with no recollection 
of this interruption. Your friends, loved ones, and projects will all be there. Of 
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 Cf. de Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna, and Peter Singer. The point of view of the universe: Sidgwick and 
contemporary ethics. OUP Oxford, 2014. P. 357 
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course, you may choose to terminate your program at this point if you are 
unsatisfied for any reason. Do you intend to continue with your program?‘ (ibid.) 
If we have a different decision about this variant to what was chosen with the 
original, Greene claims, then it may point to a status quo bias regarding our 
experiences rather than our underlying intuitions about values (as is Nozick‘s 
concern in formulating the experiment). In both Nozick‘s formulation and Greene‘s, 
one point is clear: you remain fully aware that the machine simulation is not ―real‖: 
in Nozick‘s version you enter the experience machine knowing that what it offers 
isn‘t real, whereas in Greene‘s version you wake up from the experience machine to 
be told what you were experiencing was not real. Even with the full understanding 
that the machine reality is a simulation, Greene‘s counter-argument is insightful in 
the sense that it points towards our conception of reality as a certain bias of 
experience, which will align with Nietzsche‘s pragmatic treatment of the issue, and 
the reality-agnosticism of the butterfly dream. Similarly, as one might infer from 
Greene‘s version of the thought experiment, there seems to be no reason to assume 
that such a bias could not change over time or even become the default standard of 
experience: as such, simulated reality would in such cases be more ‗real‘ and 
familiar to machine users than external world, and they would be less motivated to 
choose the external world in the counter-argument.  
That a simulated reality would be more ‗real‘ than actual reality seems 
intuitively misguided, but treating the experience of reality as a certain form of 
experiential bias (as Greene and Nietzsche seem to do) makes this a practical 
possibility. How can we address this? One clear option is that many may be 
motivated by the insight that they have not been living ―real‖ lives in the machine, 
thus motivating them to leave the machine behind and enter their new life. As 
described in the experiment, the prime motivation for such behaviour would be 
something like a desire for a ―true‖ life, or a desire to live in proper reality. 
However, as is well-described in commentaries, Nietzsche is highly sceptical of a 
will to truth in itself, or truth for truth‘s sake. He is critical, for example, firstly of the 
drive for truth at all costs, especially given that what may be found as truth may be 
dangerous for certain types of life, but also because the drive for truth taken naively 
may suggest a particular type of life-denying asceticism. If, for example, the 
simulated world could be considered as a qualitative improvement over the real 
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world in all aspects then a desire for the real world at all costs may be seen to be 
reducible to ‗the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth,‘ (OGM III 
24). As Nietzsche points out, however, the will to truth can no longer be justified by 
appeal to a metaphysical value, a truth-in-itself.  The desire to live in the ―true‖ or 
―real‖ in contrast to the simulated one on the basis that it is ―true‖ or ―real‖ alone 
does not seem to form much of a motivation, and may even sign-post a will to deny 
life for some. So, if the prospect of truth in and of itself seems like an empty 
motivation, what can serve as a motivation? Given his contempt for idealism and the 
prospect of a transcendental world, it seems reasonable to hold that Nietzsche would 
still strongly advocate for healthy types to live in the ―true‖ or ―real‖ world, but we 
must make sense of how he does so without appeal to the will to truth (in its classical 
epistemological form). 
As I have tried to make clear, the experience machine as described by Greene 
approaches the issue of appearance and reality in a manner similar to the conclusions 
that Nietzsche arrives at in Twilight of the Idols: for an individual whose life is spent 
in the machine, the machine experience will be more real to them than external 
reality, and there is no hard ontological distinction to fall back on to remedy this, 
simply the bias for one form of ontologically equivalent experience over another. 
With Nietzsche and the butterfly dream in the Zhuangzi we take another step and the 
grounding upon which both Nozick‘s and Greene‘s versions of the thought 
experiment is removed: we no longer have prior knowledge of which is the real or 
illusory world, and the philosophical debate concerning the true or real world itself is 
no longer sensible: we have no metaphysical or transcendental criteria to appeal to 
for resolving the debate. We are now faced with two ultimate answers to this issue 
from both sides of the comparison: the Zhuangzi does away with all pretences of 
establishing a qualitatively better or worse reality and instead advocates perfect 
efficacy beyond all distinctions. On the other hand, given his epistemological-
evaluational doctrine of will to power, Nietzsche might still claim that the ―real‖ 
world is preferable to the artificial one, and he could do so by appealing to the very 
same will to power as the pragmatic standard of truth, as we have discussed 
previously. Returning to what Grimm writes concerning Nietzsche‘s conception of 
truth: ‗Nietzsche's criterion for truth is not concerned at all with the logical content 
of the proposition. The content, in fact, is largely irrelevant. Its truth or falsity lies in 
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the degree of efficacity, in the degree of power increase or decrease, with which the 
proposition functions when I employ it in my behaviour‘ (Grimm 1977, p. 19).  
Applying the insights of this conception to the case of the appearance/reality 
distinction, the distinction itself and the ontological status of either turn out to be 
irrelevant in terms of propositional content (namely, the question as to whether one 
or the other is the ―true‖ world), what is important is the difference in the degree of 
power one instantiates compared to another. Here it must be emphasized that what is 
meant by ―power‖ is not merely the experience of power, for the machine could be 
theorized to provide any experience of power (for example, that of being a king, 
general, or Olympic athlete). Such an experience would not be intuitively equivalent 
to its real counter-part (the real ‗king‘ issues decrees that have effects on whole 
countries, while the experience of being a king changes nothing outside the 
simulation). Power properly understood in this context must be nothing less than the 
actual relation of the person as an ontological constellation of drives, all directed at 
furthering themselves, understood and evaluated in relation to all other such 
constellations. Power is thus again understood as relational: something can be more 
or less powerful only by comparison or contrast with other more or less powerful 
things
76
.  
In an 1888 note Nietzsche emphasizes this relational aspect to power with 
regard to how we should understand a world of ‗appearances‘ without reference to a 
world-in-itself: ‗the world, apart from our condition of living in it, the world that we 
have not reduced to our being […] does not exist as a world ―in-itself‖; it is 
essentially a world of relationships; under certain conditions it has a differing aspect 
from every point; its being is essentially different from every point […] The measure 
of power determines what being possesses the other measure of power; in what form, 
force, constraint it acts or resists‘ (WTP 568). The same can be said for establishing 
the difference between the experience machine world and the ‗real‘ world: what 
motivates us to give the experience machine world the status of being ‗artificial,‘ 
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 Cf. WTP 917: ‗To feel stronger-- or in other words, joy-- always presupposes a comparison (but not 
necessarily with others, but with oneself in the midst of a state of growth and without one's first 
knowing in how far one is making comparisons-). Nietzsche also lists different forms of ‗artificial 
strengthening‘, some of which are telling. The artificial feeling of superiority, for example is the 
Caliph of Morocco, who is only allowed to see globes on which his kingdoms occupy four-fifths of 
their surfaces. The experience machine might likewise induce the artificial feeling of superiority by 
limiting what the subject experiences to within the simulated world. 
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‗false‘ or ‗illusory‘ is our recognition and understanding that it has little effect on the 
surrounding, ‗external‘ world. It can be argued that the same may be said of dream 
experiences: we understand our dreams as unreal because of the disparity between 
dream experiences and the regularity of waking life. The disparity between the sense 
of power in both provides a basis for distinguishing the reality of either, as hinted at 
by Nietzsche in an 1887 note discussing the concept of substance: ‗The degree to 
which we feel life and power (logic and coherence of experience) gives us our 
measure of ―being,‖ ―reality,‖ not-appearance‘ (WTP 485).  
This latter point is important to briefly address, given Nietzsche regular use 
of the phrase ‗feeling of power‘. This presents an issue, indeed a general interpretive 
one, because the conscious notion of feeling is at odds with causal efficacy: a lower 
type may ‗feel‘ powerful but not have any causal efficacy (as, for example, when an 
individual plays a character in a game that has a great degree of power). This, then, 
poses a specific problem: Could the experience machine not simply simulate the 
feeling of power (if the feeling of power is reducible to something like a conscious 
feeling), like its real equivalent? This would bypass the condition for any form of 
causal efficacy, as the machine would induce feelings of power without any effect on 
the world by the individual. Although Nietzsche‘s use of the phrase is constant 
throughout his writing, it seems as though it should be qualified thoroughly, as 
Nietzsche would not grant that a lower type of human is powerful just because it 
feels itself as powerful. Given, also, that Nietzsche devalues the causal role of 
conscious feelings in the causal efficacy of the body, it is hard to accept that the 
phrase ‗feeling of power‘ for Nietzsche means no more than a conscious feeling of 
power. What seems to be required in order to address this issue is to further qualify 
the manner in which Nietzsche sometimes uses the phrase ‗feeling of power‘: what 
describes the feeling of power for Nietzsche may not so much be the actual 
conscious feelings of the individual
77
 but rather the complex of drives that constitute 
the individual and are mutually influenced by the individual‘s environment.  
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 Nietzsche is famously critical of consciousness at different points: ‗We could think, feel, will, and 
remember, and we could also ‗act‘ in every sense of that word, and yet none of all this would have to 
‗enter our   consciousness‘ . . . (GS 354). There is significant debate in scholarship over whether 
Nietzsche assigns a causal role to consciousness, whether there is interaction between the unconscious 
and consciousness (interactionism) or whether he treats it as wholly epiphenomenal. I roughly follow 
Leiter (2014) in claiming that consciousness may be something akin to being Kind-Epiphenomenal in 
the sense that ‗conscious states are causally effective but in virtue of nonconscious properties or type-
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The drives as such are not consciously accessible to us yet strongly direct our 
causal capacities in interacting with the world. If this account bears up, then it could 
be said that the experience machine induces a feeling of power in consciousness, the 
most superficial portion of the individual which is taken to lack any significant 
causal capacity by Nietzsche, but it does not induce a feeling of power in the drives, 
precisely because the drives that make up the individual are not being acted upon by 
the machine and in turn have nothing in the world to act upon. Take as an example 
the experience of being a pro weightlifter in the machine: no matter how much of a 
feeling of strength the machine may induce in the individual‘s consciousness (by 
providing them with the experience of cleanly pressing 200 pounds), the individual 
will not become stronger because the body has not been subjected to actual weight 
resistance. In order for the experience machine to induce the actual feeling of 
strength (a form of power) in the individual it would have to subject the individual‘s 
body to actual weight training: but this then is exactly what real weight training is, 
and it involves direct causal efficacy and interaction with one‘s environment. Thus, 
if we understand the ‗feeling of power‘ in a broad sense, not merely to refer to the 
conscious feelings of the individual but to refer to a feeling that is related to the 
individual‘s drives, we can resolve the issue of whether the experience machine can 
simulate an equivalent reality by simulating an equivalent feeling of power. If 
understood as above, the experience machine cannot, because it can only stimulate 
the feeling of power in the individual‘s conscious ego. In order to stimulate the 
feeling of power in the drives it would have to mimic the environment and 
conditions that mutually affect the drives, but this is tantamount to effectively 
reproducing reality rather than simulating it. 
 
There are now a number of critical issues to consider. First and foremost, 
what does such a position offer in response to sceptical questions about reality? In 
particular, those questioning whether our experience of reality is simply a dream, or 
an illusion of some kind. The response that Nietzsche‘s position offers us is to claim 
that we know (again, not understood in the classical epistemological sense but rather 
in the power-pragmatic sense) through a comparison of differences in the experience 
of power: we distinguish a dream from waking life on the basis of a difference in the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
facts not simply in virtue of their being conscious states‘ (73). It may be necessary to admit some 
causal role for consciousness, but in the examples I give it is the unconscious which is formative. 
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experience of power: waking life is much more regular and stable, for example. 
However, what about an experience machine or simulation in which we are no 
longer able to determine whether we have woken up from or entered the machine, 
where there is absolutely no functional difference from simulation and reality? The 
constraints above provide some measure of an answer: we could hold that a true 
experience or feeling of power on the level of the drives is only possible through 
mimicking the causal network through which power is expressed. In order to do that, 
the machine would have to reproduce that causal network, but then the reproduction 
would be effectively equivalent and not a simulation (as in the need for real weights 
in the machine to reproduce power through strength training).  
Admittedly, there are many less direct examples in which it is unclear 
whether a reproduction of such a causal network is necessary to produce an 
equivalent feeling of power through the drives, and many of these are intellectually 
or emotionally based. For example, replicating a causal network for the experience 
of being a grandmaster chess player does not seem as important as a feature of the 
simulation as it does for chess playing, or being a virtuoso cellist, and so on. Many 
of these arguably central human experiences are thus still not fully defensible by 
appeal to causal conditions that the experience machine supposedly can‘t replicate 
without its simulations being more real. We seem forced to admit then that from 
Nietzsche‘s position that we have no way of telling reality from such a simulation. 
From a pragmatic point of view it may be that such a conclusion is ultimately 
unproblematic nonetheless because, in terms of power-pragmatism, there might be 
no power difference between simulation and reality and thus no grounds on which to 
call for a comparison. If an experience machine were to stimulate the drives of 
Nietzsche‘s higher types with experiences in a manner that was causally productive 
and thus significantly influential in the world, then this would seem to be a sufficient 
conclusion for Nietzsche on the issue of appearance and reality. The will to truth that 
motivates the rejection of illusion and appearance is justifiable insofar as it leads to a 
growth in power. However, where there is equivalence in power between 
appearance/simulation, and reality, then the will to truth no longer justifies the 
questioning of reality against appearance, it may instead be the expression of an 
ascetic will to declining life. Laying aside the will to truth in such cases, and 
dissolving the epistemological issue,  we are thus entreated to engage in that same 
joyous affirmation of reality as it appears to us that Nietzsche describes as ‗[b]road 
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daylight; breakfast; return of cheerfulness and bon sens‘ (TI ‗How the ‗Real World‘ 
at last Became a Myth‗), with a good conscience.  
 
Given that power is relational, one last point about the real/apparent 
distinction must be discussed. This point concerns how different physiological types 
will respond to simulated realities. I have already suggested that Nietzsche would 
advocate life outside of simulated realities for healthy types, because there is a 
greater potential for the extension of power in the so-called external world over one 
that is contained in a simulation. Healthy types, as Nietzsche writes, are instinctively 
inclined to extend themselves in the world and have a capacity to bear more ―truth‖, 
more of the harsh realities of the world they are confronted with (and thus to be 
overcome and either physically or spiritually incorporated). Sick types, Nietzsche 
highlights, are instead in need of constant narcosis and must be protected from the 
will to truth because of its danger for sicklier forms of life. In such a case, where 
simulated reality serves as a constraint on power for the strong, it serves as a narcosis 
for the sick: we might even hypothesize that, for Nietzsche, simulated reality become 
the de facto standard of life for sick types because it provides them with such an 
idealized narcosis and, by confining their actions to within a simulated environment, 
helps separate their sphere of influence from the healthy. With that in mind, it seems 
possible to conclude that Nietzsche would not denounce simulated reality out of 
hand: a simulated reality can be considered instrumentally, like many activities in 
their recreational use, such as art, literature and games. It can serve either as a tonic 
or as a narcotic. It will serve as a tonic when used by the strong as a momentary rest 
from their extension of power, while it will serve as a narcotic for the weak and 
exhausted, as a perpetual alleviation and escape from the pain of reality
78
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With the question of any distinction between reality and simulation denied, 
we would in such cases find ourselves at the point that is the subject of the butterfly 
dream. It is at this point that the Zhuangzi advocates that the efficacious agent in 
such circumstances must become hinge-like in the agent‘s ability to adapt to and 
pursue courses of action in any particular situation: ‗A state in which ―this‖ (shi) and 
―that‖ (fei) no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of Way (daoshu). When 
the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly. Its right then is a single 
endlessness and its wrong too is a single endlessness. So I say, the best thing to use 
is clarity (ming)‘ (Watson 35). In a sense the Zhuangzi thus provides its own 
conception of post-epistemological efficacy. That is, a number of its chapters consist 
in undermining the capacity for knowledge of any constant guiding discourse that 
will forever establish the world to be the case (to set the world out in terms of shi/fei 
distinctions), what has generally been taken to be the scepticism of the Zhuangzi. 
This scepticism gives way, however, to the sentiment contained in sections like the 
butterfly dream and knack stories, wherein there is no fundamental confusion 
expressed over knowledge claims but instead only harmonious and efficacious 
practice. The ability to respond endlessly is thus what is prized according to the 
Zhuangzi‘s recognition that the distinctions made between reality and appearance, or 
any other evaluative distinctions, are not tenable. 
In both Zhuangzi‘s Daoism and Nietzsche‘s philosophy, their treatment of 
appearance and reality is fundamentally guided at the core by process thought. How 
is this the case? For Zhuangzi, according to Guo Xiang‘s commentary, the issue of 
appearance against reality does not even occur. The ancient Chinese cosmological 
basis of thinking about the world foremost in terms of processes avoids the 
construction of an overarching substance through which to discern realities from 
appearances. In the butterfly dream, such an overarching substance would be the ego 
self, an individual substance one identifies with above and beyond the state of being 
a man or the state of being a butterfly. Without this substance, one instead simply 
identifies with the state of existence one is immediately presented with at one 
moment, along with identifying with another state of existence at another point. The 
end result is an instantiation of the consummate adaptability that ancient Chinese 
philosophy emphasizes, with the underlying insight towards process being that no 
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one stage or part of a cycle is more or less real than any other. While Nietzsche also 
comes to reject the notion of an ego self as identity and is critical of the notion of 
substance, he is reacting to a tradition that does frame the appearance/reality 
distinction in substantial terms. His engagement and attempts to free his thinking 
from this tradition profoundly influence how the conclusions he arrives at diverge 
from that of Zhuangzi. The appearance/reality distinction as established by 
substantialist thought is re-understood through Nietzsche‘s process thinking as a 
means of differentiating in process. In some respects, this echoes Ames‘ 
cosmological study of will to power contrasted with de or virtuality
79: Zhuangzi‘s 
Daoist philosophy works towards adaptation within processes, whereas Nietzsche‘s 
agonistic philosophy aims at differentiation and distinction within processes, not on 
a substantial basis, but on a processual one. We will return to this core comparison 
made by Ames in the following chapter. 
 
4.5 Case Study 2 (Socio-Economic Overview) - Economics, Politics and 
Technology in Nietzsche’s Philosophy 
 
Economics, politics, and technology all represent areas on which it has been 
difficult to precisely state Nietzsche‘s definitive viewpoint. There are no doubt some 
clear reasons why this is the case: firstly, because his thought develops and changes 
on these issues throughout the three writing periods of his active life, and because a 
great deal of such writing is in aphoristic form, where any consistency and 
cohesiveness on these subjects must be implicitly interpreted rather than explicitly 
stated. With this case study, I would like to hypothesize a cohesive interpretation of 
Nietzsche‘s position on these subjects using the interpretive basis of process thought. 
Having argued that process thought can be seen to form a core methodological 
insight in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, it can be used to bring out further commonalities 
in his thinking on these subjects and thus provide a better picture of his overall 
perspective. Afterwards, I contrast some features of this interpretation with those of 
Chinese Legalist thought on socio-political institutions in order to bring out some 
general features of a process-ontological praxis. 
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 159 
 
There are few extended studies of Nietzsche‘s thinking on technology, 
although there is some amount of scholarly interpretation that specifically highlights 
Nietzsche‘s critical comments about technology. These comments concern the form 
of technology that precedes industrialisation and mass media. The press, for 
example, is a social and technological phenomenon criticised by Nietzsche because it 
is part of the modern crisis of values that has led to mediocritization and the 
diminishing of the individual in the face of herd conventionality
80
. A great number of 
commentators draw on such comments and frame Nietzsche within a tradition of 
criticizing mass culture, as, for example, Douglas Kellner does when he writes that 
‗Nietzsche would probably be appalled at the debased state of contemporary 
culture‘81 and that ‗Nietzsche's negative critique cuts across and against the populist 
turn in cultural studies that would affirm and celebrate popular culture‘ (ibid). 
Likewise, Yunus Tuncel has recently described the problem mass culture faces for 
Dionysian experience: 
‗For Nietzsche spectacle was the core of the Dionysian forces, a festive space. 
Mass media along with its cohort social media, on the other hand, disrupts that 
communion and retain spectators in their isolated state, as it inflates the Ersatz 
experiences to the further decimation of somatic experiences. It is claimed that 
virtual experiences will replace physical experiences in the coming ages.‘82 
Tuncel writes that Nietzsche predicts the contemporary situation in which social 
media and the omnipresence of information, it is claimed, has devalued our grasp of 
knowledge
83
, to the point where there is no longer distinction between high and low. 
There are also more moderate accounts of Nietzsche‘s engagement with technology. 
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degree of causal power at the disposal of an individual. The omnipresence of information devaluing 
our grasp of knowledge would thus be read as impeding our capacity to act effectively in the world. 
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As McGinn highlights in an extended article on the subject, Nietzsche could also be 
seen to report other, positive views on technology, recognizing its growth out of a 
profoundly creative intellectual enterprise: ‗N. unlike most philosophers, saw 
technology -at least modern machine technology- as an intellectually creative 
activity ("the highest intellectual powers"), not simply as a matter of trial and error, 
manual dexterity, and an intuitive talent for tinkering‗ (McGinn 1980, p. 681). All 
the same, Mcginn points out Nietzsche‘s adroit question of to what use our 
technology, our machines, will be put to use to, even as they draw on the most 
talented individuals as cogs within their operations (682). He points out that had 
Nietzsche asked this question in his later period (after Daybreak, which is the source 
of many comments that McGinn draws from) his answer would perhaps have been: 
in terms of the will to power, which McGinn interprets as  
‗[T]he basic life force which, [Nietzsche] believed, continuously sought self-
aggrandizement. He already contends that the modern lust for money happens to be 
the social medium which in modern society affords "the highest feeling of power and 
good conscience" […] Thus it would not have been surprising if N. had come to see 
preoccupation with machines, on the part of both controllers and operators, as 
explicable in terms of the insatiable will to power, not simply in terms of survival 
benefits they provide in enabling man to adapt successfully to his environment‘ 
(ibid.).  
While McGinn may raise a significant point about machines as an expression 
of will to power, his initial claim that money affords the highest feeling of power and 
good conscience may be over-stated depending on how one interprets it: certainly 
money is not itself something that produces the highest feeling of power and good 
conscience for the higher types, because it is an effect of power rather than itself a 
producer of power. Powerful individuals (not necessarily all of them) make money, 
but it is rather in their abilities (which in many cases make money) that the highest 
feeling of power lies, along with the good conscience in using them. However, 
McGinn‘s commentary, coupled with Nietzsche‘s awareness of capitalism and its 
will to ‗Anglo-angelic shopkeeperdom‘ (WTP 944) clearly paint a picture of 
technology furthering the will to power of the mass as comfort and complacency. 
Along these lines, McGinn further emphasizes the tendency for the individual to be 
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instrumentally drawn on in modern technology and the centralized, bureaucratic 
state:  
‗Given the indiscriminate use of individuals [by machine technology and the 
bureaucratic state], and N's conception of the unrealized wealth of human 
potential, he cannot possibly embrace this "teaching" of "the machine," just as he 
cannot support the constriction of the exceptional individual entailed by the 
projection of one morality for all human beings‘ (683).  
It may be important to add a proviso at this point: when McGinn refers to the 
‗individual‘, what is perhaps meant is the individual of Nietzsche‘s higher types 
rather than individuals-in-themselves. Machine technology so described has an 
enormous amount of potential energy borne from its efficiency, orderliness and high 
organizational capacity, but it also threatens, firstly, to coarsen the spiritual and 
creative abilities of those involved in running the machine: ‗the worker's uniform 
activity on the job shapes the character of his time off the job: he attempts to drown 
his work-induced boredom in changeful leisure-time activity, an overcompensation 
apt to lead to a Don Juan ethic of experience‗ (ibid.). Secondly, there is no guarantee 
that the productive energy liberated through industrialization will be put to good use: 
‗N's attitude toward the machine thus parallels his attitude toward the liberation from 
the fetters of artistic convention, a development he believed was precipitated by the 
French Revolution and confronted the artist with a flood of artistic styles from 
various cultures. In this case, as in that of the machine, the liberation of energy 
effected did not carry with it built-in spurs to creativity or built-in forms or structures 
adequate to produce disciplined, excellent activity‗ (ibid). In contemporary terms, an 
increase in leisure time has not produced an increase in self-cultivation. Although 
written in the 1980s, McGinn‘s estimation of Nietzsche‘s treatment of technology 
resonates with its contemporary form in the prevalent issues of automatization, 
virtual reality, and social media. If we go by McGinn‘s estimation, it may be difficult 
to claim that these technological advances have produced the sort of higher types and 
creative geniuses that Nietzsche yearns for in his vision of society.  This leaves the 
issue of technology in Nietzsche‘s writing open, as there is no doubt that Nietzsche 
is highly critical towards technology in its mass form, but at the same time he 
envisions great potential for its use.  
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It is now important to speculate on this latter idea that technology offers great 
potential for Nietzsche, and we can examine this issue by looking at a particular 
subset of technology quite close to the issues at the heart of Nietzsche‘s philosophy: 
human enhancement. Contributing to a recent scholarly debate on Nietzsche‘s 
relationship to transhumanism, a subject intimately related to technology in this 
sense, Babette Babich (who is responding to Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, a commentator 
sympathetic to a relation between Nietzsche and transhumanism) similarly warns 
that the advances in technology in the last 20 years may bring, instead of a golden 
age of futuristic advances, merely another form of veiled humanism
84
  wherein 
‗human enhancement may be regarded, if only for the sake of argument, as 
corresponding to ―enhancement for all,‖ like ―micro-chips for all,‖ or ―airport 
security searches for all‖ (22). Instead of having the effect of elevating humans in 
any genuine sense, the extension of technology to all as it has been currently 
proceeding (with phenomena like the proliferation of social media) may be 
importantly motivated by a will to mediocrity: ‗such a broad extension would lead to 
a society not of ―enhanced‖ but and much rather of leveled or flattened out 
humanity‘ (ibid.). Ultimately, Babich argues, transhumanism fits more in line with 
this negative conception of technological advancement than with Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy because it is ‗not at all about self-overcoming but is very much about 
self-preservation, self-assertion, self-advancement‘ (24).  
As she points out, Nietzsche reminds us that it is ultimately with the 
exemplary qualities of individuals that the most important process of both self- and 
human overcoming occurs. This is perhaps one of the most significant points that 
Babich raises. Consumer technology such as the iPhone offer a potential 
improvement to the standards or quality of living of the customer who can afford it, 
and so in general such technology may be provisionally said to raise the standard of 
a general level of life. Nietzsche, however, is not foremost concerned with raising 
the standard of the mean or average (which is not, of course, to say that Nietzsche is 
not fascinated with the norm or average of humanity), because, given the emphasis 
he places on singular individuals in terms of creative genius, it is instead that average 
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level is derivatively raised as a consequence of the actions of the exceptions: ‗The 
strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the most to advance humanity: time 
and again they rekindled the dozing passions - every ordered society puts the 
passions to sleep - , time and again they reawakened the sense of comparison, of 
contradiction, of delight in what is new, daring, unattempted; they forced men to pit 
opinion against opinion, ideal model against ideal model‘ (TGS 4). Hence, his focus 
is on elevating those exceptions with the consequence of also elevating the mean 
standard. Babich specifies a similar insight regarding this point in her criticisms of 
transhumanism:  
‗[Nietzsche‘s] project from the start to the end of his creative life was nothing 
other than the production of a higher culture in broad terms and on the individual 
level of genius, whereby Nietzsche supposed the first to require the second, i.e., 
that the restoration on the level of culture of a once and yet higher culture called 
for that same rare genius. And Nietzsche took care to emphasize and to reflect 
upon the significance of that same rarity. For Nietzsche, and this is perhaps his 
greatest distance from the transhumanist movement, this particular rarity will not 
because it cannot turn out to be an upgrade money can buy.‘ (25) 
The claim is thus that one cannot ‗manufacture‘ this sort of genius in the way that 
much consumer technology can be manufactured in order to meet the demands of 
consumers. Much of the manner in which Babich addresses this issue so far appears 
uncontentious, insofar as we are concerned with the consumer technologies that 
Nietzsche criticizes. However, it is when she approaches the family resemblances of 
themes and technologies involved in eugenics and genetic engineering that there is 
ample space for consideration. Genetic engineering, both as a technology in itself, 
and as an instrument postulated of transhumanism, is a predictably complex point of 
discussion because it straddles the intersection between technology in this previous 
sense that has been discussed (something that would plausibly be bought and sold 
commercially, or rolled out as a standard, and thus be subject to the conditions of 
money and market exchange), but it may also, I will later contend, be a technology 
instrumental in facilitating the onset of the higher types that Nietzsche describes. As 
we have already seen, Nietzsche‘s understanding of types85 implies that what one 
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can and cannot achieve is crucially constrained by one‘s physical and psychological 
capabilities: a technology that alters those capabilities appears to present the 
possibility, in turn, for modifying what humans, higher types and lower, are 
physically and psychologically capable of achieving.  
 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to explore Babich‘s criticisms of genetic 
engineering as technology in the previous capitalistic sense. She raises a number of 
important concerns with genetic engineering: what are the practical and social 
consequences of implementing genetic engineering in the market? (pp. 25 – 27). 
Given the expense of the technology, Babich quite reasonably assumes it will be the 
nearly exclusive province of the wealthy or upper class elites, and likewise, she 
anticipates an argument for this state of affairs based on ‗the idea that capitalism 
advances culture, that enhancing the wealth of the wealthy, that enhancing the well-
being of the wealthy is ‗somehow‘ in the interest of everyone‘ (28). Likewise, she 
references the question of whether ‗our ideal of education so far from ‗enhancing‘ 
society and so far from ―enhancing‖ the individual within that society […] instead 
perpetuates a particular and not accidentally capitalist structure‘ (30) and instead 
whether ‗we find only identical consumer tastes for what are only identical consumer 
goods in a world of limited resources, a world already set to serve the mindless profit 
of increasingly few‘ (ibid.). Lastly, and most importantly, Babich explicates her 
specific position against taking transhumanism to be in line with Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy. For Babich, transhumanism ultimately represents the ascetic ideal and a 
will to decline: ‗Transhumanism turns out to be the latest […] instantiation of the 
ascetic ideal. One wants life, but one does not want life as it is, with all its trouble 
and mess, with all its banality and its limitations. Instead one wants video-game or 
gaming life, one wants movie or television life: without suffering, without illness, 
without death (save of the redeemable, corrigible kind)‘ (35). 
In sum, Babich provides two directions in which the criticism of 
transhumanism and, to a lesser extent human enhancement technology, can be 
understood, 1) through socio-political and economic issues (this appears to be quite 
broad in itself, but given the inter-relation between each it is difficult to reduce these 
issues singularly), issues regarding equality and status in society, and 2) deeper 
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evaluative issues: whether transhumanism or certain trends in technology represent 
the ascetic ideal and a will to decline and mediocritization. I want to address both 
issues, and to some extent they will intersect. 
Firstly, one major worry that Babich describes is the great economic and 
social disparity that the onset of such technology (like genetic engineering) may 
introduce. I want to spend some time examining what both Babich, and Sorgner in 
response, have to say concerning this issue. Neither appear to explicitly base their 
positions to a great extent in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, which is surprising given that 
their debate takes place in The Agonist, a journal dedicated to Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy. Having established their positions, I will then address them by drawing 
further on Nietzsche‘s philosophy. To begin: Babich‘s concern is the potential for a 
technological movement like transhumanism to culminate in a greater socio-political 
totalitarianism like fascism: ‗Here we note the very specific (and very popularly 
Nietzschean) ―faith‖ in science and especially industrial, corporate, capitalist 
technology that has, if we read Sloterdijk aright, been with us since the interregnum 
between the two wars which is again and also to say that such a vision is fascist 
through and through‘ (17). As Sorgner points out, this characterisation may be 
somewhat misleading: ‗fascism implies both authoritarianism and nationalism. 
Transhumanism clearly is no movement that could be in favor of nationalism.‘86 
(Sorgner 2011, p.12). Sorgner does recognize the potential in transhumanism for 
totalitarianism, however, and also recognizes that it may contribute to divides that 
create ‗a social order which includes a hierarchical ranking of members of different 
groups‘ (13). Sorgner, perhaps because he appears to be defending transhumanism 
more generally, does not spend much time discussing this issue in terms of 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy. He instead defends transhumanism against this threat by 
pointing out there can be different political means of regulating technological 
innovations, such that they do not lead to social inequalities. A key example that he 
draws on in terms of political and national intervention on this issue is the case of 
vaccination: in states like Germany vaccinations are provided for citizens, with the 
most relevant being free (funded by public health insurance), and others provided in 
relevant circumstances (likewise funded by the public), with the more specialized 
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vaccinations being privately paid for. Sorgner believes that ‗Analogously future 
enhancement technologies can get dealt with so that all citizens can be able to have 
access to them, if they wish to use them‗ (14). Likewise, Sorgner points out that the 
exclusivity of certain technologies within some periods do not necessarily lead to 
class divisions. He draws on the example of mobile phones to demonstrate this, 
pointing to their exclusive availability to highly-positioned managers initially, 
contrasted with their widespread use now along with their cheap availability. From 
this example, and presumably others like it, Sorgner thinks that ‗if an innovation is 
reliable, useful and functional, then the demand and production will rise such that it 
will also gradually get cheaper. If mobile phones have developed in this direction, it 
is likely that the development of successful enhancement technologies will take a 
similar route‘ (14). 
While Sorgner is right to point out that the threat of fascism in 
transhumanism is somewhat misleading because its focus is not inherently 
nationalistic, his examples do not do much to assuage concerns over its potential turn 
towards totalitarianism. Antibiotics and vaccinations are surely monumental 
advances for public health, but when examined globally they are by no means as 
widely available as in Sorgner‘s example of Germany: when the examination is not 
limited merely to one state but applied globally one may see that the sort of 
inequalities that Babich indicates are clearly prevalent in the disparity between the 
quality of life of citizens in first world states like Germany compared to third world 
citizens. Likewise, there is growing evidence that the over-use and lack of regulation 
of antibiotics may lead to the resurgence of previously treatable common illnesses 
due to increased resistance
87
, thus indicating some of the unforeseen dangers of 
technologies even as benevolent as these. Lastly, Sorgner praises the availability of 
antibiotics and vaccinations in our period, claiming that ‗[he] would not wish to live 
without them anymore‘ (15) and while this claim is not particularly controversial, it 
should nonetheless be qualified: what is the use in these technologies, is it merely 
longevity? If so, then this is not something that is by itself compatible with 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy. I will return to this issue when addressing the deeper debate 
on the valuational assumptions of transhumanism compared with Nietzsche‘s work.  
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Sorgner also admits that new technologies may bring with them new dangers (ibid.) 
but he spends more time discussing the ―safe‖ examples of vaccination and 
antibiotics than the ones that Babich is evidently more concerned with. The same 
complaint may be levelled against Sorgner‘s treatment of cases where individuals 
may be implicitly forced to use technologies without wishing to. He uses the 
examples of the prevalence of laptops and computers as the de facto standard for 
submission (14) and points out that such a state of affairs does not imply ‗morally 
problematic totalitarian tendencies‘ (ibid.). Again, Sorgner picks examples that are 
relatively unproblematic and therefore not particularly rewarding to discuss; there 
are other cases which are more compelling, such as the prevalence of doping in 
sport, where athletes who wish to have any chance of competing at a high level may 
be forced to take performance enhancement drugs that adversely affect the body over 
the long term. Likewise, instead of comparing students who lack laptops for their 
assignments with those who have them, Sorgner could have compared students who 
must compete with those who have access to academic performance enhancing drugs 
like Adderall. Certainly by themselves, these do not present any immediate or 
implicit moral or totalitarian questions, but when considered through a number of 
complex socio-political and economic relations (such as the competition between 
students for university placement or work placement, in turn influencing the 
requirements and standards in academia or work, all of which relates to the economic 
and political spheres) it becomes clear that there are implicit questions or concerns 
about totalitarianism when the bigger picture is taken into account.  
Neither Babich nor Sorgner seem to come to any decisive conclusion in their 
treatment of the preceding issues: Babich focuses on the potential for transhumanism 
to be misused as fascism, whereas Sorgner points out that transhumanism is not 
concerned with the sort of nationalism that fascism implies. While Sorgner 
nonetheless engages with these questions by raising the possibility for 
transhumanism to be misused as totalitarianism, he picks technological examples 
that are not particularly controversial when there are many other examples that are. 
Sorgner leaves us with the conclusion that ‗[he does not] think that the fear of a 
future totalitarian system, which was established because of technological 
innovations, is one which ought to be dominant. [He thinks] that it is useful and 
important to have this worry in mind so that scientists continue to progress with 
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great care, but [he] definitely [does not] think that this worry should stop us from 
making further scientific research‘ (15). 
Both commentators also inveigh on the focal point of genetic enhancement as 
a case of ‗selective breeding‘ and its relation to education. Both are particularly 
concerned with whether genetic enhancement can be structurally analogous to 
education (with both roughly working with a conception of education that captures 
elements of a formative process resembling bildung). Sorgner details the basis of this 
analogy by claiming that both ‗procedures have in common that decisions are being 
made by parents concerning the development of their child, at a stage where the 
child cannot yet decide for himself what it should do‘ (Sorgner 2010, § 1.1.1). For 
Sorgner, the importance of this structural analogy is that such ‗analogies are helpful 
because they enable us to have an initial tool for making a moral judgment 
concerning these new biotechnologies‘ (Sorgner 2011, p. 24). The moral judgments 
Sorgner described are presumably those that are already present for education, such 
as whether it would be morally wrong, for example, not to provide the best education 
one can get for one‘s child (which in this case involves the use of genetic 
enhancement for determining characteristics). Babich‘s approach is to raise questions 
about the education process itself when understood in conjunction with the greater 
socio-economic background: ‗will an ―education‖ correspond to nothing more than 
the business (emphasis on the economic or cost-based affair) of acquiring and 
conferring, i.e., obtaining and selling degrees and certificates—indeed and just as 
Sorgner suggests, all like such modules, courses, degrees, parallel to many add-ons 
and upgrades‘ (Babich ibid, p. 20). Such a question is entirely legitimate given its 
similarity to questions in the contemporary debate over privatization of the 
university institution and its effects on education, and the spirit of these remarks 
reflect those of Nietzsche‘s in On The Future of Our Educational Institutions. 
Sorgner is reluctant to engage with Babich on this issue, claiming that ‗The concept 
―education‖, as [he employs it] […] has not much to do with the acquisition of 
degrees, taking a course, or reading a book.‘ (Sorgner ibid, p. 22). However, if we 
consider the debate on privatization in terms of the effects on students, the issue of 
the institutional trend towards instrumentalization and specialization in students, 
hypothetical parallels in genetic enhancement seem very clear. Babich is concerned 
that the selection process for genetic enhancement is instrumentalized in the same 
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way, which may risk hindering the production of higher types in society. Ultimately, 
Sorgner does not pursue Babich on this issue (he instead goes on to defend the 
validity of the structural analogy), but likewise it is clear that he never attempts to 
conceive of education in the manner that Babich suggests. Sorgner instead again 
concludes that conceiving of education as analogous (in many important respects) to 
genetic enhancement appropriately positions genetic enhancement for moral 
consideration (and it would seem that Babich‘s main concern are exactly those 
considerations themselves rather than the analogy).  
Lastly, it is especially with both commentators‘ concern with the values 
underlying transhumanism and how they relate to Nietzsche‘s philosophy that 
Sorgner and Babich provide fruitful discussion. As earlier stated, the general 
questions that both commentators engage with in this respect are whether the ideals 
of transhumanism are directed towards the levelling or mediocritization of humans 
rather than their elevation or self-overcoming, and whether the ascetic ideal is 
reflected in transhumanist ideals. Again, Babich raises the suspicion that the covert 
aim of transhumanism is the ascetic ideal, a rejection of life: ‗one does not want life 
as it is, with all its trouble and mess, with all its banality and its limitations‘ (Babich 
ibid, p. 35). Sorgner is very quick to defend this reading of transhumanism‘s ends: ‗It 
is not the case that the majority of [transhumanists] wish to reach an eternal life in 
the digital realm because they know that immortality is not a goal that can be 
reached realistically. A central goal of many transhumanists is that the healthspan of 
human beings gets expanded‘ (Sorgner ibid., p. 36). It is better here to defer to 
Sorgner‘s approximation of general transhumanists, as this gives them the most 
reasonable position to consider. According to Sorgner, many transhumanists aim at 
life extension but entirely accept the physical reality of their bodies and the world, 
and the finitude of both. Likewise, transhumanists are naturalists who recognize their 
part as animals in an evolutionary process. Aims like genetic modification are 
defended by Sorgner in their stead as being a matter of trying to ‗create new organic 
forms by taking into consideration naturalistic processes, which seems to be a 
procedure with significant similarities to a Nietzschean way of thinking.‘ (35) The 
debate so construed is difficult to resolve satisfactorily because both commentators 
provide differing accounts of transhumanism: Sorgner is defending transhumanists 
as naturalists who wish to improve the general conditions of the human body, while 
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Babich is criticising transhumanists as examples of the ascetic ideal who wish to 
preserve and extend their lives towards immortality, and there is little immediate 
evidence provided to choose one reading over the other. 
 
In what follows, I will now attempt to address the debate by examining how 
the processual basis of Nietzsche‘s philosophy offers a clue to resolving this debate, 
offering a renewed perspective through which to clarify these issues of technology 
and transhumanism in Nietzsche‘s philosophy. This will be done by attempting to 
cohere Nietzsche‘s thoughts on relevant political and economic issues, and showing 
how these thoughts are informed by process-philosophical assumptions. Both 
politics and economics as areas of interest in the Nietzschean corpus are an under-
represented pre-occupation, even if there are a few well-respected texts devoted to 
Nietzsche‘s political thinking. Economics in particular is still an area where 
discussion has been fairly understated
88
. Nonetheless, there are some key points in 
Nietzsche‘s relevant thought that can be identified. As van Meerhaeghe (2006, p. 46) 
and Drochon (2016, pp. 64–67) respectively identify, Nietzsche ostensibly advocates 
some form of privatization in both the economic and political spheres. Specifically, 
Nietzsche expresses the sentiment that privatization will increase in a long aphorism 
in HAH, in which  
‗distrust of all government, insight into the uselessness and destructiveness of 
these short-winded struggles will impel men to a quite novel resolve: the resolve 
to do away with the concept of the state, to the abolition of the distinction 
between private and public. Private companies will step by step absorb the 
business of the state: even the most resistant remainder of what was formerly the 
work of government (for example its activities designed to protect the private 
person from the private person) will in the long run be taken care of by private 
contractors‘ (472).  
 The progress of privatization in the economic and political spheres, Nietzsche 
predicts, will advance to such a stage that the functions of the democratic state are 
superseded by private institutions. We do not receive as clear a picture of the 
function of economic institutions in Nietzsche‘s later philosophy, and as such much 
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of what I will now detail may be taken as attempt to extrapolate an economics based 
on Nietzsche‘s economic thinking in the early period compared and contrasted with 
the key concepts he devises in the later periods, one of the most significant being the 
overhuman. As van Meerhaeghe points out (2006, p. 46), this emphasis on 
privatization may have been motivated by the dangers that Nietzsche saw in 
socialism with its own pursuit of renegotiating power for a more equal distribution 
across classes. The danger represented by equal distribution is a reflection of the 
power stasis against which Nietzsche‘s own dynamic philosophy fights. This 
struggle is most clearly appreciated in the difference between types and self-
cultivation, and especially the idea of self-overcoming that Nietzsche often refers to. 
Zarathustra proclaims, for example, that activities like value-making are effectively 
cyclical and processual: ‗The one who 
breaks their tablets of values, the breaker, the lawbreaker – but he is the creative one‘ 
(TSZ ‗Prologue‘ 9). Likewise Zarathustra proclaims that fundamental self-cultivation 
must always involve a process of self-overcoming: ‗You must want to burn yourself 
up in your own flame: how could you become new if you did not first become 
ashes!‘ (TSZ ‗On the Way of the Creator‘). Against these processes Nietzsche poses 
the epitome of societal stasis, the last humans. The relevant characteristics of the last 
humans are their determination to ensure safety and stability in their lives. They 
describe their flight from ‗regions where it was hard to live‘ (TSZ ‗Prologue‘ 5) and 
their terminal exhaustion in declaring that ‗[o]ne no longer becomes poor or rich: 
both are too burdensome. Who wants to rule anymore? Who wants to obey? Both are 
too burdensome‘ (ibid.), Zarathustra arrives at the conclusion that for the last humans 
there is ‗[n]o herdsman and one herd! Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is 
the same‘ (ibid.). These characteristics reflect a static or utopian political view that 
Nietzsche virulently rejects in favour of a view of socio-political and economic 
institutions structured in such a way as to promote the proliferation of higher culture 
and the coming of the overhuman.  
First and foremost, the means of working towards the overhuman in our 
economic and political institutions will be through privatization rather than by means 
of a parental state. Privatization will furnish a system through which individuals will 
no longer be at the behest of a majority, the services provided by private institutions 
will be capable of being directed towards different types and different interests. It is 
unsurprising that van Meerhaeghe writes that ‗Nietzsche should be attractive to a 
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free-market economist, given his contempt for state activity and his strong 
individualism‘ (van Meerhaeghe 2006, p. 49). However, Nietzsche‘s praise for 
privatized institutions is highly conditional and is not conducive to a free-market 
capitalistic reading: privatized institutions are merely a more dynamic means of 
achieving the sort of political state and society that Nietzsche envisions. This sort of 
state and society is, as Drochon elaborates, crowned by a pan-European cultural elite 
that is above and beyond privatized economic institutions, and may themselves enjoy 
distinct privileges or liberties unavailable to others. This fundamental cultural elitism 
distances Nietzsche from the ideology of free-market capitalism
89
. Likewise, against 
free-market capitalists, Nietzsche maintains the necessity of slavery
90
 of the lower 
types as a basis for the cultural production of this elite. He simply advocates 
privatized institutions as the more efficacious economic forms through which this 
can be achieved. Hence, although Nietzsche does seem to praise the role of 
privatization in minimizing the influence of the state, it is difficult to extrapolate 
from this point to pin Nietzsche‘s economic thought down to a position like free 
market capitalism or mercantilism. 
There are also more germane criticisms of privatized, free-market economics 
from within Nietzsche‘s philosophy to be considered. As McGinn writes, Nietzsche 
foresees a great deal of mediocritization within the economic sphere with the onset 
of capitalism: ‗Under the reign of capitalist competition, the public is made the judge 
of goods. But given the proliferation and increasing complexity of production, the 
public must necessarily be ignorant of what constitutes real quality in most kinds of 
product. Hence it tends to rely on appearances in deciding which to buy, thus lending 
added impetus to this factor in production‘ (McGinn 1980, p. 684). This would seem 
to imply a decline of life in terms of a lack of taste in the areas of consumption. To 
counter these negative points, McGinn points out that the Nietzsche of this period 
writing these remarks hoped for ‗a greater reliance on human reason as a critical 
factor in buying decisions, for example, in seeing through the above illusion‘ (p. 
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684). I do not think that this type of optimism survives into Nietzsche‘s later 
philosophy. Given his later grim outlook on the psychological and physical facts of 
the majority of human beings as sick and suffering from ressentiment, it is unlikely 
for Nietzsche that a human majority will develop the informed consumer tastes so 
advocated: those who are mediocre will be drawn to mediocre products, in the way 
that those who have life denying dispositions are drawn to life denying doctrines. 
This is not, however, ultimately a condemnation of the system itself, because the free 
market, while it clearly gravitates towards serving the needs of a general majority 
and mediocre public, will also be open to serving the demands of higher types. What 
must be emphasized again is the necessity for the cultural project that Nietzsche 
remains adamant in projecting for the future of philosophy
91
, as this is what will 
safeguard against an entirely mediocritized form of capitalism. Hence, 
complementing the economic system, there must a cultural basis that preserves the 
flourishing and growth of higher types, who themselves will make use of the free 
economy in such a way that Nietzsche advocates, being able to recognize quality. 
 
How is there a basis of process philosophy for the preceding comments about 
Nietzsche‘s political and economic philosophy? Most tellingly, in Nietzsche‘s mid-
to-late thought, the central concept of eternal recurrence might be hypothesized to 
inform his ultimate political ends and is itself fundamentally a processual concept. In 
HAH (the aphorism quoted above) Nietzsche speculates on the diminishing of the 
state, but he also raises a guardedly optimistic question about what will come 
afterwards: ‗the prudence and self-interest of men are of all their qualities the best 
developed; if the state is no longer equal to the demands of these forces then the last 
thing that will ensue is chaos: an invention more suited to their purpose than the state 
was will gain victory over the state‘ (ibid.). It may be that Nietzsche provided his 
own answer to this question with the development of his notions of eternal 
recurrence and the overhuman. Hugo Drochon writes that the concept of eternal 
recurrence, suggested by Nietzsche and read by various interpreters (either literally 
as a cosmological feature or in the form of a psychological schema) as the idea that 
all existence will return and re-enact itself cyclically, informs Nietzsche‘s political 
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thought by being fundamentally connected to the character of the overhuman. This 
new, higher type of being is capable of willing the eternal return where lower types 
of human being cannot, wanting to change the past and not being able to 
countenance the thought of reliving their lives in the exact same details for eternity. 
Relating eternal recurrence to politics, Drochon characterises it ‗as a tool to 
determine what caste one should belong to in Nietzsche‘s positing of his future two-
sphere political ideal‘ (Drochon 2016, p. 111). In this sense, as Drochon also points 
out (110), the doctrine is a political and ethical transformation of the cosmological 
thought of Heraclitus, recognized as a key process philosopher. Important in this 
respect is the capacity to affirm constant change, the necessary co-presence of 
opposites, and ultimately eternal conflict between them, all of which comes to form 
the world as it recurs eternally. Likewise, the overhuman itself is not a fixed final 
state or telos: it is a process of overcoming.  The basis for the form and role of the 
institutions that Nietzsche advocates for the future of politics and economics might 
be taken to reflect the key processual insight of eternal recurrence the overhuman. 
and the doctrinal basis for the individuals that will emerge partly within the 
framework of these socio-political institutions, is ultimately one of process thinking. 
 
Having briefly elaborated some aspects of Nietzsche‘s economic and socio-
political position, and how process philosophy can be recognized in them, we can 
return to the issue of technology more fully. As seen, Babich raises the issues of 
whether the future technologies considered by transhumanism (cloning, genetic 
enhancement, cybernetics, and so on) will create great economic and social disparity, 
‗[perpetuating] a particular and not accidentally capitalist structure‘92 backed by ‗the 
idea that capitalism advances culture, that enhancing the wealth of the wealthy, that 
enhancing the well-being of the wealthy is ―somehow‖ in the interest of everyone.‘ 
(28). Highly suspicious of this last idea, Babich writes that ‗as Nietzsche points out 
of the fantasy of an eternal reward, you‘ll have to wait a long time for this. Call it 
trickle-down economics, or call it whatever you like, this is the economics of the 
scratch-card lottery and it is a fantasy.‘ (ibid.). How does Nietzsche‘s economic 
position mesh with these criticisms? First off, it is abundantly clear that Nietzsche is 
                                                          
92
 Babette Babich, ―Nietzsche‘s Post-Human Imperative: On the ―All-too-Human‖ Dream of 
Transhumanism‖ in: The Agonist. Vol. IV, Issue II (2012). Online publication: 
http://www.nietzschecircle.com/AGONIST/2011_08/Dream_of_Transhumanism.html 
 175 
 
in accordance with Babich on the point that capitalism does not advance culture, he 
instead holds that it is great individuals who do so. Likewise, Nietzsche does not 
think that it is significant to enhance or protect those who are merely wealthy. Given 
these starting points, there are still some important respects in which Nietzsche‘s 
economic perspective aligns with capitalism even as Babich decries it here. For 
example, as discussed earlier, his view on privatization are consonant with a form of 
free-market capitalism. Similarly, Nietzsche is not perturbed by the possibility of 
there being a great economic and social disparity between classes, in some respects 
he encourages it by condoning a conditional form of industry-based slavery and 
through the ideal of a cultural elite. It is ultimately through this last goal of a cultural 
elite that we should attempt to situate Nietzsche‘s economic and technological 
considerations, and respond to Babich‘s points.  
To take the specific example of genetic engineering: Babich fears that 
technology like genetic engineering will be the sole province of the wealthy, which 
may lead to the aforementioned disparities. Nietzsche would not see this as a 
significant problem, except insofar as it is the province of those who are ―merely‖ 
wealthy, those who are only interested in accumulating wealth or proliferating the 
values of ‗Anglo-angelic shopkeeperdom‘. Such a criticism does not apply in the 
case of those who use their wealth in a way that furthers the development of the 
values Nietzsche envisions as a future higher culture. Putting aside the issue of 
wealth, then, what remains is the question whether a technology like genetic 
engineering creates or improves the conditions under which great individuals can 
advance culture. This will be the central question in addressing the debate between 
Babich and Sorgner through Nietzsche‘s philosophy. If the answer is yes, then we 
could infer that Nietzsche would advocate technology like genetic engineering. This 
sort of advocacy differs from Transhumanism‘s, however, because Transhumanism‘s 
primary goal is extending and improving the quality of human life. Nietzsche is 
concerned with the production of culture, great individuals and great 
accomplishments: life-extension and quality of life are only factors to be considered 
when working towards these goals rather than ends in themselves.  
Does this position, as described, thus reflect what Babich criticizes as a 
fantasy of ‗trickle-down‘ economics? This strongly depends on how the position is 
construed. Firstly, Babich is criticizing the notion of capitalism in its ‗trickle-down‘ 
form as a dream or utopian future, and she is surely right in pointing out that such a 
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view resembles the ‗fantasy of an eternal reward‘ (28) as Nietzsche criticizes it. 
Sorgner defends Transhumanism against this vision of capitalism by claiming that 
‗successful enhancement technologies can be distributed equally either by means of 
the public health system or by them becoming so cheap that they become widely 
available‘ (Sorgner, ibid., p. 14). As I have illustrated, there may be some potential 
issues with Sorgner‘s responses along these lines: we can question whether some of 
the more advanced technologies hypothesized can be made available to all when 
many third world states still lack basic facilities and resources. Nietzsche‘s position 
in this debate lies neither with Sorgner nor Babich. His writings suggest that he 
would not defend a free market economy that privileges those who are merely 
wealthy as a ‗trickle-down‘ system for improving all, nor would he defend 
technology and transhumanism in the way that Sorgner does by appeal to equal 
distribution. This does not, however, place him with Babich in the debate. Privatized 
(economic) institutions for Nietzsche may not be sufficient or primary in furthering 
the production of culture but they do play a significant role in the sense that they 
provide an economic basis which aids in producing the conditions out of which great 
types will arise. They are capable of fulfilling this role because they are conducive to 
individual opportunism and broaden a possibility space for both production and 
consumption: the spectrum of consumption and production is extended on both ends, 
for high and low types, and thus new possibilities for the production of culture 
emerge. This must be qualified by emphasizing for Nietzsche that the economic 
basis must necessarily be coupled with a renewed cultural basis: there must be a core 
of values or a cultural elite that ultimately directs the use of such an economic basis 
for the ends of greater flourishing. Babich‘s criticisms along these lines are valid to 
the extent that the cultural basis is missing, and such criticisms are indeed germane 
to Sorgner‘s arguments and to advocates of similar systems of free market of 
capitalism by themselves also. 
 
Lastly, having argued that Nietzsche‘s thought lends itself to the advocacy of 
privatized economic institutions, in a manner not equivalent to the utopian fantasy 
that Babich derides, there is one last issue of technology to be addressed. Future 
technology like genetic enhancement considered as Babich does in its ascetic form is 
certainly not what Nietzsche would advocate. As Babich writes, what motivates the 
drive to technology like this is a drive towards mediocritization and the fantasy of a 
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utopian future. Technologies considered as such would be employed for life 
extension and to make our lives more comfortable, neither of which Nietzsche takes 
as valuable goals in human flourishing. Sorgner‘s defense of transhumanism as 
consonant with Nietzsche‘s philosophy of the future (and his defense against 
Babich‘s criticisms of the movement as hiding the ascetic ideal) do not carry much 
weight in this regard. What he cites as a central goal of transhuman advocates, the 
extension of lifespan (35) by itself does not appear particularly valuable in 
Nietzsche‘s own project. Likewise, in claiming similarities with Nietzsche‘s way of 
thinking by saying that ‗transhumanists create new organic forms by taking into 
consideration naturalistic processes‘ (ibid.), Sorgner does not go very far in 
explaining the basis of these similarities beyond a shared naturalism. By itself this 
does not establish enough of a similarity: for what reason are these ‗new organic 
forms‘ created? If it is in the service of greater comfort or happiness then it is 
certainly not consonant with Nietzsche‘s future philosophy. While Sorgner‘s defense 
of Transhumanism fails to elicit enough similarities to Nietzsche‘s philosophy, 
Babich‘s criticisms are also likely to stray from Nietzsche‘s own position on 
technology. Contrary to Babich‘s negative portrayal of potential future technologies 
like genetic enhancement, such technologies, and the will to achieve them, can be 
argued for in a more positive light. Insofar as Babich‘s criticisms are to be 
considered from the perspective of the ‗herd‘ types of humans, Nietzsche might be in 
agreement. The uses of technology by types that are given to ressentiment and 
exhaustion will reflect those same natures, and serve as narcotics with utopian 
promises.
93
 Hence, a transhumanist along these sorts of lines does reflect the ascetic 
ideal because the potential for overcoming the body promises life extension and 
increased comfort. However, a transhumanist more along Nietzsche‘s line of thought 
would not reflect the ascetic ideal because the possibilities for overcoming the 
limitations of the body would be taken to offer greater potentials for ever-more 
impressive achievement and competition. 
 
At this point I would like to finally elucidate the fundamental elements of 
Nietzsche‘s position on technology and how they can be traced back to key process 
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ontological insights. We have just seen that Nietzsche would perhaps evaluate the 
effect of technologies like genetic enhancement on the basis of whether they offer 
the possibilities for greater and further overcoming and more impressive 
achievements. This element effectively equates to a form of the power-pragmatism 
that has been extensively discussed in part one of this dissertation. Given the sort of 
power-pragmatism that Nietzsche elucidates, technology is not an exception to this 
sort of understanding, and must be similarly evaluated through it. Thus, technology 
must be understood firstly as an extension of the will to power. Secondly, and just as 
importantly, it must be understood that the uses of technology are subject to different 
and potentially competing wills, and so any evaluation of a particular technology 
theoretically poses the question, just as Nietzsche poses the question in the realm of 
aesthetic values, ‗is it hunger or super-abundance that has here become creative?‘ 
(GS 370). If artworks are understood as extensions of the will to power, it may be 
the case that, given the same underlying power ontology in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, 
technological inventions and usages may be considered analogously. As such, the 
efficacious use of a technology might be considered according to whether, through 
them, there is (as in art) ‗the desire for destruction, change, and becoming [that is] an 
expression of an overflowing energy that is pregnant with future‘ (ibid) or whether it 
embodies ‗the hatred of the ill-constituted, disinherited, and underprivileged‘ (ibid.). 
Considered as such, and given that the uses of any particular technology might be 
multifarious, such a project is by no means simple and straight-forward. 
 
Nonetheless, we see in Nietzsche‘s writing on technology some principled 
clues as to how to evaluate technology in this way. Nietzsche‘s writings on 
technology are often couched in terms of its beneficial and detrimental effects to 
different types. Nietzsche‘s general position in this regard is that improved 
technology simultaneously provides greater possibilities for human achievement 
while at the same time creating worse possibilities for what Nietzsche terms 
decadence. As he writes in an unpublished note in 1888: ‗A society is not free to 
remain young. And even at the height of its strength it has to form refuse and waste 
materials. The more energetically and boldly it advances, the richer it will be in 
failures and deformities, the closer to decline‘ (WTP 40). We can see a similar 
understanding at work, for example, through the manner in which the state is formed 
for Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals. The socialization of humans through bad 
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conscience makes them irrevocably ‗sick‘ but thereby paves the way through a 
developed inner consciousness towards society proper with all of its potentialities for 
greater human flourishing. The human being at such a point became an ‗an 
interesting animal, […] only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth 
and become evil-and these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been 
superior to other beasts!‘ (OGM I 6). This conclusion may reinforce what has been 
written so far in terms of the power-pragmatist standards of evaluation in the will to 
power: it is only from the widest possible perspective of will to power that the 
function of economic or technological institutions can be appreciated, and a core 
element of appreciation in such a way is to chart the development of these 
institutions as processual and fluid. That is to say, to have a grasp on technologies 
and economic institutions in such a way as to recognize that what may be beneficial 
at one point in time to a particular type (in Nietzsche‘s case, higher or lower types) 
may change to be detrimental at another point, or that it may be both beneficial to 
one party and detrimental to the other. Hence, power-pragmatism allows for the 
evaluation of such phenomena not in terms of static ideologies but as processes of 
power expression, a socio-political estimation which resembles in some regards the 
socio-political motivations of the Chinese Legalists in the Warring States period, 
which were also derived from a processual world-view. 
 
4.6 Case Study 2 (Socio-Economic Overview) - Politico-Economic 
Thought and Process in Chinese Legalism 
 
Compared with the account I have given of Nietzsche‘s economic thought, an 
economic perspective with striking similarity can be found within the work of the 
ancient and notorious Chinese Legalist, Han Fei. As an initial qualification Han Fei‘s 
pre-occupations are clearly different: Nietzsche‘s political preoccupations, insofar as 
he has them, are couched in facilitating a life-affirming philosophy of the future 
through a valuational critique of contemporary society, while Han Fei is directly 
concerned with the maintenance of the power of the Chinese sovereign, which 
ultimately carries over into the maintenance and expansion of the Chinese empire). 
Nonetheless, both of their means of addressing these political concerns bear some 
insightful resemblances that may be traced back to a processual worldview. One of 
the major problems within the petty kingdoms in the Warring States period in China 
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was how rulers could keep their subordinates in check, specifically their ministers. 
Ministers served a crucial role in the functioning of states, which were at that point 
becoming too large to be efficiently controlled solely by the monarchy. We can now 
consider a brief example of how the Legalists suggest a process-philosophical 
technique to address this issue. Developing the notion of administrative techniques, 
or shu, Han Fei suggests that the ruler evaluate the work of his ministers by 
‗matching performance to title‘ (Watson 2012, p. 31). This involves allowing the 
ministers in advance to propose projects to be undertaken in the state, and also 
allowing them to set the criteria by which the tasks undertaken will be considered to 
be complete. If the performance matches the task set, Han Fei writes, then the ruler is 
to reward the minister appropriately. If the performance does not, then the minister is 
punished. Han Fei is remarkably stringent on this point: a minister is punished if he 
exceeds the task just as much as if he fails to meet it. The important point of this 
technique is the ruler‘s absolute restraint: the ruler does not set the tasks, because 
Han Fei argues that ministers will attempt to take advantage of the ruler‘s needs, and 
opportunists with insufficient skill for the task will be attracted. Likewise, the 
stringency of the criteria is taken to ensure that opportunistic ministers will not 
promise more than they can realistically achieve, in order to avoid punishment, while 
at the same time ensuring that ministers will still be motivated to promise as much as 
they can for the rewards. Theoretically, the technique is remarkably open-ended and 
adaptive on the part of the ruler, who exercises complete restraint and minimizes his 
presence in order to produce efficiency. The technique as Han Fei advocates it can 
be likened to a highly prototypical form of laissez-faire economy couched within a 
strongly authoritarian political system
94
.  
In order to appreciate the dynamic efficacy of such a political and economic 
system, and why Han Fei and other Legalists work towards advocating it, we have to 
examine its syncretic roots. The foremost influences (and the current example of 
‗matching performance and title‘) of shu as the Legalists conceive it can be found in 
both the early Daoist understanding of political efficacy in the Daodejing and the 
strategic notion of efficacy in the Sunzi. The understanding of political efficacy in 
                                                          
94
 Goldin  (2012, p. 9) points out that there are clear issues with performance and title as an immediate 
economic principle, in the sense that if the ‗call for bids‘ of the ruler is motivated by self-interest 
alone then some systemic issues with no immediate benefit to the individual may be neglected, such 
as in the areas of global warming and pharmaceuticals. 
 181 
 
the Daodejing is that effective political rulership involves non-interference on the 
part of the ruler; if the state is well-ordered then the ruler does not need to impose 
himself on the process of the state. Similarly, the Sunzi elaborates a notion of 
strategic efficacy that highlights the need to place oneself in an advantageous 
position according to which one can respond to military situations as they unfold 
(among the more direct examples is simply to acquire the high ground). Both of 
these understandings develop from a general view of the world as processual, 
cyclical and non-teleologically oriented. We will explore this notion of efficacy more 
fully in the following chapter. 
The preoccupation of ancient Chinese cosmology laid with processes and 
changes rather than substance and particulars, hence the ideologies and conceptual 
tools that Chinese philosophers like the Daoists and Legalists developed were 
directed at manipulating and accommodating changing circumstances. Han Fei‘s 
‗matching performance and title‘ is just such an attempt to manipulate and 
accommodate change within the political context. He takes the underlying Daoist 
intuition that working towards a static, imposed model of rulership is misguided and 
argues for a technique of political rulership that has its own form of privatization: the 
bureaucrats compete with each other and propose their own projects. Han Fei is not 
alone in this dynamic way of considering the state, he is part of a tradition of 
Legalists who work from the same fundamental understanding. While Chinese 
political philosophy, whether Confucian, Legalist or Daoist, all shares this dynamic 
basis, Legalism is known in particular for its staunch advocacy of political 
adaptation and reform. In mainstream Confucian thought, the state is by default 
considered to be the creation of the sage kings (legendary political and ethical 
exemplars), with the state also being the fundamental, de facto structure of society. 
The legalist Shang Yang, echoing the primitivist elements of Daoism, instead 
hypothesizes that the state is formed through a process of different transformations, 
transforming over time from a harmonious primitivist society to the contemporary 
feudal state of the empire as necessitated by increasing populations and the 
normative dynamics of society develop. What this entire process described by Shang 
Yang emphasizes is that, contrary to Confucian orthodoxy, the formation of the state 
was not a single act by the sage kings but rather a protracted, constantly changing 
process. As Yuri Pines describes it, ‗‗From Shang Yang‘s point of view it is 
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conceivable that during a lengthy pre-state period there were no rulers, and this 
situation was not necessarily unmanageable—at least until the population pressure 
and the resultant social tensions necessitated overall adjustment of the political 
system‘ (Pines 2012, p. 34). So described Shang Yang envisions the socio-political 
situation as much more adaptive and fluid that his ideological competitors. Pines 
proceeds to point out that Shang Yang‘s adaptive conception of the state goes even 
further than other reformers in the ancient Chinese tradition by advocating that 
adequate political rulership, if it is to remain flexible and adaptive, could be broader 
in scope in its modifications to the state: ‗The scope of change and of the required 
modifications is incomparably larger than in other texts that advocate ―changing with 
the times‖: it may include modifications not only to the political but also to the social 
structure, and even to morality‘ (ibid.). Having established that the nature of the state 
is changeable and responds to the conditions that prevail in society, the conditions of 
changing society themselves may be equally adaptive and changeable. The 
reflexiveness of these conditions may have influenced the degree to which Shang 
Yang and general Legalist reforms departed from tradition in how drastic they were: 
reforms that undermined the cherished Confucian role of education, learning and 
culture in favour of mass mobilization and food production for war and expansion. 
Such reforms were severe, and one of the key criticisms of the Legalist writings on 
political rulership is their untenability. The brutal system of rewards and 
punishments posed by Legalists and the general authoritarianism of their proposed 
regime are cited as features that cannot lend themselves to sustained rulership. As 
Yuri Pines argues, this criticism of Legalism as a whole may not be entirely well-
founded. Pines hypothesizes that due to the radical emphasis on adaptation in Shang 
Yang‘s conception of the state and rulership there is nothing inconsistent with a 
hypothetical modification to the draconian system of Legalism in an established and 
peaceful state. In such a case more moderate adaptations could then be considered: 
the brutal means Legalists advocated for attaining such political harmony would then 
be properly understood only as an instrumental means rather than static principles of 
statehood (ibid. 35).  
 
While authority and activity is ultimately still the behest of the ruler, and 
hence the state, the ideal system for Han Fei, like the Daoists, is one in which the 
state (more specifically, the state ruler) has no overt part in maintenance. Nietzsche‘s 
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ideal state maintains a number of similarities: the functions of the state will be 
increasingly privatized and the role of the state will become minimal. The key 
difference, of course, consists in how the state is minimized: Nietzsche‘s state is 
minimized in the functional sense having few areas of state influence, whereas Han 
Fei‘s state is minimized in terms of its direct operation on the population (it still 
exerts full control over the population). We are thus presented with two economic, 
technological and political viewpoints that are both strikingly similar and different in 
many respects, but are both ultimately based on the insight that the world is a 
process. The form of the institutions posited by Nietzsche are those which minimize 
state control in order to cultivate the development of higher types and culture, and 
his complaints regarding those political and economic systems that emphasize state 
control (socialism, for example) are based in the idea that the aim of equality within 
these systems results in mediocrity and cultural stasis. Legalists like Shang Yang and 
Han Fei posit radical reforms that have an adaptive form for changing circumstances: 
unlike previous philosophers they conceive the state from the outset as constantly 
changing and are therefore able to provide reforms that break from tradition. 
 
The preceding analyses have thus led us to the most significant resultant 
question for comparative process praxis thinking: in what ways do both 
philosophies, based on process, arrive at such insights in the areas of technology and 
economies? We have seen that Nietzsche‘s economic and political thought is skewed 
towards a fight against nihilism and stasis in post-Christian western culture, as 
represented in politics and economics through the unchecked tendency towards 
equality. As means of combatting this tendency, he endorses as instruments in his 
philosophical project those political and economic structures that appear to promote 
dynamism, which may encompass economic and political structures resembling 
privatization. The core of process thinking at work in Nietzsche‘s philosophy 
encourages a reception of technology that is effectively pragmatic in outlook: a 
technology is justified insofar as it is used for the purposes of an increase in will to 
power, whether it is used in the services of an ascending form of life. Likewise, a 
technology may be inveighed against insofar as its use is for the purposes of 
resentment or a weakening form of life. Similarly, the radical Chinese Legalists 
advanced political reforms influenced by a tradition of process thinking that also 
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departed from orthodoxy. Like the Daoists, in Shang Yang‘s thought the state is 
envisioned as originally idyllic and primitivist, and as population and cultural 
complexity increases within that community so too does the requirement for 
adapting political techniques and edicts. This sets Shang Yang and the Legalists 
apart from the Daoists, as they do not seem to be nostalgic for a political system that 
fits the primitivist period. Focusing as they do on maintaining first authority of ruler 
and state, and second the expansion of the power of both, they devise policies and 
methods that are themselves highly fluid, the example covered being Han Fei‘s 
emphasis that the ruler minimize his direct influence on state affairs in order to draw 
out more fully the competence of his sub-ordinates (‗matching performance to title‘). 
Chapter 5: Socio-Political Praxis in Comparative Process Ontology 
 
As discussed previously, both Nietzsche‘s philosophy and the Chinese 
Daoism (as exhibiting some of the structural features of Chinese thought) subscribe, 
broadly speaking, to forms of process ontology: both philosophies view the world 
fundamentally on the basis of constantly changing processes and events, rather than 
discrete entities, substances or things. One of the consequences of adopting such a 
basis is that both forms of thought tend to interpret events on a grand scale, with a 
predilection towards dynamically addressing socio-political phenomena. I have 
already discussed this especially in the context of economics, technology and 
politics, where both Nietzsche and Chinese Legalists posit dynamic mechanisms as a 
means of working towards the political and cultural environment they envision. In 
this last chapter, I want to draw out some further insights along these lines and 
attempt to elaborate a general concept of socio-political efficacy for comparative 
process ontology. Simply put, what sort of understanding of effective political action 
does the process worldview of both philosophies provide? Likewise, what is it to be 
an effective political agent? Throughout this chapter, I arrive at the conclusion that 
the commonalities between both views point towards a conception of efficacy based 
on process that is non-deterministic, and this conception offers fertile ground for 
further development in comparative thinking. Afterwards, I will consider some 
potential shortcomings and problems that this comparative ontology faces, by 
examining some of the ways in which either philosophy fails to deal with socio-
political problems effectively even on a processual basis. Having established the 
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aims and content of the chapter, it will now be necessary to set the ground for these 
practical case studies by giving a general account of efficacy within both Chinese 
cultural thought, more specifically within Daoism and Nietzsche‘s philosophy. 
 
5.1 Socio-Political Praxis in Comparative Process Ontology - East/West 
Models of Efficacy 
 
François Jullien has discussed the notion of efficacy at length within Chinese 
philosophy. As such, some key points of his comparative discussion of East-West 
ideas on this topic will be extensively drawn on. As Jullien points out, efficacy in the 
western philosophical tradition has throughout history been guided by the substance 
paradigm. Coupled with underlying influences from Platonic philosophy, efficacy is 
often treated as the conforming of an imperfect practical phenomenon to an ideal 
model. This is particularly evident, for example, in the strategic theorising of Carl 
Von Clausewitz, as Jullien describes. Clausewitz notes that previous strategists 
attributed deficiencies in strategic theory in two ways: firstly, warfare was 
considered to be reducible in purely material terms (that warfare was a matter of 
appreciating mathematical or geometrical laws), or secondly, warfare was 
understood through the idea that military genius was an indispensable yet 
unexplainable element of theory. Neither were sufficient for Clausewitz. Jullien 
points out that for Clausewitz the fundamental element aspect of strategic theorising 
was its ‗inevitable distance that separates the reality of it from its model‘ (Jullien 
2004, p. 11). To properly theorise was to account for how the empirical reality of 
fighting in any battle fails to correspond in practice to the idealised model of 
symmetrical warfare in theory. What this demonstrates, Jullien thinks, is an 
important example of a gap between theory and practice in western philosophical 
thinking that has remained unbridgeable and rendered the ‗practice‘ always 
necessarily deficient by comparison with the theory. In this sense, Clausewitz‘s 
theorising is reflective of a general characteristic that Jullien identifies in western 
thinking, that of model-making: ‗a revolutionary designs the model of the city that 
must be built; a soldier sets out the plan of war to be followed; an economist decides 
on the growth curve to target; and, all of them, whatever their respective roles, 
operate in a similar way. Each projects upon the world an ideal plan that will then 
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have to be incorporated into factual reality‘ (ibid. 3). Science has traditionally been 
the most wide-ranging project that exemplifies this characteristic, and while it has 
been profoundly successful in transforming the environment for human ends 
(through the imposition of models), it raises the question, as Jullien points out (ibid. 
4) of whether the technical application of models works as well within the social 
sphere, regarding how to manage social and political situations. As we have seen 
with the initial example of Clausewitz, model-making appears to produce an 
explanatory gap in the socio-political environment of warfare. We can more 
specifically talk about this gap in terms of determination; with Clausewitz‘s model 
of warfare, the concrete reality and practice of battles produces an indeterminacy that 
cannot be fully explained by the model. More generally, ‗although science may 
impose its rigor on things by understanding their necessary aspects and thereby· 
achieving technical efficacy, the situations in which our actions are performed are, 
for their part, indeterminate. But actions cannot eliminate their contingency, and 
their particularities cannot be covered by any general law‘ (ibid. 4).  
Another example of this kind of ‗practical lacuna‘ can be interpreted in 
Machiavelli‘s discussion of fortuna. The notion of fortune in political affairs is 
drawn on by Machiavelli primarily in the sense that it plays the role of an 
unaccounted-for evil in one‘s plannings: ‗[luck] shows her power in places where no 
virtu has been marshalled to resist her; she directs her onslaught to those places 
where embankments and dams have not been constructed to restrain her‘ 
(Machiavelli 2008, p. 363). We can only resist fortuna, then, by deliberate prior 
planning and preparation for her always unexpected arrival, usually in the form of 
wisdom and experience. Because fortuna is positioned as an unaccountable, extreme 
force, Machiavelli posits that it must be dealt with in a similarly extreme manner: ‗I 
am absolutely convinced that it is better to be impetuous than circumspect, because 
Fortune is a woman and you must, if you want to subjugate her, beat and strike her. 
It is obvious that she is more willing to be subjugated that way than by men with 
cold tactics‘ (369). Again, because efficacy is conceived along the lines of a 
determination of plan to ideal model, the failure of the concrete plan to conform to 
abstract model must be accounted for as something itself non-determinate and un-
accountable. Thus, an indeterminate problem of planning requires a response that 
itself is indeterminate: the political actor must be brash, ‗impetuous‘ in acting, and 
this establishes an unaccountable element in theorising applied to practice. 
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By contrast, in early Chinese thought, the effective means of action, is 
exemplified in shi – disposition or potential – as a multifarious concept that captures 
how efficacy proceeds in a number of ways in Chinese life. Rather than adhering to a 
means-end logic of action, various interpretations of shi or efficacy in Chinese 
thought consist in being in an appropriate position from which to allow a course of 
events (a process) to unfold in its suchness, without presuming a fixed end, or 
imposing one's directed actions or characteristics. Some of the earliest uses of the 
term come from the context of warfare, with the famous Chinese military text Sunzi 
or ‗The Art of War‘. There the notion of shi (or as Roger Ames translates it in this 
sense, ―circumstances‖) quite often simply refers to advantageous positioning: 
having the ‗high ground‘ for example. These concrete strategic references are also 
occasionally complemented with uses that are more general in focus, which are 
translated by Ames in terms of ‗disposition‘ or ‗configuration‘95. Shi in this latter, 
general sense reflects a correlative insight characteristic of process thinking in 
Chinese military thought: in one example, the general is encouraged to make the 
disposition of his troops like that of pent-up waters flowing through a gorge, or an 
avalanche of boulders tumbling down a slope: ‗That the velocity of cascading water 
can send boulders bobbing about is due to its strategic advantage. That a bird of prey 
when it strikes can smash its victim to pieces is due to its timing. So it is with the 
expert at battle that his strategic advantage is channelled and his timing is precise. 
His strategic advantage is like a drawn crossbow and his timing is like releasing the 
trigger. Even amidst the tumult and the clamour of battle, in all its confusion, he 
cannot be confused‘ (Ames 1993, p. 87). Ames properly highlights this correlative 
aspect when he points out that ‗[j]ust as the flow of water is determined by the 
contour of the terrain, so the physical disposition of [shi] is determined by changing 
circumstances‘ (Ames 1994, p. 67). The other significant area where the notion of 
shi is highly influential in the Chinese tradition is with the Legalist theorists, where 
the notion is applied more specifically in a socio-political context. Rather than fitting 
the underlying process (understood here in terms of qi - force or energy) to a strict 
model and then attempting to contain that process within it or account for the 
                                                          
95
 Hence, as the author of the Sunzi describes, ‗Having heard what can be gained from my 
assessments, shape a strategic advantage from them to strengthen our position. By "strategic 
advantage" I mean making the most of favorable conditions and tilting the scales in our favor‘ (Ames 
1993, p. 74) 
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unpredictability that emerges from such an operation, Chinese thought advocates 
adapting oneself to the process 'upstream' (as François Jullien terms it). In doing so, 
the early adaptation will engender the circumstances that are later favorable to the 
efficacious party. The most immediate grasp of shi is available in Jullien's 
description of it in the realm of Chinese warfare:  
'a disposition is effective by virtue of its renewability; it is a tool. [...] What is 
involved is the deeper intuition that a particular disposition loses its potentiality 
when it becomes inflexible (or static). For is it not precisely the fundamental 
objective of all tactics to ensure that dynamism continues to operate to one's 
advantage (meanwhile draining the opponent of initiative and reducing him to 
paralysis)? And how better to reactivate the dynamism inherent in any disposition 
than to open it up to alternation and reversibility?' (Jullien 1999, p. 34) 
It is this ‗deeper intuition‘ of potentiality against inflexibility that characterises 
Chinese philosophy as offering a process-based account of socio-political efficacy. 
This notion of dispositional power is developed in different strands throughout 
ancient Chinese philosophy, most notably through both the Daoist and Legalist 
thinkers. The Daodejing in particular has been read as an extended treatise on Daoist 
political rulership. Rather than focusing on direct manipulation of laws or imposition 
of one‘s will on the populace, the Daodejing advocates that the ruler withdraw from 
active ruling in favour of allowing the state to manage itself with minimal 
interference. The framework for enacting such a significant political regime is 
achieved in the Daodejing by inculcating a situational disposition within the ruler 
whereby he can appreciate the underlying totality of process (Dao). This is reflected 
in a number of strategies proliferated throughout the text, such as advising the ruler 
to adopt situational dispositions contrary to popular tradition: taking the ‗low‘ or 
feminine position instead of the typically dominant ‗high‘ or masculine position (and 
ultimately attaining a situational state prior to either), learning to attune one‘s palette 
to ‗bland‘ dishes in order to better appreciate subtlety, and so on.  
From a comparative perspective, the notion of shi as described offers rich 
resources for conceiving efficacy within process philosophy. As I described initially, 
the general conception of efficacy in the west as argued by theorists like Jullien 
proceeds according to a framework of determination, underlined by a relation of 
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concrete planning contrasted to abstract models or ideals. As such theorists argue, 
this framework leads to an explanatory gap in practice: the indeterminacy of the 
concrete practice fails to align with the abstract model. This failure is explained by 
writers like Machiavelli as a matter of fortuna, indeterminate luck, and as a matter of 
practice he advocates the equally indeterminate solution of audacious action.  This 
gap can be seen to carry over into theory more generally to the point where there are 
roughly two significant poles of determinacy on one end and indeterminacy on the 
other. Neither pole provides a truly satisfying basis for the discussion of efficacy as 
on the one hand determinacy has always been undermined by indeterminacy. On the 
other hand, the pole of indeterminacy is not satisfying due firstly, to the determinist 
claim that it is only due to ‗hidden variables‘ that indeterminacy stands as a problem, 
but secondly (and more importantly) indeterminacy elevates the explanatory gap as a 
solution (an indeterminate requires an indeterminate response). 
I now wish to propose that a comparative account of process ontology 
provides the resources with which to address this explanatory gap in a novel way. 
The core issue is the manner in which this explanatory gap must be dealt with: a 
response based on determinacy or indeterminacy may inevitably suffer the problems 
posed above. If this is so, we require an alternative framework to that of determinacy 
in order to solve the gap, and I believe this alternative framework may be glimpsed 
at in both Nietzsche‘s and Chinese philosophical accounts of efficacy and fatalism. 
 
5.2 Socio-Political Praxis in Comparative Process Ontology – Legalism: A 
Subversion of Chinese Efficacy? 
We have so far been examining the notion of efficacy from a beneficial 
standpoint, but it is also necessary to highlight some potential problems that may 
emerge from a process-based conception of efficacy. The efficacy I have described 
can be compared with a similar efficacy in Legalist philosophy that exemplifies a 
totalitarian danger, even if it is never truly actualised. With the Legalists an 
understanding of shi emerges that is complicit in the functioning of a specifically 
totalitarian or authoritarian state. It is an 'extreme depersonalization of the sovereign 
[...] which reduces him to nothing but his position' (Jullien 1999, p. 54). In contrast 
to a Confucian politics that is paternalistic in its political expression and self-
 190 
 
cultivation, the legalists advance a politics of sovereign and state that marginalizes 
the input (both in terms of action and traits) of the ruler, and instils a sense of 
political efficacy that appears to turn in on itself. Rather than the ruler maintaining 
cohesion and harmony in the state through an extension of his own efficacy, the 
Legalists advocate an efficacy of the state, in which the state apparatus maintains its 
own cohesion through automated mechanisms of surveillance, rewards (shang) and 
punishments
96
 (xing), a system that functions in a manner structurally similar to 
Jullien's comparison with the Panopticon as described by Foucault (ibid. 55).   
What is most significant is, firstly, its apparent compatibility with preceding 
methods in the philosophical tradition and secondly, the degree of automation that 
the system of control acquires once it is set in motion by the ruler. As Jullien writes, 
such a system 'is artificial and yet operates at the same time naturally; and its 
usefulness rests on the combination of those two aspects' (ibid.). The methodology of 
this system proceeds according to the same conception of efficacy we have already 
discussed: the ruler refrains from exerting an ego-based influence on the process of 
governing, he simply establishes himself within the proper context and allows events 
in the process to unfold of their own accord, similar to the Daoists. However, unlike 
such a process envisioned in Daoism, where the ruler refrains from coercive action 
such that things emergently order themselves, the despot of legalism abstains from 
imposition in order to allow the instrumental, political machine to order itself
97
. This 
is achieved in part through the imposition of stern discipline and rules that are geared 
towards the populace policing themselves: laws were advocated by the Legalists, 
most notably, that allowed for the punishment for entire families for the crime of a 
single member. The most critical aspect of this struggle for power is that regardless 
of whether the despot maintains power, once the system of rulership is established in 
its utmost form it is capable of proceeding uninterrupted, like any dynamic process: 
'the setup functions regardless of the personal moral qualities of whoever controls it, 
for that reason passing just as easily into other hands' (ibid.). In a seeming 
incoherence, then, a system is established and enacted on a basis of struggle and 
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 Cf. Jullien (1999 pp. 47-57) 
97
 'In Han Feizi, non-action is devoid of the cosmological magic it radiates in Laozi, where it 
originates inside one person and is then projected outside. In the ―Way of the Ruler‖ it is merely a 
question of the clever manipulation of labor' (Denecke 2010, p. 287) 
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conflict on a contrived level
98
 (which is at odds with the ideal of non-imposition in 
efficacy) but the functioning of the system itself comes to operate and sustain itself 
ostensibly like any analogous natural process. There is thus an efficacy of which its 
character is artificial, but its form is natural. Jullien claims that, under the Legalists, 
the concept of shi 'represents an impoverishment in relation to the intuition of 
efficacy commonly expressed through the term shi, for while the Legalists certainly 
focused on the dimension of objective conditioning peculiar to shi and likewise on 
its automatic nature, they would end up stripping their representation of shi of its 
essential variability. By immobilizing it in this way, they rendered it sterile' (Jullien 
1999, p. 273). This ‗essential variability‘ is precisely so essential because it is what 
makes efficacy adaptive and responsive to changing circumstances.  
The Legalist system of state governance, through the manner in which it 
substitutes an artificial state-mechanistic efficacy for both Confucian personal-
ethical efficacy and Daoist naturalistic efficacy, makes socio-political efficacy a 
closed system that may regulate itself in the immediate term but not be sustainable or 
adaptive in the long-term. What is more threatening about this state of affairs is that 
Legalist efficacy clearly mimics prior forms of efficacy in terms of methodology: the 
Legalist ruler exercises restraint and composure just as the Daoist ruler might, and 
yet the difference between Legalist and Daoist ideals of socio-political efficacy is 
that the Legalist conception may lead to a strongly authoritarian state, while the 
Daoist state cautions against authoritarianism. Concerningly, however, the Legalist 
ruler‘s methods of efficacy are consistent with a Daoist framework. This, then, 
signals a clear problem for conceiving socio-political efficacy (at least on this side of 
the comparison), as an adaptive, reflexive notion of efficacy should not lead to the 
sort of static authoritarianism latent in the Legalist state. 
There is a case to be made further that this may also be a problem when we 
consider the advocacy of privatized institutions as more dynamic means towards 
socio-political efficacy. In this respect, for example, the capacity for what appears to 
be an open-ended and adaptive efficacy can be effectively manipulated and reversed 
into practices and dispositions that are negative and harmful for individuals, as 
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 The ruler, and effectively the system, 'forces solidarity on people, [and] gets them to betray 
individual characteristics that distinguish them, a quality that encourages denunciations' (Jullien 2004, 
p. 48) 
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Vandenberghe discusses: 'Insecurity and vulnerability are no longer seen as a 
perverse effect of the dismantling of rigidities, but welcomed, valued and used to 
increase competition among the workers (Vandenberghe 2008, p. 880). Similarly, 
Jullien writes that in Legalism 'opposition carried to extremes will no longer be seen 
as oppression but as its opposite, [...] This is the case partly because such pressure 
creates a long-term habitus that becomes second nature to the individuals subjected 
to it' (Jullien 1999, p. 51). Because efficacy is conceived as a fluid process with 
gradations, the capacity for that process to become maladaptive in any particular 
situation (but most importantly in the social and political environments discussed) 
may be harder to track. If this is the case, then it may be conceiving efficacy in 
processual terms leads to enforced, habitual processes of subjugation (such as those 
in Legalism), which may appear autonomous and self-sustaining but ultimately lead 
to stasis if not monitored. Again, the progression from benevolent practices in 
contemporary workplaces may be difficult to track according to a processual account 
of efficacy. The contemporary form of capitalism operates 'like complex biological 
systems that successfully survive in nature' (Vandenberghe 2008, p. 881): it is fluid 
and transformative, autonomously regulated in a manner that reflects efficacy in its 
ontological, processual effect. An extension of this principle is seen in how the 
individual aspects themselves operate in a manner that approaches efficacy: 'The 
good networker who treats his or her person as a marketable asset is a master in self-
presentation and decorum. Promising to give himself entirely in any project, he 
remains in fact unattached to the job and to his self in order to remain at the 
disposition of any other project that might come up' (ibid.). In legalism, '[f]or the 
self-regulating system to work, the ruler needed to be clever rather than wise; he had 
to be good at striking poses of pretence rather than at radiating charisma' (Wiebke 
2010, p. 300). Unlike Daoism or Confucianism, in Legalism there is no necessity for 
self-cultivation in the manner that both prior schools claim is vital for effective 
rulership. At best, the Legalist ruler must simply simulate those aspects, and this is 
reminiscent of the problem raised for process ontology with regard to appearance 
and reality. That is to say, there are no grounds for a hard distinction in determining 
truly efficacious practices versus those that are simulated, just as there are no hard 
ontological grounds for distinguishing between appearance and reality. Thus, to 
summarize, Legalism as a processual system raises a significant question for 
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efficacy, particularly with regard to the framework of how to monitor socio-political 
efficacy as it develops. 
In spite of apparent issues with Legalism and the manner in which it 
problematically appropriates the traditional conception of efficacy, there have also 
been defences of the system. Li Ma‘s analysis of power legitimacy in Legalism, 
compared with the dominant Chinese political system of Confucianism, asserts that 
Confucianism may constrain individuals in a more fundamental sense than the 
authoritarian demands of Legalism. We have already described how Confucianism 
models socio-political efficacy on the self-cultivation of the ruler: the ruler, as head 
of state, becomes the exemplary figure through appropriate ritual behaviour and 
capacity to match effective behaviours to appropriate roles. There will be harmony in 
the Confucian state if the rest of the ruler‘s subjects follow the same pattern of self-
cultivation. In contrast, the Legalist ruler has no such requirement: he can have an 
absolute lack of these qualities insofar as it is the state mechanisms that produce 
socio-political efficacy rather than the ruler‘s character. We have thus far looked 
upon this state of affairs as negative because it appears to undermine the traditional 
conception of efficacy. The Legalist conception of efficacy shares great similarities 
with Daoist efficacy in terms of the privileging of non-action, yet the character of 
both regimes are startlingly different: Legalism appears authoritarian, while Daoism 
appears primitivist. The key point that Li Ma highlights, one which many detractors 
of Legalism fail to recognize, is that on an individual level Legalism advances an 
element of ideological freedom that is not present in Confucianism, for example: 
‗Confucianist power is very stable, thanks to its legitimacy of morality for the 
obtaining of obedience. On the other hand, by imposing what they must think on 
each subject, by means of a conditioning that begins right from childhood, the 
Confucianist power maintains society in a state of immobility. In spite of its 
legitimacy by means of virtue, this system is suffocating, leaving very little room 
for individual liberty. […] The Legalist system seems more severe, because it is 
more based upon force for the obtaining of obedience. In spite of this, one could 
say that it is less coercive, even more free, in particular as concerns the private 
life of an individual, because it draws up the list of forbidden behaviours rather 
than imposing in advance a list of ritual behaviours. The Legalist power is less 
stable as a result of its too frequent use of force, because it is based upon a way of 
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functioning rather than a morality. Its legitimacy of performance and efficiency, 
based upon the efficiency of the institutionalised State, is nevertheless quite 
progressive.‘ (Ma, 2000, p. 57-58) 
 
There are some extant concerns with the account given. It is questionable to 
what extent we can properly talk about the ‗private life of an individual‘ given the 
context of Chinese cultural thought of the Warring States period. Likewise, it is also 
questionable how much individual liberty is truly possible within the confines of the 
draconian laws of the Legalist state. Removed from the concrete context and 
considered generally, however, I think this raises a key point about Legalism. It is a 
less stable state, not because of its ‗too frequent use of force‘ (ibid.) but because its 
structure itself is dynamic. Rather, its too-frequent use of force can be seen to reflect 
the concrete incapacity of the administration of the period to adapt the laws of 
Legalism to a more settled political atmosphere. As we have seen in Yuri Pine‘s 
analysis of the Legalist narrative of state formation, this is not something that is 
necessarily a fixed element of Legalism itself. Legalism is dynamic because, while it 
sets out laws it does not inculcate an ideology or morality in the manner in which 
Confucianism does, in which subjects must emulate the character of the efficacious 
ruler. Instead, both subjects and ruler, at least in theory, should retain a capacity for 
individual liberty that can be construed as ‗progressive‘ in the sense that it preserves 
a variance of private perspectives within society. 
 
5.3 Socio-Political Praxis in Comparative Process Ontology – Nietzsche 
and Efficacy: Fate, Fatalism and Comparison 
 
What, on the Western side of comparison, does Nietzsche‘s philosophy offer 
for socio-political efficacy in terms of process ontology? In order to address this, we 
must consider those who Nietzsche considers to be exemplary socio-political agents. 
Perhaps foremost among these are Napoleon Bonaparte and Cesare Borgia. For 
Nietzsche what basically makes these so-called higher men exemplary figures is the 
extremely cohesive way in which they developed themselves as humans and the 
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immoral way in which they pursued power
99
. As has been widely discussed, 
Nietzsche‘s understanding of the human is as an aggregate of competing drives, the 
strength of one‘s self being dependent on how well those drives are marshalled into 
one purpose and intensity. On this basis Napoleon is lauded by Nietzsche as a 
powerful and creative political actor on the one hand and also as a great immoralist 
on the other hand. Both of these features of self-cultivation and immoralism will 
serve to show how process thought relates to socio-political efficacy in Nietzsche‘s 
work, and how they compare with those of ancient Chinese philosophy. Self-
cultivation plays a major part in determining effective political action, the severity 
and discipline that is involved in cohering one‘s drives (as Napoleon did) is 
described by Paul Glenn in processual terms:  
‗Napoleon and Goethe also embodied Nietzsche's conception of freedom. 
Nietzsche does not view freedom as traditional liberals do, as freedom from 
restraint and limitation, but instead sees it as the outcome of internal struggle. The 
warring affects threaten to destroy the coherent whole the higher person has 
fashioned of himself. The successful struggle to resist this entropic tendency 
marks freedom as an agonistic determination, and display of strength‘ Glenn 
2001, p. 137). 
This ‗entropic tendency‘ of affects to diminish cohesiveness of the self is crucial to 
understanding any process-philosophical basis, and its resistance can be understood 
in terms of constant change and progression aimed at acquiring power: namely the 
continual development of the will to power in humans. Just as important, it becomes 
clear that this mechanism is the microcosmic, individual-scale equivalent of the 
mechanisms of that Nietzsche envisions as a requirement for progression towards his 
envisioned political and cultural society: resistance of entropy (in the form of 
equalizing social institutions) through engagement of practices and dispositions that 
promote dynamism (by diminishing the role of the state and facilitating privatized 
institutions). This is a commonality that we will also consider and develop further in 
early Chinese philosophical thinking. 
                                                          
99
 ‗Compared to us, a Cesare Borgia would never be positioned as a 'higher man', as a type of 
overman (which is what I do)‘ (AC 37).  ‗Goethe was a convinced realist […] his greatest experience 
was of that ens realissimum that went by the name of Napoleon. Goethe conceived of a strong, highly 
educated, self-respecting human being, skilled in all things physical and able to keep himself in check, 
who could dare to allow himself the entire expanse and wealth of naturalness, who is strong enough 
for this freedom; a person who is tolerant out of strength and not weakness because he knows how to 
take advantage of things that would destroy an average nature‘ (AC 49) 
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We have thus seen that socio-political efficacy begins in the individual 
through a combination of self-cultivation (cohesiveness of the drives that constitute 
the self) and a certain immoralism. However, taking Nietzsche‘s general 
considerations on political efficacy above and beyond the individual exemplar 
seriously, in tandem with his diagnosis of the sickness of contemporary society, 
produces a definite problem: how can contemporary society and culture be 
revitalized in a manner that leads to the future political environment that Nietzsche 
envisions as conducive to the flourishing of the overhuman and higher types? Given 
that he diagnoses the cultural and spiritual state of contemporary society as 
overwhelmingly sick, such a project almost seems to demand that this society pull 
itself out such a sickness by its bootstraps. Democratic, progressively egalitarian 
states appear to have become a general ideal for westernized societies, and it is in the 
character of a democratic majority (a majority that is inescapably sick) through 
which such states are developing. Such states are not then, in principle, compatible 
with Nietzsche‘s vision of a future society. Likewise, Nietzsche could be said to 
abhor on the other hand the various reactionary nationalisms that have arisen as a 
response to this progressive movement. How, then, can Nietzsche‘s philosophy 
navigate the practical issues of contemporary society in such a way as to aim at the 
cultural aristocratic state that Nietzsche envisions – what sort of individual will be an 
efficacious socio-political actor in this context? 
 Don Dombowsky has highlighted the affinities of Nietzsche‘s political 
thinking with Machiavelli‘s writing. In highlighting that for Nietzsche (as for 
Machiavelli) the political form of the state is secondary to the basic function of the 
state as an enduring presence, Dombowski writes that such a view ‗introduces an 
esoteric, eclectic or spectral-syncretic element into Nietzsche‘s political philosophy, 
a willingness to use whatever ideologies are at hand in the interests of deeper and 
more distant goals‘ (Dombowsky 2004, p. 136), even political perspectives or 
ideologies that are antithetical to Nietzsche‘s philosophy. On this point we have 
already seen a similar feature in Chinese Legalism, which itself is syncretic, but as a 
structure does not lend itself to any particular ideology. What differs with the 
Nietzschean political regime will be that efficacy will not be an overt influence over 
subjects. In claiming that such a view has an ‗esoteric, eclectic or spectral-syncretic‘ 
element, what is it in Nietzsche‘s philosophy that permits the sort of spectral-
syncretism and adaptability in socio-political actors? This would seem to point 
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towards an unexplored facet of Nietzsche‘s political view. Dombowski attempts to 
address such a lacuna by parsing the esoteric or syncretic aspects through 
Nietzsche‘s perspectivism, intertwined with will to power. As Dombowski writes, 
each perspective expresses a will to power (83), ultimately a will to domination. 
Taken as such, the esoteric element is addressed in part by appealing to 
perspectivism‘s rejection of any absolute perspective, any absolute standard, and also 
in part by the inherent power-pragmatism of each perspective as a will to dominate. 
The esoteric or syncretic aspects thus emerge in how we understand ideological 
perspectives. Nietzsche ultimately foregrounds the perspectival wills to power that 
lurk behind ideologies (this constituting the esoteric aspect) while appreciating that 
any particular ideology or power-play is derived from the drives of power: power 
plays are not explained by reference to the content of ideologies but by the interplay 
of wills to power (this being the syncretic aspect). We can thus imagine that the 
consummate political actor of Nietzsche‘s future philosophy appreciates all political 
ideologies in such a manner, fundamentally as wills to power, and is thus able to 
manipulate them and appropriate them from the vantage point of his own holistic 
perspective of the doctrine of will to power.  
We can further understand socio-political efficacy for Nietzsche through 
likening it to Machiavelli‘s notion of virtu, which Dombowski has argued for 
previously (Dombowski, 2004: 139). All of the characteristic qualities of 
Nietzschean virtu are present: amorality in effective action, creative capacity, 
perpetual agonistic striving towards an increase in the will to power (Dombowski, 
ibid.). As François Jullien points out, Machiavellian virtu is a form of efficacy that is 
ascribed to political action. Socio-political actors with virtu act opportunely on a 
situation, and through their qualities impose their will on that situation in acting: 
‗[t]he Prince sings the praises of an ability to take action. The matter of politics, 
being contingent, is-by the same token-malleable and, in consequence, also 
technically transformable. A man can gain a hold on it and, despite the dangers 
involved, can hope to give it form by imposing his own designs upon it‘ (Jullien 
2004, p. 54). As Jullien shows, virtu as described portrays efficacy as a matter of 
individual intervention and mastery. We can now attempt to piece together both 
aspects of efficacy as discussed in order to form a potential picture of what the 
efficacious socio-political actor in Nietzsche‘s future philosophy might resemble. 
Such a socio-political actor may be a ‗higher man‘, a type of person that has 
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consolidated and developed its self in a cohesive manner. Likewise, such an actor is 
amoral in effective action and a significant reason for this is such an actor‘s 
understanding of the world as will to power. The efficacious political actor 
recognises political ideologies and movements ultimately in terms of wills to power, 
as patterned features of a process of power acquisition and expansion. The political 
actor is thus capable of appropriating those ideologies without hypocrisy (what I 
suggest is the spectral-syncretic and esoteric element) and is able to manipulate more 
effectively those individual features of will to power that influence the political 
sphere, those such as ressentiment.  
We have already explored how the Machiavellian conception of virtu 
perpetuates the model-ideal distinction in efficacy that Jullien describes in 
Clausewitz: ‗[f]or the very reason that action intervenes in the course of things, it is 
always external to it and constitutes an initiative that is intrusive. Because it 
impinges from outside, introducing a plan/project (ideal), it is always to some degree 
external to the world and is therefore relatively incompatible and arbitrary‘ (ibid. 
54). By understanding the socio-political actor as external or apart from the situation 
being imposed from without, such a conception presents two problematic points: 1) 
it positions the socio-political actor as something that is not itself part of the 
unfolding situation, which may limit the capacity for effective response (as for 
example, Clausewitz held that the limitation of theorising war was the 
unpredictability of the actual battles), and 2) it draws theory towards a deterministic-
indeterministic framework of thought that may similarly limit the capacities for 
effective socio-political theorising and action. 
 
We can now ask whether the same criticisms may be made of a potential 
conception of the efficacious socio-political actor in Nietzsche‘s philosophy. 
Nietzsche is interesting with regard to the second point above because he is a 
philosopher sceptical of mechanistic determinism, one half of the above distinction. 
In a note entitled ‗Against Determinism and Teleology‘ Nietzsche criticizes the 
mechanistic conception of determinism, which relies on the external distinctions of 
subject and object in order to posit the equally external concepts of cause and effect 
of them. Nietzsche claims that ‗[o]nly because we have introduced subjects, "doers," 
into things does it appear that all events are the consequences of compulsion exerted 
upon subjects—exerted by whom? again by a "doer." Cause and effect-a dangerous 
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concept so long as one thinks of something that causes and something upon which an 
effect is produced‘ (WTP 552). Likewise, in the course of his criticisms on this point, 
Nietzsche also claims that once we give up as metaphysically necessary the concepts 
of subject and object we can also give up as metaphysically necessary the concept of 
substance. On the one hand, this reinforces the idea, along with other textual 
references, that Nietzsche‘s thought could be more-so aligned along the tradition of 
process thinking, but it also presents a well-recognised issue in critical commentary: 
Nietzsche certainly considers that humans and things generally in the world become 
made what they are, and do what they do, in virtue of the drives of will to power that 
compose them. What is difficult to determine, then, is in what way Nietzsche retains 
this quasi-deterministic view without actually being a determinist of the sort he 
criticizes.  
Attempting to answer this, Brian Leiter provides a succinct summary of 
Nietzsche‘s account of individuals and their capacities in terms of the notion of type-
facts. Type facts are biological, physical or psychological facts about a person: hair 
color, for example, or body size. The sort of type-facts a particular organism has 
will, to a large extent, determine its bodily and psychological capacities. Thus, 
someone may have the requisite physical type-facts necessary to be a professional 
basketball player, but may not fulfil that potential if they do not have the proper 
environment in which to fully develop those type-facts (through coaching, for 
example). Thus, we are significantly determined by our type-facts, but not wholly. 
This again raises the question of exactly how we are determined. Leiter sketches out 
three positions in terms of this issue: classical Determinism, Classical Fatalism, and 
Causal Essentialism. Classical determinism is the mechanistic conception of causal 
determinism that Nietzsche critiques, while Classical Fatalism holds that everything 
is fated to happen, but not in the directly causal manner of determinism. Of this latter 
position Leiter points out that ‗Classical Fatalism involves the notion of some sort of 
non-deterministic, perhaps even noncausal necessity, and in that sense is a rather 
cryptic view‘ (Leiter 2014, p. 66). Lastly, there is Leiter‘s own interpretation that 
attempts to address this problem, Causal Essentialism. Causal Essentialism is ‗the 
doctrine that for any individual substance (e.g., a person or some other living 
organism) that substance has ―essential‖ properties that are causally primary with 
respect to the future history of that substance, i.e., they non-trivially determine the 
space of possible trajectories for that substance‘ (ibid.).  
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I now wish to more generally discuss causal essentialism, which draws on 
type-facts to causally explain how Nietzsche thinks humans are led to have certain 
characteristics or achieve certain acts. Firstly, it is clear that Nietzsche is often 
critical of the notion of ‗substance‘, at least as a metaphysically necessary concept. It 
may be the case that Nietzsche thinks it is necessary that we describe humans in 
terms of such language as a fiction required for productive life. In such a case Leiter 
might be said to give us a workable terminology for doing so and capturing the sense 
in which Nietzsche wants to describe fatalism. There are other problems that might 
make us hesitant to describe Nietzsche‘s fatalism in terms of causal essentialism, 
however. Leiter wishes to say that Nietzsche is not a classical determinist because, 
pace determinism, he thinks that not everything about an individual‘s life is 
mechanistically determined. In order to do so, he argues that for Nietzsche type-facts 
are causally primary, which is to say that those facts play the most important part in 
determining the space of potential for a person, in conjunction with environmental 
and circumstantial factors. Firstly however, if type-facts are causally primary and 
determining, then are they not so in the classical determinist sense? Leiter claims 
not, because for Leiter classical determinism must hold across the board: everything 
must be classically determinist. By themselves neither type-facts nor environment 
are wholly determining. If correct, Leiter‘s description of type-facts as causally 
primary would conveniently resolve the tension between determinism and fatalism 
within Nietzsche‘s writing. However, Nietzsche is critical of classical determinism 
not only in its ―across the board‖ form, but also of its methodology and the 
metaphysical assumptions it involves. Determinism involves the use of concepts like 
substance, object and subject, which Nietzsche thinks are not metaphysically 
necessary and therefore not truly descriptive of the way things actually are. Even so, 
if we assume, as before, that Nietzsche thinks these concepts, while not reflective of 
the real world, may be necessary human illusions that serve a pragmatic purpose, and 
that type-facts are causally primary but not wholly classically determined, this raises 
a slew of questions about the causal distinction between type-facts, environment and 
circumstance.  
This is a particularly difficult question because Nietzsche himself offers 
conflicting views about how much environment and circumstance are determinative 
for the individual. On the one hand, he critiques the milieu theory, which held that 
environment determined the individual, against this he claims that ‗the force within 
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is infinitely superior; much that looks like external influence is merely its adaptation 
from within. The very same milieus can be interpreted and exploited in opposite 
ways‘ (WTP 70). Hence there is the sense that for Nietzsche individuals can 
overcome their environmental conditioning, and that exemplars in fact influence 
their environment more than it does them. At the same time, however, it is clear that 
for Nietzsche we are made what we are by the animal and vegetal drives that have 
preceded us and that we have incorporated, and that even aspects of our lives such as 
our diet have a profound influence on our potential. In this sense, Nietzsche seems to 
think that type-facts themselves are determined by circumstances or environment. 
The constitutive facts of a tomato plant are determined by the preceding environment 
out of which it genealogically developed. Likewise, humans trace their evolution 
back to the environment and external factors in which they developed. To highlight 
that our type-facts are causally primary, then, risks triviality when we recognise that 
those type-facts obtain and operate the way they do directly because of environment 
and circumstances. In fact, if we are committed to methodological naturalism in the 
way Leiter suggests Nietzsche is, we may find that as our ability to scientifically 
understand type-facts becomes increasingly fine-grained and accurate, what appears 
causally primarily in them may be seen to be reducible to the causes of environment 
and circumstances. Given such an understanding,  it appears that when we claim that 
any particular set of type-facts are causally primary in a person‘s beliefs or actions 
we are doing nothing more than arbitrarily selecting such characteristics and 
assigning them causal primacy for pragmatic, practical purposes, not because they 
actually are. According to such a view, then, to say that a person fulfils his or her 
potential in the ―right way‖100 (which according to Leiter‘s view, is when the type-
facts are causally primary along with other natural facts) is at risk saying nothing 
more than that the extension of certain natural facts of environment and 
circumstances prevailed over others. Again, however, Nietzsche appears to want to 
resist claiming this. As such, causal essentialism as a basis on which to understand 
how individuals have efficacy in a non-deterministic manner simply seems too 
deterministic to be viable, even as a revisionary conception. 
 
                                                          
100
 Leiter‘s discussion of type–facts greatly figures in the context of how autonomy is possible within 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy. 
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If Causal Essentialism appears to provide an inadequate explanation of 
Nietzsche‘s quasi-deterministic position, it may be helpful to re-examine his 
fatalism. Leiter is correct in pointing out that fatalism as far as we read it in 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy appears mysterious: it ostensibly suggests a non-causal 
feature that makes events necessarily happen, and evidently it is not an omnipotent 
being like God. Likewise, the will to power doctrine appears too causally structured 
to serve as such a feature. However, I believe that some of the mystery behind such a 
position can be addressed by drawing on both process thought as a means of 
understanding fatalism in Nietzsche‘s philosophy101, and by comparing equivalent 
conceptions of fatalism in Chinese philosophy. Firstly, then, how will process 
philosophy help us understand how fatalism works in Nietzsche‘s philosophy? We 
have already seen, as Jullien points out, that the ideal/model theoretical distinction in 
Western thought is conducive to reinforcing the deterministic/indeterministic 
dichotomy: Clausewitz arrives at a point in theory in which the careful planning of 
the model is faced with the unaccountable vicissitudes of the actual battleground, 
which escapes all determination. Likewise, Machiavelli‘s effective socio-political 
actor must take his chances against fortuna. If Nietzsche rejects classical 
determinism as a true depiction of the world, this would seem to imply that non-
determinism is equally erroneous, as they are predicated on the same conceptual 
framework. Other key concepts may shed light on Nietzsche‘s position in this regard.  
Although, Nietzsche‘s exemplary political figures share the same agonistic 
tendencies toward imposition that Machiavelli describes in tackling fortuna, to 
discuss Nietzsche‘s conception of socio-political efficacy as virtu is by itself to miss 
something crucial that sets it apart from Machiavelli‘s conception. We will see that 
in Nietzsche‘s thought there is a necessitarian element involved in the socio-political 
efficacy of Nietzsche‘s future exemplars, the highest of which aim in the disposition 
of their characters at willing that their actions and the world could not be otherwise 
and to affirm all prior actions as necessary. Where Machiavelli‘s opportunistic socio-
political actor imposes on a situation and if aided with the ineradicable element of 
luck prevails, Nietzsche‘s socio-political actor wills their imposition as necessary. 
This necessitarian quality to socio-political efficacy distances Nietzsche‘s conception 
                                                          
101
 The most relevant passage is in EH, where Nietzsche  writes ―that one wants nothing to be 
different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary [ . . . ] 
but to love it‖(EH, ―Why I Am So Clever,‖ 10). This passage also elaborates Nietzsche‘s notion of 
amor fati, his ‗formula for greatness in a human being‘ (ibid.). 
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from that of Clausewitz‘s and Machiavelli‘s to a certain extent. This quality is what 
links socio-political efficacy directly into Nietzsche‘s ontological philosophy. 
Reconsidering the original issue of conforming to a model-ideal, Nietzsche‘s socio-
political thinking along these lines straddles a peculiar line: it does not fall squarely 
within the traditional of dualistic thinking like Machiavelli and Clausewitz, but 
proceeds within a causal framework not present in Chinese philosophy.  
 
How do we begin to understand the necessitarian and fatalistic elements of 
such a socio-political efficacy? As Robert C. Solomon has pointed out, Nietzsche‘s 
concept of amor fati does not seem to square particularly well with Leiter‘s causal 
essentialism: ‗It is to the ancients, and only rarely to contemporary (nineteenth 
century) science, that he appeals his fatalistic thesis, from his early Birth of Tragedy 
until his final Ecce Homo. "Amor fati" ("love of fate") hardly makes sense as a 
paean to causal essentialism‘ (Solomon 2002, p. 69). Solomon also makes an 
important point about fatalism as it is construed in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, that 
‗though fate is clearly presented as necessity, it is by no means clear that it involves 
anything like agency or any person's (or divinity's) purpose.‘ (ibid.). If the world is 
necessarily the way it is not because of some sort of agency, and not because of 
classical determinism, what makes it so in Nietzsche‘s philosophy? 
 At this point, we ought to examine on what this question itself is predicated 
upon. Such a question points to the capacity for human beings to consider 
possibilities, that things could have been otherwise. Nietzsche points out the crucial 
problem humans encounter with temporality and the past in their inability to ‗will 
backwards‘, to change what has happened in the past. This inability, coupled with 
the ability to consider things as otherwise, fosters a spirit of revenge: ‗this alone is 
revenge itself: the will‘s unwillingness toward time and time‘s ―it was.‖‘ (TSZ ‗On 
Redemption‘). Nietzsche attempts to overcome this spirit in TSZ by promoting a 
form of necessitarianism with the requirement of not only recognising that all things 
are necessarily so, but affirming and loving the fact that they could not be otherwise: 
‗[a]ll ‗it was‘ is a fragment, a riddle, a grisly accident – until the creating will says to 
it: ‗But I will it thus! I shall will it thus! […] That will which is the will to power 
must will something higher than any reconciliation‘ (ibid.). As such, the overhuman 
must love and affirm all things as they are, ultimately willing that they could not 
have been otherwise. This general outlook is indeed what partially characterises the 
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type of overhuman. There is both a form of necessitarianism and fatalism in 
Nietzsche‘s writings. The latter, fatalism, is developed through Nietzsche‘s writings 
on individual types. Amor fati in this sense, love of fate, represents the summation of 
the course of one‘s life as necessary to being who one is, and one‘s deliberate willing 
them to be so in the form of a coherent story of the self. Nietzsche emphasizes this 
story-based element in his later autobiography: ‗My formula for human greatness is 
amor fati: that you do not want anything to be different, not forwards, not 
backwards, not for all eternity. Not just to tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it—
all idealism is hypocrisy towards necessity—, but to love it‘ (EH ‗why I am so 
clever‘). It is the emphasis on ‗human greatness‘ that foregrounds a sense of story, as 
Nietzsche himself is recounting the story of how he came to be who he is. Robert 
Solomon‘s account of fatalism in Nietzsche argues for a similar conclusion through 
the idea that fate and fatalism is a narrative issue: ‗the notion of fate gains 
respectability in our modern world, not as the expression of any mysterious agents or 
as an inexplicable necessity but as the larger narrative in which we see our lives‘ 
(Solomon 2003, p. 191). Fate, so understood, is intimately linked to one‘s character. 
While it is compatible with determinism in the sense that we can understand one‘s 
character in terms of causality and type-facts, determinism is explanatorily 
insufficient for the notion of fate because it does not ‗provide a certain kind of 
narrative in which fatalism, in contrast to determinism, begins at the end, that is, the 
outcome, and considers the outcome as in some sense necessary, given the nature of 
the person‘s character‘ (179). 
Thus, Nietzsche‘s fatalism proper can be understood on the one hand to lie 
outside of the determinate/indeterminate dichotomy simply because fate is not 
explained solely by reference to determination: it requires a narrative to be properly 
explicated. I believe that this, however, is only one side of which Nietzsche‘s 
necessitarianism forms the other. What I mean by this is not simply that one‘s 
character forms part of a narrative that could be no other way, as in fatalism, but that 
ultimately Nietzsche‘s perspective of will to power encourages a view of the world 
in his future exemplars that is necessitarian: they will form their conception of their 
selves in terms of fatalism but also favour a metaphysical view of the world as 
necessitarian. To be fair, this account is speculative, and there is surprisingly few 
accounts made that engage with Nietzsche‘s philosophy as necessitarian. I will argue 
that we can extrapolate necessitarianism from the conception of will to power, along 
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with a psychological explanation for why humans have access to the sort of 
hypothetical thinking that allows them to think the past as change-able, along with 
the future. Beginning with the latter, there are a number of scholars who have offered 
reasonable explanations as to how Nietzsche understands temporality as experienced 
by humans. John Richardson, for example, describes the processes of ‗original time‘ 
and ‗human time‘. Original time is effectively a structural feature of an organism, 
more specifically the interplay of the drives composing it: ‗Life gets its original time 
from this logic of drives or wills. This basic time lies in the way the meaning or 
reason for what the drive does is dispersed into both the future and the past of the 
present doing. It is dispersed there partly within the drive‘s own perspective, but 
primarily as an external fact about that perspective‘ (Richardson 2007, p.  216).  
We should by no means equate original time here with the role of an 
objective temporality: original time for an organism may have ‗mistakes‘ in the 
sense that it sums over the complexity of a complete moment in favour of a 
particular highlight (as, for example, a primitive man might only be capable of 
recognizing a predator in a particular moment given its immediate danger). Human 
time, Richardson writes, is a distortion of original time in the sense that we introduce 
further errors into original time as byproducts of the evolution of features of 
consciousness such as memory, or promising (ibid. 220). Hence, the psychological 
explanation of our experience of time is in line with Nietzsche‘s genealogy of the 
human as a socialized animal: ‗our time-consciousness is originally an awareness of 
the past, used to stall and inhibit action by the drives. Secondarily it also extends 
forwards: we remember the rules in order to set our sights on new goals different 
from the objects of our drives‘ (ibid. 222). These latter features form part of what 
can be interpreted as a dual process theory in psychology, with the former being 
unconscious reasoning and the latter being conscious (part of which memory, 
awareness of time, conscience and other psychological features might belong).  
As is known, Nietzsche castigates the role of conscious reasoning as the 
primary motivators of human action and privileges the unconscious action of drives. 
I would like to suggest that the same might be said of hypothetical thinking, another 
feature of conscious reasoning. Hypothetical thinking is relevant here because 
among many things it concerns the consideration of possibilities for action in the 
past, present, and future. As we have seen, the spirit of revenge is fostered by the 
will‘s desire to ‗will backwards‘, to act differently to how it acted, or to desire 
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different results from a previous context. This is not to say that hypothetical thinking 
is not beneficial, of course, but the key point is that it is a function of conscious 
reasoning, and conscious reasoning is a product of the drives. Hypothetical thinking, 
the capacity to consider alternative outcomes is thus a perspectival feature rather 
than a feature of reality. We can see, however, that Nietzsche seems to provisionally 
privilege necessitarian thought, and necessitarianism can be seen to be compatible 
with will to power. This is because, according to the will to power doctrine, the 
world is composed of perspectives which themselves are expressions of force. As 
such, there are no hypothetical expressions of force: all force is by nature expressed. 
Hypothetical thinking (the perception of alternatives or possibilities), rather than 
reflecting some objectively true feature of reality, is instead a tool of reasoning used 
by the organism to extend its power (to debatable degrees when it comes to the 
argument over the role Nietzsche assigns to consciousness). 
Lastly, a core element that makes both elements (fatalism, necessitarianism) 
process philosophical is that of becoming, and the will‘s demand for ‗redemption 
from the flux of things and from the punishment called existence‘ (TSZ ‗On 
Redemption‘). One of the early developments in the human organism was its ability 
to sum over much of a particular experience or moment for the sake of necessity
102
. 
Likewise, the capacity to appreciate and understand things as remaining still rather 
than constantly changing induces a conception of temporality that also inspires the 
spirit of revenge. Both fatalistic and necessitarian features are means by which 
Nietzsche attempts to reconceive temporality as a process to be affirmed rather than 
resented. In summary, then, I have discussed the notion of socio-political efficacy in 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy through an immediate comparison with Machiavelli‘s 
understanding of virtu, and briefly examined some of the historical exemplars that 
Nietzsche cites as great men and efficacious agents. I then examined the way in 
which Nietzsche‘s understanding of efficacy differs from Machiavelli‘s, focusing on 
the idea that there is a necessitarian element to efficacy in Nietzsche‘s philosophy, 
supported by his fatalism. Nietzche‘s fatalism is non-deterministic, and lends itself to 
the construction of the narrative of one‘s self.  Nietzsche‘s necessitarian thinking, 
                                                          
102
 Nietzsche details this especially in OGM II, in which he writes that forgetfulness  ‗is not merely a 
vis interiae, as superficial people think. Is it much rather an active capability to repress, something 
positive in the strongest sense, to which we can ascribe the fact that while we are digesting what we 
alone live through and experience and absorb into ourselves (we could call the process mental 
ingestion, we are conscious of what is going on as little as we are with the entire thousandfold process 
which our bodily nourishment goes through (so-called physical ingestion‘. 
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however, emerges in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which the capacity to affirm that 
everything could not be otherwise is linked to an underlying view of the world as 
process, a continual flux. 
 
Fatalism and fate, underlined by process thinking, are thus seen to play a 
crucial role in socio-political efficacy in Nietzsche‘s thought. We may be able to find 
the clearest point of comparison in ancient Chinese philosophy in the Zhuangzi, 
where fate is understood as inevitable change. Lisa Raphals has previously explored 
this theme in the text, pointing out that ‗Zhuangzi […] describes the scope of free 
will not as happenstance (jie) but as the inevitability of change in the world (bian 
hua) and the ability of sagacious individuals to respond to it‘ (Raphals 2012, p. 214). 
Although it is not present without other passages that conflict with its outlook, the 
Zhuangzi specifies at length the manner in which exemplary characters achieve a 
modicum of understanding of this inevitable change. These are the ‗daimonic‘ 
characters (shen ren). The shen ren are examples in the Zhuangzi of individuals who 
have attained a consummate mastery of a particular skill, such as Cook Ding 
(Graham, 63) or the swimmer Lu-liang (Graham 1981, p. 136). We have already 
seen that for Nietzsche and Machiavelli, consummate socio-political action is 
understood through the conceptual framework behind virtu. For the ancient Daoists, 
the practical intuition behind efficacy is expressed through wu-wei, or efficacious 
non-action, ascribing strategies that advocate withdrawal from conscious political 
action and imposition. Wu-wei is a notion significantly developed in the Zhuangzi. 
Wu-wei shares the same fundamental ontological insight as shi in that it is a practice 
based on allowing a process within the underlying totality of processes (Dao) to 
unfold in its suchness (ziran). The major development of wu-wei in the Zhuangi, 
however, is the emphasis on necessary practices of conceptual negation as the 
ground of efficacious action, often ones that are somatic. Meditative practices such 
as 'fasting of the heart-mind' are employed, de-emphasizing social and conceptual 
consciousness and the ego self, thereby hoping to make the practitioner themselves 
as a socio-political agent more processual and adaptive by being more spontaneous. 
The practitioner transitions from a state of (overly) conscious, technical or 
instrumental language or activity (which itself requires a high degree of skill 
mastery) to a state where one acts in the form of undifferentiated process. Paired 
with the prerequisite high degree of skill mastery demonstrated in 'knack' examples 
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like Cook Ding we see a very specialised somatic practice that is grounded in a 
processual view of the world. To summarize, then, wu-wei offers, through 
comparison, an alternate account of how socio-political efficacy might be envisioned 
within a comparative process ontology: there is no idealized model set out in 
advance in ancient Chinese accounts of efficacy, what is instead emphasized is the 
continued adoption of a renewable and open-ended disposition, which is exemplified 
in a number of ways in thought: whether it be in the very direct sense of simply 
maintaining the high ground in warfare, or the more abstract sense of breaking down, 
through wu-wei, the imposed, conscious social distinctions which guide everyday 
thought. 
If the conception of efficacy discussed above escapes the problems apparent 
with a determinate/indeterminate model, then it may be subject to another problem. 
Although ancient Chinese philosophy is by no means metaphysical in the traditional 
European sense, it is faced with certain methodological concerns that some authors 
have nonetheless deemed metaphysical. In considering the transition in wu-wei from 
practiced, instrumentally-motivated action to self-so action more in line with the 
undifferentiated totality of processes (Dao), Eske Møllgaard notes that '[h]ow the 
real can become an object for practical manipulation and strategic action is, of 
course, very hard to explain, and in trying to do so the Chinese thinkers get 
entangled in a whole metaphysics of action' (Møllgaard 2007, p. 41). Along this line 
of thought, if my practice mimics the undifferentiated totality, then it must itself be 
undifferentiated: it should not have any conscious goals or estimations. Evidently, 
however, such actions do. If this is the case then the relationship between conscious, 
directed activity and efficacious, non-coercive action seems to be paradoxical. The 
efficacious agent synchronises his intentional action with the natural unfolding of 
things, his action then becomes itself a natural, undifferentiated spontaneous 
unfolding. In doing so, the noncoercively desired results of such efficacy will 
naturally unfold. Møllgaard argues that it is unclear 'how [...] a particular selfish 
wish (that of the sage, the ruler, or the general), as an injunction, [can] infiltrate the 
order of things to the extent that it becomes pervasive, undetectable, and inevitably 
fulfilled [...] Chinese thought has to posit an act before actuality – a truly 
metaphysical figure of thought.' (ibid. 41).  
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If intentional action is reformulated through wu-wei as non-coerced, 
efficacious action in undifferentiated process then 'how can action take place if 
nothing is yet actualized? [...] How can action, even if it is understood as response 
(ying) and transformation (hua ), take place at all if there is no thing to respond to 
and no thing to transform?' (ibid. 42). In submerging my intentional activity in the 
ceaseless flow of efficacy, I can no longer be said to have had an intentional activity 
in the first place, as the flow has neither beginning nor end. This also has the 
consequence of threatening to undermine the usefulness of wu-wei practice by 
undermining the distinction between conscious, instrumental activity versus 
spontaneous, wu-wei behaviour. Hence, from the perspective of undifferentiated 
totality, the process of (for example) climate change is ultimately as spontaneous as 
the state of an environment that hasn‘t been affected by humans, it‘s simply a 
different form of process. This is made possible, again, because what starts as a 
conscious, instrumental practice is transformed through wu-wei into a spontaneous, 
self-so process.  Møllgaard thinks that, because of the possibility for positing 
instrumental action at the very basis of process, and therefore legitimizing in 
practical terms the technical manipulation and perhaps abuse of the world, it is 
necessary for Zhuangzi to maintain 'a split in the process of the real and shows that 
spontaneous self-emerging life is not available for technopolitical manipulation' 
(ibid. 42). The problem that emerges is that either the transition from instrumentality 
to spontaneity is transcendental (it is not available to the understanding for 
instrumentalization), or we are forced to conflate the instrumental with the 
spontaneous, which results in the possibility for harmful manipulation through what 
many would term the 'un-natural' or 'techno-political'.  
As we have seen, this represents a general paradigmatic issue with theorizing 
process ontology in this way: we must formulate new responses to old dichotomies. 
The old dichotomy of appearance and reality, as discussed earlier, cannot be 
discussed in terms of a correspondence model of reality nor by appeal to any 
transcendental principle (such as the atomic self, as with the western misreading of 
the butterfly dream). The same problem appears to manifest itself here: we cannot 
draw on a transcendental principle to distinguish between a process mastered 
through wu-wei that is deemed harmful versus one deemed beneficial. As described, 
I have attempted to elucidate two responses to this issue: a ‗therapeutic‘ response, as 
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described by reference to commentaries on the butterfly dream, in which the problem 
is recognized as unintelligible. There is fundamentally no problem because from the 
perspective of the totality there is no real distinction between harmful and benevolent 
processes. There is also the ‗agonistic‘ response I have described from Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy, wherein differentiation is achieved by evaluating the degree of power 
involved. Regarding Møllgaard‘s posed problem, the same methodology may be 
posited to form a response. The ‗therapeutic‘ approach of the Zhuangzi would appear 
to lead us in the direction of claiming that ultimately, from the point of view of the 
sage, there is only efficacious activity. Nonetheless, we might still say that those 
who act consciously are still acting efficaciously to a certain extent (when viewed 
holistically, from the perspective of Dao), but perhaps not as much as those who do 
so having mastered the notion of efficacious non-action, wu-wei. Thus, the difference 
would then lie in the degree of mastery: it seems reasonable to suggest that mastery 
of wu-wei in some respect discourages practices that are artificial or highly 
conscious. To be a consummate telecommunications marketer drawing on wu-wei 
may be inherently more difficult given that the role encourages sedimented thinking, 
whereas the knack stories in the Zhuangzi describe butchers and swimmers where the 
focus is on a relatively simple activity. If we understand the ‗therapeutic‘ approach 
in this way it can be likened to the Nietzschean stance on differentiating processes 
described in the chapter on appearance and reality: we differentiate intentional 
activity from spontaneous non-action on the basis of the degree of power it entails. 
 
5.4 Socio-Political Praxis in Comparative Process Ontology – Emerging 
Problems: The Feminine as inadequacy in Comparative Process Ontology 
 
As philosophical worldviews concerning the nature of the world, both the 
Daodejing and Nietzsche's early dionysian philosophy, coupled with his later 
perspectival writings, present remarkably similar views in several key respects. 
Firstly, both take continuous change or dynamism as the basic condition of the 
world, and consequently consider the world not in terms of substances or things, but 
as forces or processes. Likewise, both stress the importance of an interdependence of 
contrasting perspectives in constituting the coherence of the world. In constructing a 
tenable philosophical worldview or ontology, a general ideal is that it should be able 
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to overcome (which does not mean simply to deny) one's particular anthropocentric 
viewpoint, and any views of the world narrowly constituted only by one's race, 
status, ideology or gender. Both the Daodejing and the Nietzsche's early Dionysian 
and later perspectival philosophy aim to uphold this ideal, and yet when drawn into 
into discussion involving the socio-political sphere, are lacking in some respects. 
This can clearly be seen in the treatment of the concept of the feminine. In this 
section, while I attempt to show that the primacy of change at the basis of either 
philosophies at least furnishes a ground on which both concepts of the feminine and 
masculine can be constructed on equitable terms, their actual treatments fall short by 
collapsing from a holistic view into a contextualized view. In Chinese philosophy 
this was the philosopher Dong Zhongshu‘s appropriation of the concept of the 
feminine for the process of state legitimization, while I focus on Nietzsche‘s pre-
occupation with the social progress of women in Beyond Good and Evil. There is, of 
course, a significant distinction in Nietzsche‘s philosophy between femininity and 
the social movement of feminism. My claim is that Nietzsche sometimes risks 
conflating the two, in EH for example (‗Why I Write Such Good Books‘ § 5), where 
Nietzsche develops his claim that he is the ‗foremost psychologist of the eternal 
feminine‘ by stating that ‗The emancipated [women] are basically the anarchists in 
the world of the ―eternal feminine‖, the ones who turned out badly, whose 
nethermost instinct is for revenge‘. We can see this also in BGE 238, where where 
Nietzsche writes about the fundamental antagonism between men and women, such 
that ‗must always think about woman as Orientals do: he must conceive of woman as 
a possession, as property that can be locked, as something predestined for service 
and achieving her perfection in that‘. What is particularly interesting in this instance 
is that in order to reinforce his point on this matter, Nietzsche cites ‗the tremendous 
reason of Asia‘ and the manner in which ‗as their culture increased along with the 
range of their powers, they also gradually became more severe‘. We will see that this 
occurs within the relevant period of Chinese philosophy due to an appropriation of 
underlying ontological principles, potentially undermining the flexibility of those 
principles. If so, this would make it difficult to untangle some of Nietzsche‘s holistic 
views on femininity generally from those views he has on feminism in modernity
103
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 To be clear, there are texts in which Nietzsche conveys a markedly different and clearer view of 
the division between the feminine and feminism, as in TSZ. The issue is not whether Nietzsche 
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which in turn may serve to undermine the holistic principles at work in the 
underlying process ontology. This, however, is one of the great advantages of a 
process ontology, it renders qualities like masculine and feminine in a fluid, dynamic 
and complementary manner, and so it may be important to evaluate the socio-
political uses of these terms to ascertain whether that dynamism is undermined.  
If it is true that both philosophies establish a holistic perspective of process 
from which to evaluate socio-political events, why was it that a problematic relation 
to the feminine nonetheless developed out of both philosophies? Answering this, I 
hope to show that the open ground in either philosophy is undermined through the 
privileging of one difference over another in the service of immediate socio-political 
ends: that of political unity in the Chinese empire, and that of the critique of 
modernity in Nietzsche's later critical philosophy. As previously discussed, Daoist 
philosophy of the Warring States period and the texts covered in this work draw on a 
general philosophical world-view of change. Change is here understood in terms of a 
totality of configurations of force. Force itself in Chinese philosophy can be 
understood as qi or vital energy. Chinese cosmology distinguishes between heaven-
and-earth (tiandi) on this basis: heaven, the sum total of processes of the world, is 
constituted by energy which is 'free-flowing' and dissipated (similar to the older 
notion of the great breath in Chinese cosmology). One means of concretely 
understanding this process is to consider Earth as the totality of qi energy in its 
condensed forms, what we immediately find presented to us as things and matter, 
conventionally speaking. In either case the nature of these processes is such that any 
given forms are only temporal, always changing, and only what they currently are by 
comparison to what has come before and what will come afterwards. As such, these 
continuously changing configurations of energy seamlessly shift into different forms, 
and can therefore be said, somewhat like Heraclitus's doctrine of co-present 
opposites, to be simultaneously both opposite and complementary. The perpetual 
functioning of these configurations is what ancient Chinese philosophy refers to as 
harmony (he), a timely complementarity between the polarities of qi.  
The two major practical distinctions made of these processes are known as 
yin and yang  in Chinese philosophy. Although they have a family resemblance of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
conflates feminism with feminity, it is whether his political writings about men and women in texts 
like BGE and EH threaten to undermine the distinction. 
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meanings throughout Chinese history, we can briefly summarise them as two 
polarities, instantiating various contrasts like hardness and softness, persistence and 
receptivity, and so forth. These polarities are fundamentally both cosmological and 
aesthetic, and come to be explicitly linked to the masculine and feminine. An 
important point is that these principles and their instantiations are not immutable: 
they imply each other through mutual dependence and give way to each other 
through mutual generation.  
Their instantiation in the Yijing，an early major Chinese cosmological text, 
provides an adequate elaboration of this point. The Yijing draws on the yin-yang 
principles in order to interpret phenomena and dictate efficacious action. Yin and 
yang are organized into thematic structured groups to be interpreted, and proper 
action is determined according to whether a principle is organized in a pattern of 
ascendancy or decline: one thus determines one's course of action according to 
whether a principle is arising or declining. The principles themselves, however, have 
no superiority or inferiority apart from their contingent place in the structure. 
Based on this underlying grasp of process, the later philosophical text of the 
Daodejing advocates an efficacy of political rulership based on feminine principles, 
mobilised against the tumultuous masculine obstinacy of rulers in the Warring States 
period. The Daodejing emphasizes a structural complementarity of both masculine 
and feminine, but accords primacy of action in the political sphere with the feminine. 
The ruler, for example, must draw on the feminine aspects, derived from the 
cosmological tradition, of a 'low' innocuous position and must privilege stillness over 
imposed action. As Katrin Froese writes, 'Rather than extolling the masculine virtues 
of aggression, assertiveness, and strength, the [Daodejing] venerates receptivity, 
openness, and weakness—which are commonly associated with women' (2006, p. 
207). It's not that a set of inherently superior principles are being advocated in the 
Daodejing over inferior ones, as should be clear from the preceding cosmology. If 
there are sentiments of superiority and inferiority in the Daodejing they most likely 
reside with the linking of the feminine to the totality of Dao in the Daodejing, an 
overarching principle above and beyond heaven-and-earth that has an inherent 
generative capacity. By itself, however, such a generative primacy is not taken as a 
dominant principle, only as one that guides efficacy. Furthermore, the Daoist 
understanding of a consummate individual or sage-king is ultimately one whose self-
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cultivation is such that they precede the masculine-feminine distinction altogether. In 
the Daodejing, such a disposition represents the maximum of qi energy
104
. 
Consummate efficacy in the sage-ruler therefore requires an open-ended state of both 
masculinity and femininity, where one can know or maintain either according to the 
circumstances. Most importantly, this is possible because both masculinity and 
femininity in ancient Chinese cosmology are themselves open-ended and reversible 
states: by adopting a disposition prior to either state the Daoist sage is in a position 
to flow effortlessly between either, according to the circumstances. 
If yin and yang portray such an open-ended ground, as I've tried to show, 
why is it that there was a historical favouring of the masculine and a denigration of 
the feminine throughout later Chinese philosophy? Robin Wang argues that the 
divergent notion that yin and yang are in opposition and in a relation of inferiority or 
superiority is a later development that emerges most pointedly in the work of Dong 
Zhongshu, an early scholar famous for his integration of Confucian philosophy (and 
yin-yang cosmology) with the Chinese state during the Han Dynasty (206BC – 
220AD). As Wang points out, Dong's aim of integrating these complementary 
aspects with the political system led to the problematic distinctions between yin and 
yang that are often wholesale misattributed to a general understanding of yin-yang. 
These were derived from 'a social need for a unity of ideology that would serve the 
authority of the emperor' (Wang 2005, p. 216). Dong imposed overtly artificial, 
political and contextually-motivated distinctions in order to achieve this end, with 
yang becoming an invariantly dominant principle. Following from this principle, the 
gender roles of emperor and father were then maintained as dominant over the 
feminine roles of mother and wife. The imposition of these rigid and stultifying 
distinctions suggests an ideological shortcoming on the part of the political system. 
Rather than a dynamic and adaptive system ordering itself through harmonious 
cultivation or efficacious non-action, as both earlier Confucianism and Daoism 
aimed for in different ways, unity and stability was achieved through the contrivance 
of an immediate, static framework. Such an approach resembles the authoritarian 
philosophical methodology of Legalism, with which the first Chinese empire was 
achieved under the Qin dynasty, a dynasty that was sustained for a mere 15 years. 
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Where Chinese cosmology conceives of the masculine and feminine as a 
harmonious complementarity, Nietzsche perpetually stresses the conflict and 
opposition of these forces in his writings. I will now briefly consider how the 
feminine figures into Nietzsche's earlier conception of a Dionysian world-will, 
contrasted with the later role the feminine plays in the critical, evaluational 
philosophy of will to power in Nietzsche's later work. There are aspects of 
Nietzsche's early understanding of a Dionysian world-will in The Birth of Tragedy 
that lend themselves toward a more open-ended treatment of the feminine, similar to 
what we have seen in Chinese cosmology and the Daodejing, emphasis on 
opposition aside. The constant struggle of feminine and masculine is especially 
reflected in Nietzsche's pairing of the Apollonian and Dionysian aesthetic drives. 
This pairing has often been taken to be an opposed duality, with Apollo constituting 
the formal, masculine portion, while Dionysian sensuality and intoxication bearing 
resemblance to the feminine. In fact, it may be more incisive to consider this 
distinction as a polarity rather than a strict duality. Other mythological 
interpretations that skew a dualistic relation are possible. For example, the phallic is 
implicated in the nature of Dionysus, on the one hand, while the Dionysian cult was 
claimed to be female, on the other. This suggests an ambiguous relation between 
both masculine and feminine. More directly, one can also argue that no strictly 
atomic masculine or feminine aspect in this so-called duality can be reached. Picart 
writes that 'both entities appear to possess a reproductive duality- possessing both 
"masculine" (excitatory) and "feminine" (birthing) capacities within themselves, and 
yet require each other in order to effect birthing' (1999, p. 43). The interpenetration 
between both aspects here is remarkably consonant with the yin-yang relation in 
Chinese cosmology. Such an understanding of the Apollonian/Dionysian divide 
stands closer to the Chinese early cosmological understanding of yin-yang. Again, as 
with the Daodejing, if there is any resemblance of primacy it stands with the 
feminine, generative capacity of the Dionysian, out of which the individual is 
derived. Of course, this relation is more-so problematised in Nietzsche's case than in 
the Daodejing, due to the terror of existence that Nietzsche initially associates with 
the Dionysian will, following in Schopenhauer's footsteps. Aside from these 
problematic points, the upshot in Nietzsche's early Dionysian philosophy is that it is 
crucial that a dynamic, balanced proportion between these two productive forces is 
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present in the individual, that the individual be able to draw on both polarities in 
order to effect a healthy psyche. 
The relational, polarising aspects of this understanding are well preserved in 
Nietzsche's later perspectival observations. Once Nietzsche has overcome his early 
Schopenhaurian and Kantian metaphysical difficulties concerning a thing-in-itself 
and the real/apparent distinction, he eventually develops the insight of the world as a 
web of interrelated perspectives behind which no noumenon or thing-in-itself 
resides. Such a view, coupled with Nietzsche's emphasis on values as polarities 
rather than absolutes, establishes an open-ended ground for the changeability and 
reversibility of masculine and feminine aspects that emerge from undifferentiated 
flux.  The yin-yang evaluations in Daoism and Chinese cosmology are, to debatable 
degrees, reconcilable with this basic understanding of flux because of the high 
degree of 'open-endedness' and reversibility posited of those aspects: the aspects 
themselves border on the undifferentiated.  
However, the holism of power-perspectivism in Nietzsche's philosophy, 
described in previous chapters, can be seen to be at odds with particular evaluative 
aspects of his own to will to power perspective because they strongly differentiate. 
Nietzsche‘s will to power perspective is taken as the grandest philosophical and 
explanatory perspective yet, given its basis in perspectivism, and yet the evaluations 
Nietzsche makes within that perspective threaten to undermine that basis. We can 
directly see this conflict between his perspectival and evaluative philosophy 
crystallised like nowhere else in the 'the most abysmal antagonism and the necessity 
of an eternally hostile tension' (BGE 238) between the feminine and masculine. 
Having examined the structural workings of process philosophy throughout the 
present work, it would appear that such a remark turns against the idea that qualities 
like feminine and masculine in a process-based ontology are complementary rather 
antagonistic. Nietzsche's critical use of both masculine and feminine in his later 
works (especially BGE) to denounce what he sees as the negative social 
developments of modernity is linked to a philosophical project of the future that has 
no analogue in Daoism. For example, he draws on a negative instantiation of the 
feminine in his condemnation of the 'effeminate taste of a democratic century' (BGE 
134), and he criticises the movement towards the emancipation of women in equally 
negative terms as an 'almost masculine stupidity' (BGE 239), while the move away 
 217 
 
from traditional gender roles is criticised as a 'defeminization' (ibid.). In another 
aphorism, he posits scholarly inclination in women as an indication of something 
wrong with their sexuality (BGE 144). Using the feminine and masculine in this way 
to critique modernity, Nietzsche undermines the 'open-endedness' and 
transformability of either aspect by binding them within established stereotypes of 
the masculine and feminine, and by using traditional gender roles in his criticism of 
the feminist movement. Quite apart from the debate about Nietzsche's misogyny and 
his criticism of the feminist movement, it seems to me that a more basic complaint 
that can be levelled here is the unsustainability of such a strategy. The features of 
masculinity and femininity that Nietzsche posits in these criticisms are too 
ideologically contingent and artificial to be considered inherent to the earlier 
masculine/feminine polarity his work indicates. Drawing on the masculine and 
feminine as socio-political tools with which to critique the decadence of modernity, 
Nietzsche effaces the open ground of his earlier Dionysian philosophy and the 
holism of his perspectivism. The earlier oppositional interdependence and 
interpenetration of masculine and feminine facilitated the equitable possibility, for 
example, of there being women who are more active and life-affirming in their 
disposition than men. Nietzsche's later socio-political philosophy, however, was 
increasingly aware of its own contingency, given the unpopularity of Nietzsche‘s 
books. Particularly in BGE, we can see that Nietzsche desires on the one hand to 
engage with his current age, yet also to gesture towards a future philosophical age he 
hopes will come about. His critical pre-occupation with the present may have 
prompted Nietzsche to rely more and more on socio-politically contingent features of 
the times as means of critiquing modernity (with the political movements of the 
times, for example), thereby losing sight of the original ontological fluidity of the 
concepts of masculine and feminine being used. 
 
This points to a broad methodological concern with comparative process 
ontology as I have outlined it. In their criticism of the departure of Confucianism 
from a gender equity inherent in both yin and yang, Wang and Kelly claim that 'a 
system that countenances difference is liable to come to value one of the differences 
above the others' (2004, p. 416). It is unavoidable that the systems of human life 
must countenance difference in order for human life to function and flourish. That is 
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to say, we must depart at some point from the holism of perspectivism or cosmology 
and differentiate in order to be efficacious. In this respect neither Nietzsche nor 
Daoism, nor Chinese cosmology in general, does away with the masculine-feminine 
distinction altogether (which would be purely undifferentiated), nor however do they 
hesitate to attribute concrete, problematic features to that distinction, however all-too 
timely those features may be. Given this fundamental point, it is pivotal that the 
maintenance and development of difference in human life within socio-political 
thinking does not degenerate in two important respects that Kelly and Wang 
highlight: 'the arbitrary elevation of differences, and unrestrained power' (ibid.). 
From the socio-political perspective of comparative process ontology, these two 
elements should guide the manner in which one necessarily discriminates a process. 
In both Nietzsche's later critical philosophy and Dong Zhongshu's yin-yang 
systemisation, an equitable ground for the feminine is effaced due to the elevation of 
one difference over the other and the subsequent imposition of artificial, contingent 
and unadaptive differentiations. This elevation in either case occurred due to an 
ideological motivation of the immediate time. In an unpublished note, Nietzsche 
surmises that '[t]he greater the impulse toward unity, the more firmly one may 
conclude that weakness is present' (WTP 655). We might therefore conclude that 
Chinese philosophy's misappropriation of the feminine with Dong Zhongshu's yin-
yang systemisation was due to a contingent need for unity in the state. In Nietzsche's 
case, we might surmise that his break with a more holistic conception of the 
feminine was due to his increasing concern with the contingent political situation of 
modernity as an obstacle for his future philosophy. If we return to the earlier holistic 
philosophy, the grander interpretations in either case, however, I think we are 
presented with a philosophical ground for both masculine and feminine that is 
exceptionally dynamic and adaptable, balanced and accommodating. 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to lay the ground for the development of 
comparative process thought, more specifically understood as comparative process 
ontology. I began this project by speculating some foundational points for 
elaborating a process world-view in Nietzsche and ancient Chinese philosophy. The 
central difficulty in enunciating a conception of process or becoming from a Western 
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perspective such as Nietzsche‘s is the struggle to achieve distance from the 
substance-metaphysical tradition. We have had to contend with the 
noumenal/phenomenal distinction as a barrier to discussing process (the question of 
whether we can conceive of a becoming-in-itself, or whether becoming is 
immanent), and with a language and vocabulary that is couched in substance 
terminology. Commentators such as Cox and Richardson provide an important 
response to these issues but they are likewise hindered by the above issues. In the 
hopes of developing a further solution I have drawn on the resources of process 
philosophy (in terms of an events-based vocabulary) along with those of Chinese 
philosophy. Ancient Chinese philosophy, particularly the correlative cosmology of 
the Yijing gives us an alternative vocabulary based on a view of the world as a 
totality of cyclical processes, thus presenting the possibility of considering becoming 
without the same metaphysical and linguistic issues we find in the Western tradition.  
Having established some fundamental features of a comparative ontology or 
cosmology of change, I elaborated the ways in which epistemology and evaluation 
are reconsidered in their continuity with this ontology. This required significant 
interpretation on the part of Nietzsche‘s philosophy, and I advanced arguments for 
considering his perspectivism as ontological and equivalent with becoming or 
process, while his will to power doctrine is an evaluative perspective among other 
perspectives. I attempted to address the problem of how Nietzsche can claim that 
there is a hierarchy of perspectives (in which he favours his type of perspective) by 
discussing the pervasiveness of different perspectives. That is to say, the more 
pervasive a perspective is, the further up the order of rank of perspectives it lies. 
Hierarchy is not simply dependent on any particular perspective, it is a feature that 
emerges from the interplay of different perspectives. This establishes the manner in 
which epistemology and evaluation is continuous with an underlying process 
ontology in Nietzsche‘s philosophy. In order to further elaborate how we might 
differently conceive of this relation between ontology and evaluation, I considered 
the manner in which Chinese cosmology directly influences political thought, 
specifically the Chinese political ideal of All-Under-Heaven. I likewise considered a 
comparative account of how significant social and geographical differences 
influence the ways in which Greek and Chinese fundamental world-views 
developed.  
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Having sufficiently established an ontological or cosmological framework for 
how to proceed, I began to examine core issues for comparative process thought and 
ontology. The first necessary step in expanding upon how the insights of such a 
framework can be applied was to examine the issue of language. Language poses an 
essential element in any similar account of a comparative process ontology because 
it is the means by which such an ontology is elaborated, and poses a number of 
metaphysical questions concerning humans and their relation to the world. I argued 
that we can find the resources within Nietzsche‘s later philosophy (specifically the 
implications of his will to power doctrine), for a renewed conception of language as 
expression of force. Such an approach diminishes the importance of traditional 
dichotomies between language and world that have shaped our present conception of 
language. The different pre-occupations of ancient Chinese philosophy, as discussed 
in my treatment of the School of Names and the notion of disputation (and the 
mereology influencing Chinese philosophical accounts of language in turn) reflects a 
similar opportunity to consider language outside the frame of traditional 
metaphysical questions. 
The last two chapters focused on applying and developing comparative 
process ontology in case studies. In the first case study I considered a classical 
philosophical problem in the West: appearance and reality, elaborated through 
Robert Nozick‘s ‗experience machine‘ experiment. This presented an important issue 
for comparative process thought because the ontology described in previous chapters 
undermines the prospect of a hard distinction between appearance and reality, and so 
the question was raised as to how one can legitimately distinguish between relevant 
processes in such cases. I delineated a hypothetical response in Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy, considering how the will to power doctrine and power-perspectivism 
furnishes the capacity to distinguish between appearance and reality on the basis of 
degrees of power. This was contrasted with the ‗butterfly dream‘ passage in the 
Zhuangzi, which appears to offer the resources for a ‗therapeutic‘ response to the 
issue. Instead of attempting to elaborate a distinction, the Zhuangzi emphasises a 
practical, situational efficacy that does not distinguish in such a way. I then explored 
the second case study, which is a broad survey of technological, political and 
economic issues understood through comparative process thinking. There I 
suggested a potential response drawn from Nietzsche‘s philosophy on the issue of 
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technology and the debate of its future use. I suggested that Nietzsche‘s philosophy 
leads us towards a power-pragmatic understanding of the benefits and detriments of 
technology such as genetic engineering, where the will behind the technology must 
be evaluated. This pragmatism is also reflected in the sort of political institutions 
Nietzsche frames for the state: he favours dynamic, open-ended institutions as a 
means of resisting society‘s tendency towards herd stagnation, which is based on his 
dynamic view of the world. He also suggests reducing the influence of the state in 
favour of private institutions for this reason. Compared to such an account, I 
examined the social and political aims of the Chinese Legalists. The legalists, based 
on a view of the world as cyclical processes, likewise envision adaptive and 
responsive reforms for changing political climates, and like Daoists promote 
minimal interference of the governing ruler. I argued that the comparison reveals 
striking similarities and contrasts for comparative process thought.  
The final chapter delved further into socio-political issues by attempting to 
isolate a comparative conception of socio-political efficacy: what is it that makes for 
an effective social and political agent? I began by considering a traditional 
dichotomy of practice and ideal model, as described by François Jullien, in relation 
to Carl Von Clausewitz‘s strategy. This dichotomy, as was argued, emphasizes 
another dichotomy of determinism/indeterminism with regard to efficacious action. 
This was seen in the analysis of Machiavelli‘s virtu¸ in which the upshot of effective 
political action, because it falls short of an ideal model, must involve some degree of 
luck or unaccountability. This was developed in terms of Nietzsche‘s philosophy, 
where I distinguished between his fatalism and his necessitarianism in order to draw 
out significant differences with Machiavelli‘s virtu. These differences are important 
because they share a similar process-based standpoint seen in ancient Chinese 
writing on efficacy. I pointed out that the Chinese notion of efficacy (shi) does not 
set out a model in advance, and concerns itself with situational disposition. This 
feeds into an understanding of fate, as seen in the Zhuangzi and its ‗knack stories‘. 
As part of this analysis, I also raised some potential issues with conceiving effective 
socio-political action. These are again related to the problem comparative process 
ontology faces in requiring a new framework through which to understand 
conventional distinctions. I pursued these problems further in the last section, where 
I took as my focus the issue of the feminine as conceived in Nietzsche‘s philosophy 
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and the Han philosopher Dong Zhongshu‘s state philosophy. I pointed out the 
failings in conception of the feminine with both philosophies, particularly in relation 
to the process thought underlying their positions. I speculated on the reasons for 
these failings and how they might be addressed, by maintaining a greater holism that 
process ontology provides instead of producing overly-artificial distinctions through 
which to pursue socio-political ends. This raised a question for further consideration: 
how and to what extent should differentiations be introduced from a comparative 
process ontology into a socio-political praxis? This is an important question, because 
such differentiations are necessary for socio-political functioning. To finally 
conclude, I hope to have established a ground on which to further pursue the 
prospect of a comparative process framework of thought, from the basic level of 
ontology continuously to the level of practice and implementation. As established in 
the introduction, such an account is by no means comprehensive: further contrasts 
and comparisons with other process thinkers are required, a further development of 
these themes are required on the Chinese side of comparison, and further responses 
are required for the socio-political questions so far raised. In addition, I hope to have 
provided an account which prospectively establishes Nietzsche as a philosopher who 
deserves to be considered a significant thinker of process philosophy. Although his 
published writings do not extensively deal with the issue of change, I hope to have 
shown that a world-view of change and dynamism significantly influence the 
direction of some of his most crucial philosophical ideas, those of perspectivism and 
will to power. 
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